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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should the Utah Supreme Court deny appellant's petition

for writ of certiorari where appellant has failed to establish a
special or important

reason or consideration

justifying this

Court's review?
2.

Should the Utah Supreme Court deny appellant's petition

for writ of certiorari where appellant failed to raise to the Court
of Appeals the argument she now asserts for the first time in her
petition?
3.

Even if this Court decides to review appellant's petition

for writ of certiorari setting forth arguments not raised to the
Court of Appeals belowf has not the Court of Appeals applied the
well-recognized and controlling abuse of discretion and harmless
error standards of review involving jury voir dire issues?
COURT OF APPEALS' OPINIONS
The Court of Appeals' initial opinion is reported at Evans v.
Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991), attached
hereto as Appendix A.

And the Court of Appeals' modified opinion

is attached hereto as Appendix B and is cited as Evans v. Doty, 175
Utah Adv. Rep. 80 (Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1991).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals decision filed
December 12, 1991, is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1991).

NO PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS CONTROL THIS MATTER
Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the Case. This is a medical malpractice action

relating

to

the

surgical

repair

by

cardio-thoracic

surgeon

Dr. Donald B. Doty of Salt Lake City of a patent ductus defect in
the heart of a two-year-old infant with downs syndrome.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. A complaint

in this action was filed on November 4, 1986.

Appellee timely

filed an answer, and the case was set for jury trial on May 9,
1989, with the Honorable John Rokich presiding.
On May 9, 1989, the potential jurors were subjected to an
extensive voir dire examination by Judge Rokich and the jury was
selected

after

two

hours

of

questioning.

After

a

total

deliberation time of 33 minutes, the jury returned a unanimous
verdict in favor of appellee, Dr. Donald Doty.

The jury was then

polled, and each juror confirmed this independent and unanimous
decision.

(Tr. Vol. 8, p. 858; R. p. 262-63.)

on the verdict was entered on May 25, 1989.

A formal judgment
Appellant filed a

motion for new trial or J.N.O.V., which, after full briefing and
oral argument, was denied by the court by minute entry dated
August 17, 1989.

In denying this motion the court found that

"there was substantial evidence to support their verdict."
p. 326, see Add. A.)
1989.

A formal order was entered on September 12,

(R. p. 327-30.)

October 12, 1989.

(R.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on

(R. p. 331-32.)
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The Court of Appeals filed its opinion on October 16, 1991.
See Evans v. Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991).
On or about November 6, 1991, plaintiff filed her petition for
rehearing in the Utah Court of Appeals.

(See Appendix C.)

On or

about November 27, 1991, appellee filed his court-ordered response
to appellant's petition for rehearing.
C. Statement of Facts.

(See Appendix D.)

Appellant Corinne Evans was born

January 6, 1982, six weeks premature and suffering from downs
syndrome and a yet to be diagnosed heart defect known as patent
ductus arteriosus.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5.)

Without surgical closure

of the patent ductus, appellant would have eventually died from
pulmonary hypertension.
Respondent

(Tr. Vol. 4, p. 23, Vol. 6, p. 59.)

Dr. Donald

Doty,

a pediatric

cardio-thoracic

surgeon, was selected to operate on the appellant to correct the
patent ductus arteriosus, and the surgery was timely performed on
March 30, 1984, when appellant was two years, two months old. (Tr.
Vol. 21, p. 22, Vol. 3, p. 23.)
All experts, including Dr. Achtel for appellant, agreed that
the patent ductus repair itself was successful, despite a nerve
injury to one vocal cord.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 651, Vol. e, p. 71, 126,

Vol. 6, p. 59, 60, Vol. 4, p. 70.)
At trial each expert said it was a known complication of a
patent ductus arteriosus surgery that damage or injury to the
recurrent laryngeal nerve could occur.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol. 5,

p. 22, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 6, p. 46.) The experts said that a bad
result or injury to the nerve does not mean there was negligence
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involved with the surgery.

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 55, Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol.

4, p. 20, Vol. 5, p. 23.)
Prior to trial, plaintiff submitted the following proposed
list of voir dire questions which she alleges that the trial court
erred in not using:
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Have you read magazine or newspaper
articles or other literature about
medical negligence?
Did any of you read Time magazine in
March 1986?
Have you ever signed any petition on the
issue of negligence?
Have you seen anything in your doctor's
office about negligence?
Have you discussed this subject with
family, doctor or friends?

(R. 137-44.)
In lieu of appellant's proposed questions, Judge John A.
Rokich asked the panel:
Now, of utmost importance to me in this
trial is that we get eight fair - and impartial jurors. This may be the only time
these litigants get to have their day in
court, and I'm a firm believer that those who
want to be in court have their day in court
and they are tried by eight fair - and impartial people. And so, keep that in mind.
Also, as you answer these questions, keep
in mind the only basis for your decision in
this case, the eight of you who are selected,
is from the testimony elicited from the mouths
of people, witnesses, under oath, and only
those documents that I admit into evidence.
You are not to take into consideration any
other extraneous matters to make your
decision.
So, with that in mind, your test for
being fair and impartial is whether you can
sit here and listen to the evidence and make
your decision and afford these individuals
here today as litigants a fair - and impartial trial. So, that's our system and I
4

trust that you will keep that in mind so when
these people leave this courtroom, regardless
of how the outcome of the verdict is, at least
they know they were treated fairly and
impartially by this court and by the jurors.
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 7.)

Sometime later the judge asked the venire:

Now, many of you have heard and read
articles, and there have been television
programs, with regard to negligence on the
part of doctors.
Do any of you have any
strong feelings as a result of seeing or
reading anything about medical negligence that
would make it so that you couldn't be fair and
impartial here today?
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 31.)

Two jurors indicated that they were biased,

and those jurors were immediately removed for cause by the court.
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 31.)

The judge also asked:

"Now, do any of you

have any strange feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against
a doctor?"

(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 36.) None did. The judge also stated:

So, my role is to instruct you on the
law. Since I have to instruct you on the law,
I have to ask you, despite the fact that you
may not agree with the law, are you willing to
follow the law as instructed by this court?
If not, please raise your hand.
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 26.)

None did.

After the above (and other)

questions were asked, the judge stated:
Now, I have one or two more questions and
that is, and I mentioned this before, but will
you be willing to try this case fairly and
impartially based upon the evidence presented
in this case without bias or prejudice for or
against any party?
If you can't do that,
please raise your hand.
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 37.) One juror indicated that she could be biased,
and the court removed her for cause.
In her docketing statement on appeal, plaintiff expressly
accepted and urged the court to apply the "abuse of discretion"
5

standard of review in considering whether the trial court erred in
refusing to allow plaintiff's counsel to question prospective
jurors during voir dire examination. Plaintiff did not explicitly
raise as an issue in her docketing statement the appropriateness of
the voir dire given.

(See Docketing Statement dated October 26,

1989, attached as Appendix E.)
In her initial brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, appellant
expressly urged the Court of Appeals to apply the "abuse of
discretion" standard of review in considering whether the trial
court failed to "allow the plaintiff to voir dire the jurors
concerning their exposure to information relating to a claimed
insurance crisis and to tort reform arguments."

(See Plaintiff's

Appellate Brief dated June 29, 1990, attached as Appendix F.)

The

only other issues plaintiff raised in that brief dealt with whether
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow plaintiff
to voir dire a jury concerning his wife's employment and whether
the court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for
a new trial where plaintiff claimed the jury verdict was contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

(See Appendix F.)

In its response brief, defendant/appellee argued that the
trial court had not abused its discretion during voir dire and that
if it did, such error was harmless.
Appendix G.)

(See Appellee's Brief at

After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion

plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing, raising as the only two
issues that (1) "a defect in the jury selection process is per se
reversible error"; and (2) "plaintiff presented a prima facie case
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and is entitled to a trial before an unbiased

jury."

(See

Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at Appendix C.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since plaintiff has failed to set forth special and important
reasons meriting this Court's granting plaintiff's petition for
writ of certiorari, said petition should be denied.

In the

alternative, since plaintiff failed to raise to the Court of
Appeals

the argument

she now urges on petition

for writ of

certiorari, said petition should be denied. Also, inasmuch as the
Court of Appeals appropriately applied the well-recognized and
controlling abuse of discretion and harmless error standards of
review involving jury voir dire issues, there is no reason for this
Court's granting plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari and
reviewing this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
This Court Should Not Grant Plaintiff's
Petition for Certiorari Since Plaintiff Has Not
Established Any Special or Important Reason
Justifying this Court's Review
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth
some of the considerations governing this Court's review of writs
of certiorari. Although, as expressly stated in the Court's rules,
the listed considerations are "neither controlling nor wholly
[measure] the Supreme Court's discretion," they are indicative of
the character of reasons that this Court considers in determining
whether

a writ

of certiorari will be reviewed.

Given such

"character of reasons," it is clear that plaintiff has failed to
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set forth any
Court's review.

"special and important

reason" justifying this

Indeed, plaintiff has not established in her

petition for writ of certiorari that the Court of Appeals' decision
is somehow in conflict with the decision of another panel from that
court.

Also, plaintiff has not established that the Court of

Appeals' decision is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court on the same issue.

Rather, plaintiff has argued that the

mere existence of unrelated and clearly distinguishable cases from
the Supreme Court merit review of the Court of Appeals' underlying
decision in this case. Unfortunately for plaintiff, however, this
Court's

own

decisions

on

jury

voir

dire

issues

are

wholly

supportive and in harmony with the Court of Appeals' decision
below.

See, e.g. , State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448-49 (Utah

1988); and cases cited in Appellee's Response to Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing at Appendix D pp. 5-13. Certainly plaintiff
cannot argue that the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
so far departs "from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision" (see Utah R. App. P. 46(c)); and since the issue of
jury voir dire has previously been settled by the Supreme Court,
there is no reason to consider this petition for writ of certiorari
under Rule 46(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or
similar conditions not expressly listed in that rule.
In short, since plaintiff has offered no special or important
reason justifying this Court's issuance of a writ of certiorari in
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this case, this Court should deny plaintiff's petition for such
writ.
POINT II
Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Should be Denied Since She Failed to Raise
to the Court of Appeals the Argument
She Now Asserts for the First Time in Her Petition
This Court has long upheld the rule that it will generally
refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial court below.
See Zions First National Bank v. National American Title Insurance,
749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited therein).

In that

case, the appellant had argued that there was no "sound policy
reason" for this Court not considering the issue first raised on
appeal since the issue was arguably a legal question.

However,

this Court ruled:
[Appellant's] position ignores one of the
reasons for refusing to consider any matter
for the first time on appeal, even a matter of
law. Although we may not defer to a trial
court's conclusions on a legal question, we
certainly may derive great benefit from the
trial judge's views on the issue and may be
persuaded by those views. This provides ample
justification
for refusing
to consider
[appellant's] claims.
Id. at 654.
Further, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d 806
(Utah 1988), this Court likewise concluded that it would not
consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had
limited

its ruling

complaint.

to the theory

See id. at 807-809.

raised

in the

plaintiff's

Similarly, the Court of Appeals

has heretofore considered the inefficacy and inappropriateness of

a petitioner raising issues for the first time in a petition for
rehearing. In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) , that Court ruled that it will "ordinarily . . . not consider
arguments presented for the first time on petition for rehearing,
and [it is] especially loathe to revisit a decision once rendered
when the party

seeking reconsideration

intentionally

did not

present [the Court] with particular arguments in a more timely
fashion."

(Citation omitted.) This rationale fully comports with

the Court's "standing aversion to considering for the first time at
some later stage issues that could have been raised at an earlier
stage."

Jd.

claims posed
tangentially

And this rule applies to theories, arguments and
in a petition
connected

for rehearing that are at least

to but were

not

raised

in regard

arguments or theories considered previously on appeal.

to

See id.

Importantly, although the Court of Appeals in Sampson granted
the

petition

for

rehearing

therein,

it

did

so

only

after

considering (1) the burden the petitioner held when confronted with
"multiple issues of . . . magnitude" in what was a criminal case;
(2) the significance of the issue presented; (3) and the fact that
the United States Supreme Court in the interim had evidently issued
an opinion with "helpful authority" "not available at the time of
initial argument."

See id. at 1113.

Nevertheless, that Court

stressed that the circumstances of granting that petition for
rehearing

were

"unique"

and

future

parties

were

explicitly

cautioned "that the complexity of issues, the length of briefs, or
tactical choice to initially avoid issues on appeal will normally
not suffice to induce [the court] to consider issues raised for the
10

first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made."
Id. at 1113 n.21.
Certainly, this correct principle of law likewise applies in
cases where a petitioner seeks to raise for the first time in her
petition for writ of certiorari arguments not raised before to the
Court of Appeals. The rationale for application of such a rule in
this

instance

compares

with

that

this

Court

has

previously

articulated involving issues not raised at trial below, namely,
that although this Court might not defer to the Court of Appeals,
conclusion on a legal question, it certainly might have derived
great benefit from the Court of Appeals' views on the issue and may
have been persuaded by the views.

Compare Zions First National

Bank, 749 P.2d at 654 (possible benefit derived from trial court's
views).

Certainly, plaintiff should not be benefitted by her

decision to not raise arguments to the Court of Appeals which she
now wishes to address in the petition for writ of certiorari.
Applying this correct principle of appellate review to this
case compels the denial of plaintiff's petition
certiorari.

for writ of

Indeed, nowhere in plaintiff's presentation to the

Court of Appeals did she argue that the abuse of discretion
standard of review cannot be applied when considering voir dire
issues.

Instead, plaintiff herself expressly urged the Court of

Appeals to apply the very abuse of discretion standard she now
fortuitously criticizes and conclude that the trial court erred in
connection with jury voir dire.
6-9, attached as Appendix F.)

(See Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 2,
Plaintiff herself also implicitly

urged the Court of Appeals to apply the harmless error analysis and
11

conclude that notwithstanding this correct standard of review the
error in limiting the jury voir dire was not harmless under these
specific facts.

See Plaintiff's Brief at page 12, attached as

Appendix F. And plaintiff even urged the Court of Appeals to apply
on appeal its opinion in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App.
1959), which cites with approval and adopts a decision by the
Montana Supreme Court applying the harmless error analysis to the
very claims of improper jury voir dire plaintiff raises here. (See
Appendix F at pages 10-11 arguing application of Doe v. Haven, 772
P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adopting the Montana Supreme Court's
decision in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979),
which applies the harmless error analysis to jury voir dire issues
directly relevant to this case.)
Further, although in his response brief to the Court of
Appeals appellee Dr. Doty explicitly stressed in a separately
identified argument that the abuse of discretion standard should
apply and that any error in the trial court's exercise of its
discretion

concerning voir dire was harmless, see Appellee's

Response Brief at pages 17-18, attached as Appendix G, plaintiff
utterly ignored this argument on appeal to the Court of Appeals and
failed to respond or challenge the same in her reply brief.
Notwithstanding the above, however, plaintiff now argues for
the first time that (1) the Court of Appeals improperly used the
abuse of discretion standard (see Appellee's Petition for Writ at
6);

(2) "using a harmless error or abuse of discretion test as

applied by the Court of Appeals in this case is inadequate and
improper"

(see Petition at 9); and
12

(3) "the Court of Appeals

applied a standard of review which is contrary to reason and
violates prior decisions of this court."

(See Plaintiff's Petition

for Writ at 12.) Clearly these arguments are either raised for the
first time in plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari and
should not be considered by this Court or are expressly at odds
with the very standards of review and arguments plaintiff urged
upon the Court of Appeals in her initial brief below.
Similarly, although in its initial published opinion the Court
of Appeals articulated the correct application of the harmless
error analysis that "given the totality of the circumstances" it
was not convinced the jury verdict would have been different "if
the trial judge inquired as to the panel's exposure to tort reform
propaganda" (see Appendix A at 15), and although it stressed that
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" was key in the
harmless error analysis, plaintiff did not raise in her petition
for rehearing that the "totality of the circumstances" standard
should not be applied. Nevertheless, now for the first time in her
petition for writ of certiorari plaintiff claims that this standard
is incorrect.

(See Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at

pages 9-12.)
Clearly, in her petition for writ of certiorari plaintiff is
doing exactly what she did in her petition for rehearing below,
namely, to grasp at any new argument, even those ignored before or
urged by plaintiff herself previously, to obtain a reversal of the
jury's verdict.
should

This Court should not sanction this tactic and

accordingly

deny

plaintiff's

certiorari.
13

petition

for

writ

of

POINT III
Even if this Court Chooses to Analyze Issues Raised
by Plaintiff for the First Time in Her Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, the Court of Appeals Applied
the Well-Recognized and Controlling Abuse of Discretion
and Harmless Error Standards of Review Involving
Jury Voir Dire Issues
Even

if this Court chooses to consider

plaintiff's new

arguments (1) raised for the first time in her petition for writ of
certiorari; and (2) at odds with the very arguments plaintiff urged
upon the Court of Appeals, plaintiff's petition

for writ of

certiorari should not be granted since the arguments underlying the
same are not well grounded in law.

It is a well-recognized

appellate review principle that the abuse of discretion standard
applies together with the harmless error analysis in considering
whether a trial judge's failure to pose questions on voir dire to
the jury necessitates a retrial. Indeed, as concisely set forth by
the Court of Appeals below, "A trial court abuses its discretion
when 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not]
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary
to evaluate jurors.'"

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah

1988) , cited by Evans v. Doty at 3 (see Appendix A) . Clearly, this
Court

has

previously

adopted

this

plaintiff's claims to the contrary.
753 P.2d at 448.

standard

notwithstanding

See, e.g., State v. Bishop.

Although plaintiff claims in her petition for

writ of certiorari that this rule is distinguishable, plaintiff is
incorrect.

The rule was concisely stated, and although the jury

voir dire in Bishop did not deal with insurance issues, the case
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itself dealt with a much more serious subject, the capital homicide
verdict involving the defendant.
Similarly, as the Court of Appeals noted in this action below:
A new trial is not always necessary simply
because the trial court refuses to ask jurors
an appropriate question submitted by one of
the parties to the litigation. See McDonouqh
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,
553 (1984) ("[I]t ill serves the important end
of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to
recreate the peremptory challenge process
because counsel lacked an item of information
. . . ."; United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d
1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (All circuits agree
that whether refusal to ask potential jurors
questions
"does
not
always
constitute
reversible error; that question hinges upon" a
number of factors including "the extent to
which the [topic] is covered in other
questions on voir dire and on the charge to
the jury . . . . " ) ; State v. Malmrose, 649
P.2d 56, 60 (Utah 1982) ("Traditionally, the
trial court is given considerable latitude as
to the manner and form of conducting the voir
dire examination and is only restricted in
that discretion from committing prejudicial
error."); State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470 (Utah
App. 1990) ("For a court's exercise of
discretion in disallowing voir dire questions
to be overturned, appellant must show that the
abuse of discretion rose to a level of
reversible error."); Hornsby v. Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah
App. 1988) ("Only " [substantial impairment of
the right to informed exercise of peremptory
challenges" constitutes an abuse of discretion
mandating reversal.).
See Appendix B at pages 12-13 n.6. Further, for expediency and
economy

this

Court

is

referred

to Appellee's

Response

to

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at Appendix D, pp. 5 to 13,
setting forth the overwhelming case law supportive of the standards
applied by the Court of Appeals herein and this Court in analogous
situations.
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Given

the

foregoing

and a review of the pertinent

and

controlling case law on the issue including that from this very
Court as cited in Appendix D at pages 5-13, there can be no
question that the Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of
review in this case as set forth by court rule, case law urged by
the plaintiff herself on appeal and previous decisions by Utah
Appellate Courts.
POINT IV
Plaintiff's Argument Raised for the First Time
in Her Petition for Rehearing to the Court of Appeals
Concerning the Prima Facie Case She Allegedly Presented
Likewise Lacks Merit
As set forth for the Utah Court of Appeals, although plaintiff
otherwise essentially argues that the Court of Appeals improperly
invaded the province of the jury by holding that a second jury
would reach the same result as the first, in actuality that court
ruled that (1) due deference must be accorded the jury and its
decision; (2) plaintiff did not meet her burden of marshaling the
evidence supporting the verdict before she would be allowed to
demonstrate that the evidence may be insufficient to support the
same; and

(3) it was not convinced that had the trial judge

inquired on voir dire as plaintiff requested, the jury verdict in
this case with this jury and this evidence "would be different."
See Evans v. Doty,

171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48.

Contrary to

plaintiff's evident opinion, such conclusions properly recognize
the

sanctity

of

the

jury

process

and

its

verdict

and

the

jurisprudential error that occurs when an appellate court "secondguesses" the same.
16

Further, plaintiff has offered no legal support for her
allegation that the mere presentation of a prima facie case somehow
entitles her to a new trial before an unbiased jury. And plaintiff
has likewise improperly leaped to the conclusion that this jury was
biased when the record is devoid of evidence to support this claim.
Finally,

plaintiff

seems

to

misunderstand

the

critical

principle controlling this Court's review on appeal and her failure
to meet her responsibilities in respect to that standard of review.
Indeed, a review of plaintiff's argument identifies it as merely a
restatement of plaintiff's claim in her initial brief that "the
trial court abuse[d] its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial where the jury verdict was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence and was apparently based on
speculation."

See Appendix F at page 2.

However, as repeatedly

set forth by this Court and noted by the Court of Appeals herein,
before plaintiff could attack the verdict and claim it was based on
speculation, plaintiff must have marshaled all the evidence in
support of the verdict.
766 (Utah 1955).

See, e.g., Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d

Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to marshal the

evidence below and now merely recites in her petition for a writ of
certiorari

evidence

which

she

believes

allegedly

supports

allegations raised in her complaint. Indeed, it is as if plaintiff
again expects that by merely recanting evidence allegedly in
support of her claim she can somehow convince this Court to
(1) ignore the Court of Appeals' correct application of this
controlling standard of review, (2) speculate as she does that the
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jury should have properly returned a verdict for her and (3) grant
her a petition for writ of certiorari.
Given the inaccuracy and meritless nature of plaintiff's
second point in her petition for writ of certiorarif this Court
should also deny plaintiff's petition as to that claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to set forth a special or important
reason justifying this Court's review of her petition for a writ of
certiorari.

In addition, arguments raised for the first time by

plaintiff in her petition for writ of certiorari should not be
considered and the petition for writ of certiorari should likewise
be denied since a plain and simple review of the Court of Appeals'
decisions unequivocally demonstrates that the Court of Appeals
applied

the

correct

abuse

of

discretion

and

harmless

error

standards of review involving plaintiff's claims regarding issues
of jury voir dire.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

*3

day of February, 1992.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

BY ^--^-f^^
David H. Epperson
Jaryl L. Rencher
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Doty
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APPENDIX A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice action following
a jury verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal,
plaintiff asserts that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge
refused to ask prospective jurors questions sufficient to allow
the plaintiff to exercise her peremptory challenges; and (2)
there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and,
therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in January 1982, six
weeks premature and suffering from Downs Syndrome. In October,
1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe pneumonia. During her
hospital stay, doctors discovered Corinne also suffered from
extreme pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the hypertension

was caused by a patent ductus arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus
is a blood vessel which bypasses the non-functioning lungs of an
infant prior to birth. At birth, the ductus normally closes
spontaneously. In Corinne7s case, however, the ductus failed to
completely close, resulting in the defect.
Corinne7s parents selected the defendant, Doctor Donald J.
Doty, to operate on Corinne to correct the condition. Dr. Doty
is a certified cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had performed
more than one hundred patent ductus repairs, and has written
extensively about the procedure.
Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus. However, during
surgery, Corinne7s recurrent laryngeal nerve, which runs near the
ductus, was permanently damaged. As a result, Corinne7s left
vocal cord was paralyzed. Following surgery, Corinne, through
her parents, commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty
negligently injured the nerve during surgery.
During voir dire Corinne7s attorney submitted many
questions; in fact, the voir dire lasted two hours. However,
over Corinne7s attorney's objections, the trial judge refused to
ask several questions designed to probe the jurors7 exposure to
tort reform propaganda. After a four-day trial the jury returned
a verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.
VOIR DIRE
First, Corinne claims the trial judge improperly refused to
ask potential jurors certain questions during voir dire and, as a
result, the voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel to
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges. Corinne does
not claim the trial judge failed to remove certain jurors for
cause.1

1. At trial, Corinne7s attorney apparently objected to the
impaneling of one juror on the grounds that the juror7s spouse
was employed by an insurance company, and also that counsel had
not been allowed to question the juror concerning this
employment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is in a
short statement in the "issues" portion of Corinne7s brief.
Because Corinne has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue
on appeal, we decline to address its merits. Generally, this

900132-CA

2

This court reviews challenges to a trial judge's voir dire
under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d
456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
1990). A trial court abuses its discretion when, "considering
the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to
evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah
1988) .
Even if we determine the court abused its discretion in
restricting voir dire, this does not end our inquiry. In order
to reverse, we must also find the error was sufficiently
prejudicial to plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ. P.
61 (1991) ;2 see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989);
Borkoski v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979).
Further, the party seeking the new trial has the burden of
showing that the error was not harmless. Ashton v. Ashton, 733
P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987).
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes:
the first is to detect actual juror bias—the basis of a "forcause" challenge; and the second is to allow parties to collect
sufficient information to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d
445, 447 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah

court will not manufacture
fails to brief or argue an
Optical Co. , 164 Utah Adv.
Morrison-Knudsen. 603 P.2d
2.

a legal argument for an appellant who
issue. See English v. Standard
Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v.
862, 865 (Wyo. 1979).

Rule 61 reads:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is grounds for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
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1990); Hafen. 772 P.2d at 457, In this case we are concerned
with the second category. As we recently stated, a Mtrial judge
should liberally allow questions 'designed to discover attitudes
and biases, both conscious and subconscious,' even though such
questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause."
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839,
845 (Utah 1988)). The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the
purpose of peremptory challenges:
Although a trial judge has some discretion in
limiting voir dire examinations, . . . that
discretion should be liberally exercised in
favor of allowing counsel to elicit
information from prospective jurors. . . .
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on
the right of counsel to ask voir dire
questions designed to discover attitudes and
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even
though they would not have supported a
challenge for cause. . . . Juror attitudes
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological
biases or prejudices that may not rise to the
level of a for-cause challenge but
nevertheless support a peremptory challenge•
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial judge to ask
questions merely to discover a potential juror,s overt biases.
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of
impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished.
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list of proposed
voir dire questions including several general questions probing
the prospective jurors' exposure to tort reform information.
Additionally, Corinne's counsel identified and offered a specific
example of such propaganda, a cover article in the March 24, 1986
issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry, Your Policy Is
Cancelled." Corinne asked the court to question the potential
jurors about any exposure to this magazine article. Some of the
specific questions Corinne proposed included:
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Have you read magazine or newspaper articles
or other literature about medical negligence?
Did any of you read Time magazine in March, 1986?
Have you ever signed any petition on the issue of
negligence?
Have you seen anything in your doctor's office about
negligence?
Have you discussed [medical negligence] with your
family doctor or friends?
Rather than asking the prospective jurors Corinne's
requested questions in the area of exposure to "tort reform"
material, the trial judge asked:
Now, many of you have heard and read
articles, and there have been television
programs, with regard to negligence on the
part of doctors. Do any of you have any
strong feelings as a result of seeing or
reading anything about medical negligence
that would make it so that you couldn,t be
fair and impartial here today?
Now, do any of you have any strong feelings about
anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor?
Following the first question, two jurors indicated their
inability to be fair and impartial, and the trial judge dismissed
them for cause. There was no response to the other question. At
the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, the judge impaneled the
jury over plaintiff's objections.
Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly refused to ask the
questions posed by Corinne's attorney as these questions would
have improperly introduced the issue of insurance. Though
Corinne,s requested questions did not directly refer to
insurance, Dr. Doty claims that because they focused on potential
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly suggested that Dr.
Doty carried liability insurance and thus were properly excluded
on that basis.
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Recently, many jurisdictions have been faced with the issue
of when a plaintiff may infuse insurance into voir dire
questioning. The issue of insurance-related voir dire
questioning has arisen in three distinct situations. First,
plaintiffs have sought to inquire into prospective jurors'
relationships with insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d
224, 227-32 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested permission
to determine whether jurors have been exposed to a specific,
identifiable media report or advertising campaign; often where
insurance companies have funded such a campaign to convince the
public of the "evils" of modern tort law and the impact of large
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g., Ostler, 781 P.2d
at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 689-90. Finally, plaintiffs have
sought to inquire of jurors as to their general knowledge about
and attitudes toward medical negligence and tort reform without
regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report.
See, e.g. , Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this
case, both the second and third categories described above are at
issue.
The underlying concern in each of these situations is
whether discussing insurance in front of jurors may lead the
jurors to infer that the defendant carries liability insurance.3

3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more likely to
find for the plaintiff or increase a plaintiff's damage award if
the jury knows the defendant has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17
P.2d at 229. This per se "insurance" rule developed during a
time when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the rule
against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the
existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a
'hush, hush' policy could be effective." McCormick, Evidence §
201 at 481 (2d ed. 1972).
More recently, however, courts have begun to question this
traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App.
2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472 (1958). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has noted:
The word "insurance" is not outlawed from the
courtroom as a word of magical evil. Jurors
are not unaware that insurance is at large in
the world and its mention will not open to
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Utah courts have never adopted a rule that discussion of
insurance is per se improper, but instead have recognized that
whether a plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must be
evaluated from the particular facts of the individual case.
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or death
case, if acting in good faith for the purpose
of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors,
and not merely for the purpose of informing
them that defendant is insured, may in one
form or another inquire of prospective jurors
on voir dire examination with reference to
their interest in or connection with
insurance companies.
Balle, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this court has recognized
that the issue of insurance voir dire questioning involves a
delicate balancing of the respective interests of the parties,

them a previously unknown realm. It is in
fact more realistic for the judge to dissolve
the phantom by open talk in the courtroom
than to have it run loose in the unconfined
speculations of the jury room. The court has
wide control over the voir dire and can
adequately safeguard the inquiry by
explaining to the jurors the limited scope
and purpose of the examination and thus
eliminate any implication of the existence or
relevance of insurance in the case before it.
Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965).
There can be little question that even unsophisticated
jurors will suspect the existence of insurance. w[T]he general
prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries is
known to the jurors; hence, for the law to forbid any disclosure
of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of
hypocritical futility.11 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 169
(Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver State Disposal Co. v.
Shellev. 105 Nev. 309, 774 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are
likely aware of insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly eroded as,
today, corporations and individuals almost universally purchase
insurance.
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and that plaintiffs must conduct any insurance-related inquiry in
good faith, Brobera, 782 P.2d at 200-01.
Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely on the reasoning
in the 1979 Montana Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yost. 594
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979) , as determinative of whether tort-reform
inquiry should be allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost, a medicalmalpractice action, the plaintiff sought to pursue a line of
inquiry during voir dire to determine the existence of juror bias
as a result of a specific national advertising campaign by
insurance companies. The advertising campaign had run in several
national magazines during the time when the jury was impaneled.
Plaintiff's counsel requested
permission to examine prospective jurors with
a line of inquiry to determine whether any
prospective jurors have been exposed to, have
observed, or are aware of the national
campaign by leading insurance companies,
directed particularly at prospective jurors,
to the effect that large jury verdicts are in
fact paid by the general public at large and
constituted "windfalls" to the recipients.
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion, but did allow plaintiff's counsel to "inquire as to each
juror whether or not they feel that doctors are unnecessarily or
professional people are unnecessarily oppressed by suits or large
verdicts." id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial
court should have allowed the line of questioning as to the
insurance companies' advertising campaign. The court held that:
[I]n appropriate cases, an attorney upon voir
dire may inquire of prospective jurors
whether they have any business relationship
with insurance companies and whether they are
policyholders of an insurance company named
as a defendant or of a mutual insurance

4. This court has previously considered Yost persuasive.
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 459.
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See

company involved in the case. [Further],
upon a proper showing of possible prejudice,
an attorney may inquire whether a prospective
juror has heard or read anything to indicate
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal
injury cases result in higher insurance
premiums for everyone; if so, whether the
prospective juror believes such materials;
and if so, whether that belief will interfere
with the juror's ability to render a fair and
impartial verdict. Depending on the
responses received to these inquiries and
subject to the discretion of the trial court,
limited follow-up inquiries may be made.
Id. at 694.

The court adopted this rule because

[w]hen insurance companies inject the issue
of insurance into the consciousness of every
potential juror through a high priced
advertising campaign, . . . they threaten
every plaintiff's right to an impartial jury.
. . . In such cases, it is only fair that
attorneys have some means to secure this
right for their clients. Liberal voir dire
is the best means to this end.
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was dealing with a
particular advertising campaign. In this context the court
explained that when, during voir dire, a party inquires about
particular advertisements and specifically interjects the issue
of high insurance premiums, the questions are proper only where
counsel first asks certain general introductory questions.
Counsel must first ask questions to determine if the prospective
juror has read anything that might affect the juror's
impartiality, or whether the juror regularly reads any of the
magazines or publications that have printed the prejudicial
material. If "no positive responses are received to these
introductory inquiries, there is no reason to pursue further the
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id. at 695. Finally,
the Yost Court imposed a "good faith" requirement on plaintiff's
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting to suggest to
jurors that the defendant carries liability insurance. Id.
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The Yost court, however, found the trial court's refusal to
allow the inquiry on voir dire was harmless error. The court
pointed out that the ad campaign complained about by the
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award, and at no point
suggested "that juries should not find a party negligent in the
first place." Id. Thus, the Yost court apparently believed that
any bias created by the ad campaign would only manifest itself
when the jury considered the amount of damages. Because the Yost
jury found no liability, the court found the error harmless.
The Yost court was not faced specifically with the issue of
what questions about general tort reform are permissible when the
plaintiff cannot show the existence of a specific tort-crisis
advertising campaign or article, but instead wants to uncover
information about the potential juror's exposure to general
information on medical negligence and tort reform for the purpose
of exercising peremptory challenges. Despite the Yost court's
failure to address this issue, however, its approach suggests
that general inquiry about tort reform and its effect on juror
impartiality—that does not mention or discuss insurance
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. £d. at 695.
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not err in voir
dire because the judge asked appropriate introductory questions
as instructed by Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d
456 (Utah App. 1989) . In Hafen, a motorcycle-automobile
collision injury action, the trial court asked the jury "whether
anyone had read or experienced anything that would affect the
amount of compensation they would be willing to award in a
verdict." Id. at 458. The plaintiff objected to this
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that the question was
insufficient "to reach any deep-rooted bias caused by 'tort
reform propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted the judge to
ask "specifically whether the prospective jurors had read any
such 'tort reform propaganda.'" Id.

5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial court's
refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general background
questions such as their level of education and the types of
magazines they read, and (2) whether any jurors had an employment
or financial relationship with an insurance company. These
questions, however, raise different concerns and issues than
those presented by the instant case.
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The Hafen court upheld the trial court's refusal to ask the
proposed "tort reform" questions under an abuse of discretion
standard. The court ruled that the question the trial court
asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We do not disagree with the
holding of Hafen. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen
court relied upon Yost's treatment of questions concerning
specific media accounts (i.e. the second category of insurance
questions)as supporting its decision that the plaintiff must ask
one of two alternative general questions, to determine potential
juror bias, before proceeding with more specific "tort reform
bias" questions about specific articles:
[Yost] held that before any specific
questioning about the articles would be
allowed, either of two alternative types of
preliminary questions must be asked:
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of
or read anything . . . which might affect his
ability to sit as an impartial juror . . . or
. . . whether the prospective juror reads any
of the magazines or newspapers in which it
has been demonstrated that the . . • articles
had appeared."
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and apply it
to the instant case.
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost, 594 P.2d at 695)(citations omitted).
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the Yost analysis
somewhat confusing. Unlike Hafen, which dealt with the third
category on insurance questions, Yost dealt with the second voir
dire "insurance" category where the plaintiff clearly established
that the defendant's insurance company had launched a specific,
contemporaneous tort reform advertising campaign.
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attempting to discover,
by a generalized tort-reform question not tied to insurance
premiums, whether potential jurors had been exposed to tortreform information in general. This was precisely the type of
preliminary question approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In
short, Hafen's reading of Yost failed to distinguish between the
second and third category of voir dire insurance-tort reform
questions, and oversimplified the analysis of insurance-tort
reform voir dire questions by grouping these two categories
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together. Thus, to the extent the Hafen opinion can be read as
per se not allowing general questions as to whether juror have
read or seen media reports concerning medical negligence or tort
reform where insurance is not specifically interjected, we reject
it.
In view of this analytical framework, we now turn to the
case before us. Corinne's objections to the court's voir dire
were two-fold. First, Corinne objected to the trial court's
failure to inquire as to the juror's knowledge of a specific Time
magazine article on tort reform and insurance premiums. Second,
Corinne's counsel objected to the trial court's failure to ask
general questions designed to discover if any potential juror had
been exposed to medical negligence or tort reform information in
general. In this case, both of these objections go to the issue
of Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges.
Under the first issue—whether the trial court should have
questioned jurors concerning the Time magazine article—the Yost
analysis is instructive because, like Yost, this issue fits into
the second "insurance" voir dire category outlined above. In
Yost, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated that defendant's insurance
company, the real party in interest, had participated in a
contemporaneous, nation-wide advertising campaign designed to
influence the public concerning the "evils" of large jury awards.
Yost, 594 P.2d at 694. Because the advertising raising was
ongoing at the time the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held
that plaintiff's counsel had established sufficient foundation
that counsel should have been allowed to question jurors as to
their exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held that in such
circumstances, before an attorney may question jurors as to their
exposure to advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the jurors are likely to have been recently
exposed to such propaganda. .Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire as to a juror's
exposure to a specific article or advertisement raising
specifically the issue of the need for tort reform and its
relationship to high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must lay a
foundation showing that the juror is likely to have been exposed
to the material, and further that the material was published
recently enough so that the juror will likely remember reading
it.
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In this case, the Time article was three-years old when the
jury was impaneled. Thus, jurors were not likely to remember
having read the article. Corinne's proposed question asked
jurors whether they had "read Time magazine in March, 1986." We
find it unlikely that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to
accurately respond to such a question. Accordingly, because
jurors were unlikely to have recently read the Time article or to
remember having read it, we do not find the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to inquire about the specific article.
Corinne's second objection, however, is more problematic.
Corinne's counsel presented several general questions inquiring
as to jurors' exposure to information on tort reform and lawsuits
against doctors. The questions fit the third "insurance" voir
dire category described above. As explained, determining whether
an insurance voir dire question such as this should be asked
requires a balancing of the relative interests of the parties in
light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In
tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases,
we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have
developed tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure
to such propaganda. See Yost 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly, in
cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest
in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information
generally on medical negligence or tort reform.
Here, the trial judge did ask questions sufficient to ferret
out actual tort reform biases. However, Corinne claims that the
court's questions did not allow her sufficient information to
exercise her peremptory challenges. Specifically, Corinne wanted
to know which of the potential jurors had been exposed to tort
reform propaganda—even if the potential jurors believed that
such exposure had not changed their attitudes or biased them. We
conclude she should have been allowed such an opportunity. The
judge stated: "many of you have heard and read articles, and
there have been television programs, with regard to negligence on
the part of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a
result of seeing or reading anything about medical negligence
that would make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial
here today?" Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of
them could recall exposure to such articles and programs, Corinne
would have had an opportunity to identify jurors who had been
exposed to such information. Further, this is the type of
general preliminary question approved in Yost. See id. at 695.
However, rather than seek responses to such a question, the trial
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judge instead focused
asking whether jurors
trial judge's line of
information to assist

on the issue of for-cause type bias by
felt they could be impartial and fair. The
questions ignored Corinne's need to gather
in exercising her peremptory challenges.

Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may
foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors,
and, had Corinne been able to identify those jurors exposed to
such propaganda, she could have more intelligently exercised her
peremptory challenges. Furthermore, we note that Corinne's
requested questions made no mention of insurance premiums and
thus, the risk of prejudicing Dr. Doty's interests under this
proposed inquiry was much less than in Yost. In sum, we believe
the trial court should have asked the potential jurors some of
the questions proposed by Corinne about their exposure to tortreform and medical negligence propaganda—not just if they had
been biased by the exposure.
Our conclusion that the voir dire was unduly restrictive
does not end our inquiry. Next, we must determine if the error
was sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit a new trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that harmless errors are those
"which, although properly preserved below and presented on
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989).
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the jury found no
cause of action for negligence, any voir dire error must be
considered harmless* Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that
because the jury found for the defendant on the issue of
liability, any failure of the judge to question the jurors
regarding tort-reform propaganda was harmless. Yost, 594 P.2d at
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an important
distinguishing factor between Yost and this case. As explained
above, Yost dealt with a very specific and unique situation—the
direct impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nation-wide
advertising campaign on potential jurors. Because the
advertising campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury awards, and
did not focus on liability, the Yost court believed that a biased
jury would manifest their bias by first finding liability and
then improperly limiting the damage award. Accordingly, the Yost
court held that when the jury found for the defendant, such
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finding was not a result of bias created by the advertising
campaign.
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias cannot be traced
directly to a single, recent advertising campaign, but may have
arisen from an overall exposure to media reports and insurance
advertisements. To adopt the Yost conclusion, as advocated by
Dr. Doty, would be an over-simplification of the harmless-error
rule. We cannot assume that a jury would manifest its bias by
only reducing damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury
might act on its bias by finding the defendant not negligent.
Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of Yost, we believe
the trial court's error in denying Corinne's general tort-reform
medical negligence questions was harmless. Given the totality of
the circumstances, we are not convinced that had the trial judge
inquired as to the panel's exposure to tort-reform propaganda,
thus allowing plaintiff to more intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges, the jury verdict would be different. In light of the
extensive, two-hour voir dire, the strong evidence supporting the
jury's verdict, and considering the totality of the
circumstances, we cannot say that Corinne has met her burden of
showing prejudicial error.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court should have
granted her motion for a new trial as there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. "To successfully attack
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it." Von Hake v. Thomas. 705
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). ffWe accord due deference to the jury
as the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role.11
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App.
1987), cert, dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital Thrift &
Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). Corinne has not met her burden
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of marshalling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the jury
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.6
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6. Although Corinne has failed to marshall the evidence in
support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, review of the
trial record shows that, even had Corinne properly marshalled the
evidence, there nevertheless is ample evidence to support the
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial, Dr. Doty's
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and counsel also
read the deposition of another expert witness to the jury.
Further, Dr. Doty himself offered expert testimony. Both of Dr.
Doty's well-qualified experts testified that the injury Corinne
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have occurred in the
absence of negligence, and that such nerve injury is a risk that
sometimes cannot be avoided with this surgical procedure. One of
Dr. Doty's experts testified that during his surgical experience,
he had had several patients who sustained comparable nerve injury
during similar procedures that were adequately performed. The
jury also heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous times in
practice without any medical negligence. Finally, Dr. Doty
testified that he performed Corinne's surgery in compliance with
a reasonable and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension brought to
bear on the nerve because the ductus was large and because the
patient suffered from high blood pressure.
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
~This is an appeal in a medical malpractice action following
a jury verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal,
plaintiff asserts that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge
refused to ask prospective jurors questions sufficient to allow
the plaintiff to exercise her peremptory challenges; and (2)
there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and,
therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in January 1982, six
weeks premature and suffering from Downs Syndrome. In October,

1. This amended opinion replaces the opinion in Case No. 900132CA issued on October 16, 1991.

1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe pneumonia. During her
hospital stay, doctors discovered Corinne also suffered from
extreme pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the hypertension
was caused by a patent ductus arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus
is a blood vessel which bypasses the non-functioning lungs of an
infant prior to birth. At birth, the ductus normally closes
spontaneously. In Corinne's case, however, the ductus failed to
completely close, resulting in the defect.
Corinne7s parents selected the defendant, Doctor Donald J.
Doty, to operate on Corinne to correct the condition. Dr. Doty
is a certified cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had performed
more than one hundred patent ductus repairs, and has written
extensively about the procedure.
Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus. However, during
surgery, Corinne7s recurrent laryngeal nerve, which runs near the
ductus, was permanently damaged. As a result, Corinne's left
vocal cord was paralyzed. Following surgery, Corinne, through
her parents, commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty
negligently injured the nerve during surgery.
During voir dire Corinne's attorney submitted many
questions; in fact, the voir dire lasted two hours. However,
over Corinne7s attorney's objections, the trial judge refused to
ask several questions designed to probe the jurors7 exposure to
tort reform propaganda. After a four-day trial the jury returned
a verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.
VOIR DIRE
First, Corinne claims the trial judge improperly refused to
ask potential jurors certain questions during voir dire and, as a
result, the voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel to
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges. Corinne does
not claim the trial judge failed to remove certain jurors for
cause.2
2. At trial, Corinne7s attorney apparently objected to the
impaneling of one juror on the grounds that the juror's spouse
was employed by an insurance company, and also that counsel had
not been allowed to question the juror concerning this
employment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is in a
short statement in the "issues" portion of Corinne7s brief.
Because Corinne has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue
on appeal, we decline to address its merits. Generally, this
court will not manufacture a legal argument for an appellant who
fails to brief or argue an issue. See English v. Standard
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This court reviews challenges to a trial judge's voir dire
under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d
456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah
1990) . A trial court abuses its discretion and thus commits
reversible error when, "considering the totality of the
questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to
gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes:
the first is to detect actual juror bias—the basis of a "forcause" challenge; and the second is to allow parties to collect
sufficient information to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges. See Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P. 2d
445, 447 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990); Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457. In this case we are concerned
with the second category. As we recently stated, a "trial judge
should liberally allow questions 'designed to discover attitudes
and biases, both conscious and subconscious,' even though such
questions go beyond that needed for challenges for cause."
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839,
845 (Utah 1988)). The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on the
purpose of peremptory challenges:
Although a trial judge has some discretion in
limiting voir dire examinations, . . . that
discretion should be liberally exercised in
favor of allowing counsel to elicit
information from prospective jurors. . . .
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on
the right of counsel to ask voir dire
questions designed to discover attitudes and
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even
though thev would not have supported a
challenge for cause. . . . Juror attitudes
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological
biases or prejudices that may not rise to the
level of a for-cause challenge but
nevertheless support a peremptory challenge.
State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial judge to ask
questions merely to discover a potential jurors overt biases.
The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear
Optical Co., 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v.
Morrison-Knudsen. 603 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo. 1979).
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responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of
impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished.
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list of proposed
voir dire questions including several general questions probing
the prospective jurors' exposure to tort reform information.
Additionally, Corinne's counsel identified and offered a specific
example of such propaganda, a cover article in the March 24, 1986
issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry, Your Policy Is
Cancelled." Corinne asked the court to question the potential
jurors about any exposure to this magazine article. Some of the
specific questions Corinne proposed included:
Have you read magazine or newspaper articles
or other literature about medical negligence?
Did any of you read Time magazine in March, 1986?
Have you ever signed any petition on the issue of
negligence?
Have you seen anything in your doctor's office about
negligence?
Have you discussed [medical negligence] with your
family doctor or friends?
Rather than asking the prospective jurors Corinne's
requested questions in the area of exposure to "tort reform"
material, the trial judge asked:
Now, many of you have heard and read
articles, and there have been television
programs, with regard to negligence on the
part of doctors. Do any of you have any
strong feelings as a result of seeing or
reading anything about medical negligence
that would make it so that you couldn't be
fair and impartial here today?
Now, do any of you have any strong feelings about
anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor?
Following the first question, two jurors indicated their
inability to be fair and impartial, and the trial judge dismissed
them for cause. There was no response to the other question. At
the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire, the judge impaneled the
jury over plaintiff's objections.

4

Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly refused to ask the
questions posed by Corinne's attorney as these questions would
have improperly introduced the issue of insurance. Though
Corinne's requested questions did not directly refer to
insurance, Dr. Doty claims that because they focused on potential
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly suggested that Dr.
Doty carried liability insurance and thus were properly excluded
on that basis.
Recently, many jurisdictions have been faced with the issue
of when a plaintiff may infuse insurance into voir dire
questioning. The issue of insurance-related voir dire
questioning has arisen in three distinct situations. First,
plaintiffs have sought to inquire into prospective jurors7
relationships with insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v. Affleck. 99 Utah
381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d
224, 227-32 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested permission
to determine whether jurors have been exposed to a specific,
identifiable media report or advertising campaign; often where
insurance companies have funded such a campaign to convince the
public of the "evils" of modern tort law and the impact of large
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g., Ostler, 781 P.2d
at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 689-90. Finally, plaintiffs have
sought to inquire of jurors as to their general knowledge about
and attitudes toward medical negligence and tort reform without
regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report.
See, e.g., Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this
case, both the second and third categories described above are at
issue.
The underlying concern in each of these situations is
whether discussing insurance in front of jurors may lead the
jurors to infer that the defendant carries liability insurance.3
3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more likely to
find for the plaintiff or increase a plaintiff's damage award if
the jury knows the defendant has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17
P.2d at 229. This per se "insurance" rule developed during a
time when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the rule
against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the
existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a
'hush, hush' policy could be effective." McCormick, Evidence §
201 at 481 (2d ed. 1972).
More recently, however, courts have begun to question this
traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v. Cornelius. 164 Cal. App.
2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472 (1958). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has noted:
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Utah courts have never adopted a rule that discussion of
insurance is per se improper, but instead have recognized that
whether a plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must be
evaluated from the particular facts of the individual case.
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or death
case, if acting in good faith for the purpose
of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors,
and not merely for the purpose of informing
them that defendant is insured, may in one
form or another inquire of prospective jurors
on voir dire examination with reference to
their interest in or connection with
insurance companies.
Balle, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this court has recognized
that the issue of insurance voir dire questioning involves a
delicate balancing of the respective interests of the parties,
and that plaintiffs must conduct any insurance-related inquiry in
good faith. Broberg, 782 P.2d at 200-01.
The word "insurance" is not outlawed from the
courtroom as a word of magical evil. Jurors
are not unaware that insurance is at large in
the world and its mention will not open to
them a previously unknown realm. It is in
fact more realistic for the judge to dissolve
the phantom by open talk in the courtroom
than to have it run loose in the unconfined
speculations of the jury room. The court has
wide control over the voir dire and can
adequately safeguard the inquiry by
explaining to the jurors the limited scope
and purpose of the examination and thus
eliminate any implication of the existence or
relevance of insurance in the case before it.
Kiernan v. Van Schaik. 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 1965).
There can be little question that even unsophisticated
jurors will suspect the existence of insurance. "[T]he general
prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries is
known to the jurors; hence, for the law to forbid any disclosure
of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of
hypocritical futility." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 169
(Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver State Disposal Co. v.
Shelley, 105 Nev. 309, 774 P.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are
likely aware of insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly eroded as,
today, corporations and individuals almost universally purchase
insurance.
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Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely on the reasoning
in the 1979 Montana Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yost, 594
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979), as determinative of whether tort-reform
inquiry should be allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost, a medicalmalpractice action, the plaintiff sought to pursue a line of
inquiry during voir dire to determine the existence of juror bias
as a result of a specific national advertising campaign by
insurance companies. The advertising campaign had run in several
national magazines during the time when the jury was impaneled.
Plaintiff's counsel requested
permission to examine prospective jurors with
a line of inquiry to determine whether any
prospective jurors have been exposed to, have
observed, or are aware of the national
campaign by leading insurance companies,
directed particularly at prospective jurors,
to the effect that large jury verdicts are in
fact paid by the general public at large and
constituted "windfalls" to the recipients.
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion, but did allow plaintiff's counsel to "inquire as to each
juror whether or not they feel that doctors are unnecessarily or
professional people are unnecessarily oppressed by suits or large
verdicts." Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial
court should have allowed the line of questioning as to the
insurance companies' advertising campaign. The court held that:
[I]n appropriate cases, an attorney upon voir
dire may inquire of prospective jurors
whether they have any business relationship
with insurance companies and whether they are
policyholders of an insurance company named
as a defendant or of a mutual insurance
company involved in the case. [Further],
upon a proper showing of possible prejudice,
an attorney may inquire whether a prospective
juror has heard or read anything to indicate
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal
injury cases result in higher insurance
premiums for everyone; if so, whether the
prospective juror believes such materials;
4. This court has previously considered. Yost persuasive.
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 459.
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and if so, whether that belief will interfere
with the juror's ability to render a fair and
impartial verdict. Depending on the
responses received to these inquiries and
subject to the discretion of the trial court,
limited follow-up inquiries may be made.
Id. at 694. The court adopted this rule because
[w]hen insurance companies inject the issue
of insurance into the consciousness of every
potential juror through a high priced
advertising campaign, . . . they threaten
every plaintiff's right to an impartial jury.
. . . In such cases, it is only fair that
attorneys have some means to secure this
right for their clients. Liberal voir dire
is the best means to this end.
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was dealing with a
particular advertising campaign. In this context the court
explained that when, during voir dire, a party inquires about
particular advertisements and specifically interjects the issue
of high insurance premiums, the questions are proper only where
counsel first asks certain general introductory questions.
Counsel must first ask questions to determine if the prospective
juror has read anything that might affect the juror's
impartiality, or whether the juror regularly reads any of the
magazines or publications that have printed the prejudicial
material. If "no positive responses are received to these
introductory inquiries, there is no reason to pursue further the
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id. at 695. Finally,
the Yost Court imposed a "good faith" requirement on plaintiff's
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting to suggest to
jurors that the defendant carries liability insurance. Id.
^he Yost court, however, found the trial court's refusal to
allow the inquiry on voir dire was harmless error. The court
pointed out that the ad campaign complained about by the
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award, and at no point
suggested "that juries should not find a party negligent in the
first place." Id. Thus, the Yost court apparently believed that
any bias created by the ad campaign would only manifest itself
when the jury considered the amount of damages. Because the Yost
jury found no liability, the court found the error harmless.
The Yost court was not faced specifically with the issue of
what questions about general tort reform are permissible when the
plaintiff cannot show the existence of a. specific tort-crisis
advertising campaign or article, but instead wants to uncover
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information about the potential juror's exposure to general
information on medical negligence and tort reform for the purpose
of exercising peremptory challenges. Despite the Yost court's
failure to address this issue, however, its approach suggests
that general inquiry about tort reform and its effect on juror
impartiality—that does not mention or discuss insurance
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. Id. at 695.
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not err in voir
dire because the judge asked appropriate introductory questions
as instructed by Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d
456 (Utah App. 1989) . In Hafen, a motorcycle-automobile
collision injury action, the trial court asked the jury "whether
anyone had read or experienced anything that would affect the
amount of compensation they would be willing to award in a
verdict." Id. at 458. The plaintiff objected to this
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that the question was
insufficient "to reach any deep-rooted bias caused by 'tort
reform propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted the judge to
ask "specifically whether the prospective jurors had read any
such 'tort reform propaganda.'" Id.
The Hafen court upheld the trial court's refusal to ask the
proposed "tort reform" questions under an abuse of discretion
standard. The court ruled that the question the trial court
asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We do not disagree with the
holding of Hafen. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen
court relied upon Yost's treatment of questions concerning
specific media accounts (i.e. the second category of insurance
questions)as supporting its decision that the plaintiff must ask
one of two alternative general questions, to determine potential
juror bias, before proceeding with more specific "tort reform
bias" questions about specific articles:
[Yost] held that before any specific
questioning about the articles would be
allowed, either of two alternative types of
preliminary questions must be asked:
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of
or read anything . . . which might affect his
ability to sit as an impartial juror . . . or
5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial court's
refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general background
questions such as their level of education and the types of
magazines they read, and (2) whether any jurors had an employment
or financial relationship with an insurance company. These
questions, however, raise different concerns and issues than
those presented by the instant case.
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. . . whether the prospective juror reads any
of the magazines or newspapers in which it
has been demonstrated that the . . . articles
had appeared."
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and apply it
to the instant case.
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost. 594 P.2d at 695)(citations omitted).
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the Yost analysis
somewhat confusing. Unlike Hafen. which dealt with the third
category on insurance questions, Yost dealt with the second voir
dire "insurance" category where the plaintiff clearly established
that the defendant's insurance company had launched a specific,
contemporaneous tort reform advertising campaign.
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attempting to discover,
by a generalized tort-reform question not tied to insurance
premiums, whether potential jurors had been exposed to tortreform information in general. This was precisely the type of
preliminary question approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In
short, Hafen's reading of Yost failed to distinguish between the
second and third category of voir dire insurance-tort reform
questions, and oversimplified the analysis of insurance-tort
reform voir dire questions by grouping these two categories
together. Thus, to the extent the Hafen opinion can be read as
per se not allowing general questions as to whether juror have
read or seen media reports concerning medical negligence or tort
reform where insurance is not specifically interjected, we reject
it.
In view of this analytical framework, we now turn to the
case-before us. Corinne's objections to the court's voir dire
were two-fold. First, Corinne objected to the trial court's
failure to inquire as to the juror's knowledge of a specific Time
magazine article on tort reform and insurance premiums. Second,
Corinne's counsel objected to the trial court's failure to ask
general questions designed to discover if any potential juror had
been exposed to medical negligence or tort reform information in
general. In this case, both of these objections go to the issue
of Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges.
Under the first issue—whether the trial court should have
questioned jurors concerning the Time magazine article—the Yost
analysis is instructive because, like Yost, this issue fits into
the second "insurance" voir dire category outlined above. In
Yost, plaintiff's counsel demonstrated that defendant's insurance
company, the real party in interest, had participated in a
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contemporaneous, nation-wide advertising campaign designed to
influence the public concerning the "evils" of large jury awards.
YostP 594 P.2d at 694. Because the advertising raising was
ongoing at the time the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held
that plaintiff's counsel had established sufficient foundation
that counsel should have been allowed to question jurors as to
their exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held that in such
circumstances, before an attorney may question jurors as to their
exposure to advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the jurors are likely to have been recently
exposed to such propaganda. Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire as to a juror's
exposure to a specific article or advertisement raising
specifically the issue of the need for tort reform and its
relationship to high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must lay a
foundation showing that the juror is likely to have been exposed
to the material, and further that the material was published
recently enough so that the juror will likely remember reading
it.
In this case, the Time article was three years old when the
jury was impaneled. Thus, jurors were not likely to remember
having read the article. Corinne's proposed question asked
jurors whether they had "read Time magazine in March, 1986." We
find it unlikely that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to
accurately respond to such a question. Accordingly, because
jurors were unlikely to have recently read the Time article or to
remember having read it, we do not find the trial court abused
its discretion in failing to inquire about the specific article.
Corinne's second objection, however, is more problematic.
Corinne's counsel presented several general questions inquiring
as to jurors' exposure to information on tort reform and lawsuits
against doctors. The questions fit the third "insurance" voir
dire category described above. As explained, determining whether
an insurance voir dire question such as this should be asked
requires a balancing of the relative interests of the parties in
light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In
tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases,
we cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have
developed tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure
to such propaganda. See Yost 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly, in
cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a legitimate interest
in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information
generally on medical negligence or tort reform.
Here, the trial judge did ask questions sufficient to ferret
out actual tort reform biases. However, Corinne claims that the
court's questions did not allow her sufficient information to
exercise her peremptory challenges. Specifically, Corinne wanted
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to know which of the potential jurors had been exposed to tort
reform propaganda—even if the potential jurors believed that
such exposure had not changed their attitudes or biased them. We
conclude she should have been allowed such an opportunity. The
judge stated: "many of you have heard and read articles, and
there have been television programs, with regard to negligence on
the part of doctors. Do any of you have any strong feelings as a
result of seeing or reading anything about medical negligence
that would make it so that you couldn't be fair and impartial
here today?11 Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of
them could recall exposure to such articles and programs, Corinne
would have had an opportunity to identify jurors who had been
exposed to such information. Further, this is the type of
general preliminary question approved in Yost. See id. at 695.
However, rather than seek responses to such a question, the trial
judge instead focused on the issue of for-cause type bias by
asking whether jurors felt they could be impartial and fair. The
trial judge's line of questions ignored Corinne's need to gather
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges.
Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may
foster a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors,
and, had Corinne been able to identify those jurors exposed to
such propaganda, she could have more intelligently exercised her
peremptory challenges. Furthermore, we note that Corinne's
requested questions made no mention of insurance premiums and
thus, the risk of prejudicing Dr. Doty's interests under this
proposed inquiry was much less than in Yost. In sum, we believe
the trial court should have asked the potential jurors some of
the questions proposed by Corinne about their exposure to tortreform and medical negligence propaganda—not just if they had
been biased by the exposure.
. Our conclusion that the trial judge should have allowed
additional questions during voir dire does not end our inquiry.
The failure to ask an appropriate question on voir dire does not
always constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.6 We
6. A new trial is not always necessary simply because the trial
court refuses to ask jurors an appropriate question submitted by
one of the parties to the litigation. See McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) ("[I]t ill
serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean
simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because
counsel lacked an item of information . . . . " ) ; United States v.
Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (All circuits agree that
whether refusal to ask potential jurors questions "does not
always constitute reversible error; that, question hinges upon" a
number of factors including "the extent to which the [topic] is
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only reverse if "considering the totality of the questioning,
counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the
information necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop. 753
P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988).
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the jury found no
cause of action for negligence, any voir dire error must be
considered harmless. Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that
because the jury found for the defendant on the issue of
liability, any failure of the judge to question the jurors
regarding tort-reform propaganda was harmless. Yost. 594 P.2d at
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an important
distinguishing factor between Yost and this case. As explained
above, Yost dealt with a very specific and unique situation—the
direct impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nation-wide
advertising campaign on potential jurors. Because the
advertising campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury awards, and
did not focus on liability, the Yost court believed that a biased
jury would manifest their bias by first finding liability and
then improperly limiting the damage award. Accordingly, the Yost
court held that when the jury found for the defendant, such
finding was not a result of bias created by the advertising
campaign.
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias cannot be traced
directly to a single, recent advertising campaign, but may have
arisen from an overall exposure to media reports and insurance
advertisements. To adopt the Yost conclusion, as advocated by
Dr. Doty, would be an over-simplification of the harmless-error
rule. We cannot assume that a jury would manifest its bias by
only reducing damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury
might act on its bias by finding the defendant not negligent.
-Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of Yost, we believe
the trial court's error in denying Corinne's general tort-reform
covered in other questions on voir dire and on the charge to the
jury . . . . " ) ; State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah 1982)
("Traditionally, the trial court is given considerable latitude
as to the manner and form of conducting the voir dire examination
and is only restricted in that discretion from committing
prejudicial error."); State v. Hall. 797 P.2d 470 (Utah App.
1990) ("For a court's exercise of discretion in disallowing voir
dire questions to be overturned, appellant must show that the
abuse of discretion rose to a level of reversible error.");
Hornsbv v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d 929, 933
(Utah App. 1988) (Only " [substantial impairment of the right to
informed exercise of peremptory challenges" constitutes an abuse
of discretion mandating reversal.).
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medical negligence question did not rise to the level of an abuse
of discretion. Given the totality of the questioning allowed and
in light of the extensive, two-hour voir dire, we cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion such that we must reverse. The
trial court asked many questions that would allow Corinne to
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges, including an
inquiry into the jurors' occupations, background, and feelings
about medical malpractice law in general. Further, when the
trial court asked potential jurors if they could not be impartial
because of an exposure to tort-reform information, two indicated
they could not be impartial and the trial court excused them.
Accordingly, an examination of the totality of questioning leads
us to conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
conducting voir dire.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court should have
granted her motion for a new trial as there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. "To successfully attack
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it.11 Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "We accord due deference to the jury
as the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role."
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App.
1987) , cert, dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital Thrift &
Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989). Corinne has not met her burden
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of marshalling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the jury
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent,7

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

<=s***^£ y*
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

,£&7S0****?&^^7t^^¥^^
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

7. Although Corinne has failed to marshall the evidence in
support of her sufficiency of the evidence claim, review of the
trial record shows that, even had Corinne properly marshalled the
evidence, there nevertheless is ample evidence to support the
jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial, Dr. Doty's
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and counsel also
read-the deposition of another expert witness to the jury.
Further, Dr. Doty himself offered expert testimony. Both of Dr.
Doty's well-qualified experts testified that the injury Corinne
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have occurred in the
absence of negligence, and that such nerve injury is a risk that
sometimes cannot be avoided with this surgical procedure. One of
Dr. Doty's experts testified that during his surgical experience,
he had had several patients who sustained comparable nerve injury
during similar procedures that were adequately performed. The
jury also heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous times in
practice without any medical negligence. Finally, Dr. Doty
testified that he performed Corinne's surgery in compliance with
a reasonable and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension brought to
bear on the nerve because the ductus was. large and because the
patient suffered from high blood pressure.
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PETITION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Appellant hereby petitions this Court for a rehearing.

The

Court's opinion is reported at Evans v. Doty. 171 Utah Adv. Rep.
43 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1991).

By his signature below, counsel

for appellant certifies that this petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its well-reasoned opinion, this Court properly held that
the trial court unfairly restricted the voir dire examination of
the jury, and thus impaired plaintiff's right to intelligently
exercise

peremptory

challenges.

This

Court

misapprehended,

however, the test to determine whether the error was harmless. The
Court invaded the province of the jury by opining that a properly
selected jury would likely have reached the same result.

Prior

decisions of this Court, the Utah Supreme Court, and the United

States Supreme

Court establish that actual prejudice

is not

necessary. If there was any evidence which would support a verdict
for plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to present that evidence to
a property selected jury. Substantial evidence in this case showed
defendant negligently injured plaintiff, and would have supported
a verdict for plaintiff.

The case should be remanded for a new

trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A DEFECT IN THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS
IS PER SE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
This Court properly held that the trial court unfairly
deprived plaintiff of her right to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges:
However, Corinne claims that the court's
questions did not allow her sufficient information to exercise her peremptory challenges.
Specifically, Corinne wanted to know which of
the potential jurors had been exposed to tort
reform propaganda—even if the potential
jurors believed that such exposure had not
changed their attitudes or biased them. We
conclude she should have been allowed such an
opportunity. . . . The trial judge's line of
questions ignored Corinne's need to gather
information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges.
171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47, slip op. at 13-14.
This Court then considered whether the error was harmless,
applying a test from State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989):
Our conclusion that the voir dire was
unduly restrictive does not end our inquiry.
Next, we must determine if the error was
2

sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit
a new trial. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled
that harmless errors are those "which, although properly preserved below and presented
on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential
that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." State
v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989).
171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47, slip op. at 14.
Verde and the cases cited therein all involve the exclusion
or admission of evidence. A different test applies where the jury
selection process is impugned.
A hearing before an unbiased tribunal is a basic element of
due process.

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Miller v.

City of Mission, Kansas. 705 F.2d 368, 372 (10th Cir. 1983).
Peremptory challenges promote selection of an unbiased jury by
allowing a party to exclude jurors based on "real or imagined
partiality."

Swain v. Alabama. 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), quoted

in Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

"Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on the right

of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious . . . ." State
v. Worthen, 765

.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988).

Because an unbiased tribunal is such an important right, the
Utah Supreme Court has long held that any impairment of peremptory
challenges is reversible error.

Empirical proof of prejudice is

not required. State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). The

3

convincing weight of the evidence is irrelevant.

In Crawford v.

Manning. 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975), the Court stated:
It is no excuse to say that the verdict
was unanimous and since six of the eight
jurors could find a verdict, the error was
harmless.
By exercising one of their peremptory challenges upon this prospective
juror, plaintiffs had only two remaining. The
juror which remained because the plaintiffs
had no challenge to remove him may have been
a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will
upon them.
Similarly, one of the jurors in the instant case may have had
strong unexpressed feelings about tort litigation and may have
imposed his will on the other jurors.
Although Crawford involved a peremptory challenge used to
remove a jurur who should have been removed for cause, the same
rule applies when voir dire examination is improperly limited.
"Substantial

impairment of the right to informed exercise of

peremptory challenges is reversible error."

Hornsbv. 758 P.2d at

929 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, and State v. Ball. 685 P.2d
1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)). The trial court in Hornsbv curtailed the
plaintiffs right to probe the juror's religious background.

This

Court held the limitation was error, and reversed and remanded for
a new trial. There is no discussion in the opinion of the relative
strength of the parties' evidence. The jury selection process was
flawed, so reversal was necessary.

Moran v. Jones. 75 Ariz. 175,

253 P.2d 891, 894-95 (1953).
Any other rule would improperly invade the jury's province.
A directed verdict can be granted at trial only where reasonable
minds could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence.
4

Management Comm. of Gravstone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v. Gravstone
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982).

This Court must

follow the same rule in determining whether the improper curtailment of voir dire is prejudicial.

This Court may "direct" or

determine the verdict that a hypothetical new jury would reach only
if the evidence supports only one conclusion. If there is evidence
which would have supported a verdict for the plaintiff, and if the
jury was improperly selected, this Court cannot properly hold that
a different jury would have returned a defense verdict.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE
AND IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
BEFORE AN UNBIASED JURY.
Defendant Doty operated on Corinne Evans, then two years two
months old, to correct a patent ductus arteriosus.

(Tr. vol. 2

(Doty), p. 22; tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 23.) Her recurrent laryngeal
nerve was damaged during the surgery (tr. Vol. 5 (Gay) p. 23; tr.
vol 2 (Doty) p. 25), resulting in permanent paralysis of her left
vocal cord.

(Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 33.) The paralyzed vocal cord

fails to open when Corinne breathes (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 42), and
as a result Corinne required constant oxygen therapy for two and
a half years (id. p. 66; tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 42, 53), and
continues to need night-time oxygen.

(Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 24-

25; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 69, 122-23.)
The recurrent laryngeal nerve runs along the ductus arteriosus.

(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 33.)

without first locating the nerve.
5

Dr. Doty tied off the ductus
(Trial exhibit 9-P.)

This

failure was negligent and caused Corinne's injury,
(Achtel) pp. 21, 27, 28, 34, 37.)

(Tr. vol. 6

Dr. Doty acknowledged the

possibility that he had cut the nerve (tr. vol. 2 (Doty) pp. 8384), and admitted that cutting the nerve would have constituted
negligence.

(Id. p. 84.) He further acknowledged that "I have no

way of knowing if I did [cut the nerve] or not.11

fid.)

An unbiased jury, based on this evidence, could properly
return a verdict for Corinne.

This Court improperly invaded the

province of the jury by holding that a second jury would reach the
same result as the first.
CONCLUSION
This Court properly held that the trial court's limitation of
voir dire prevented plaintiff from intelligently exercising her
peremptory challenges.

The jury was improperly selected.

This

Court should not usurp the jury's role by predicting what a
different jury would decide.

The case must be remanded for a new

trial.
DATED this

&^

day of November, 1991.

JACKSON HOWARD, and
~7l
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice
action following a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant doctor. On appeal, plaintiff asserts
that: (1) during voir dire, the trial judge
refused to ask prospective jurors questions
sufficient to allow the plaintiff to exercise her
peremptory challenges; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict
and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new
trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff, Corinne Evans, was born in
January 1982, six weeks premature and suffering from Downs Syndrome. In October,
1983, Corinne was hospitalized for severe
pneumonia. During her hospital stay, doctors
discovered Corinne also suffered from extreme
pulmonary hypertension. Tests revealed the
hypertension was caused by a patent ductus
arteriosus. The ductus arteriosus is a blood
vessel which bypasses the non-functioning
lungs of an infant prior to birth. At birth, the
ductus normally closes spontaneously. In
Corinne's case, however, the ductus failed to
completely close, resulting in the defect.
Corinne's parents selected the defendant,
Doctor Donald J. Doty, to operate on Corinne
to correct the condition. Dr. Doty is a certified cardio-thoracic surgeon. Dr. Doty had
performed more than one hundred patent
ductus repairs, and has written extensively
about the procedure.
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5£

Dr. Doty successfully repaired the ductus.
However, during surgery, Corinne's recurrent
laryngeal nerve, which runs near the ductus,
was permanently damaged. As a result,
Corinne's left vocai cord was paralyzed. Following surgery, Corinne, through her parents,
commenced this law suit, claiming Dr. Doty
negligently injured the nerve during surgery.
During voir dire Corinne's attorney submitted many questions; in fact* the voir dire
lasted two hours. However, over Corinne's
attorney's objections, the trial judge refused
to ask several questions designed to probe the
jurors' exposure to tort reform propaganda.
After a four-day trial the jury returned a
verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.
VOIR DIRE
First, Corinne claims the trial judge improperly refused to ask potential jurors certain
questions during voir dire and, as a result, the
voir dire was insufficient to allow her counsel
to intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges. Corinne does not claim the trial judge
failed to remove certain jurors for cause.1
This court reviews challenges to a trial
judge's voir dire under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Doe v. Ha/en, 772 P.2d 456,
457-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 800
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). A trial court abuses its
discretion when, "considering the totality of
the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an
adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439,448 (Utah 1988).
Even if we determine the court abused its
discretion in restricting voir dire, this does not
end our inquiry. In order to reverse, we must
also find the error was sufficiently prejudicial
to plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ.
P. 61 (1991);2 see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989); Borkoski v. Yost, 182
Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979). Further,
the party seeking the new trial has the burden
of showing that the error was not harmless.
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah
1987).
Voir dire has two distinct and equally important purposes: the first is to detect actual
juror bias-the basis of a "for-cause"
challenge; and the second Is to allow parties to
collect sufficient information to intelligently
exercise peremptory challenges. See Ostler v.
Albina Transfer Co.. Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 447
(Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1990); Hafen. Ill P.2d at 457. In this
case we are concerned with the second category. As we recently stated, a "trial judge
should liberally allow questions 'designed to
discover attitudes and biases, both conscious
and subconscious/ even though such questions go beyond that needed for challenges for
cause." Hafen, 772 P.2d at 457 (quoting State
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)).
The Utah Supreme Court has elaborated on
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the purpose of peremptory challenges:
Although a trial judge has some
discretion in limiting voir dire examinations, ... that discretion should
be liberally exercised in favor of
allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors—
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may
depend on the right of counsel to
ask voir dire questions designed to
discover attitudes and biases, both
conscious and subconscious, even
though they would not have supported a challenge for cause.... Juror
attitudes revealed during voir dire
may indicate dimly perceived, yet
deeply rooted, psychological biases
or prejudices that may not rise to
the level of a for-cause challenge
but nevertheless support a peremptory challenge.
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah
1988)(emphasis added).
Accordingly, it is not enough for a trial
judge to ask questions merely to discover a
potential juror's overt biases. The judge must
also allow counsel the opportunity to hear
responses to questions that may indicate
hidden or subconscious attitudes. Without
such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling a fair and impartial jury is diminished.
At trial, Corinne's counsel submitted a list
of proposed voir dire questions including
several general questions probing the prospective jurors' exposure to tort reform information. Additionally, Corinne's counsel identified and offered a specific example of such
propaganda, a cover article in the March 24,
1986 issue of Time magazine entitled "Sorry,
Your Policy Is Cancelled." Corinne asked the
court to question the potential jurors about
any exposure to this magazine article. Some of
the specific questions Corinne proposed included:
Have you read magazine or newspaper articles or other literature
about medical negligence?
Did any of you read Time magazine
in March, 1986?
Have you ever signed any petition
on the issue of negligence?
Have you seen anything in your
doctor's office about negligence?
Have you discussed [medical negligence] with your family doctor or
friends?
Rather than asking the prospective jurors
Corinne's requested questions in the area of
exposure to "tort reform" material, the trial
judge asked:
Now, many of you have heard and
read articles, and there have been
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television programs, with regard to
negligence on the part of doctors.
Do any of you have any strong
feelings as a result of seeing or
reading anything about medical
negligence that would make it so
that you couldn't be fair and impartial here today?
Now, do any of you have any
strong feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against a doctor?
Following the first question, two jurors indicated their inability to be fair and impartial,
and the trial judge dismissed them for cause.
There was no response to the other question.
At the conclusion of the two-hour voir dire,
the judge impaneled the jury over plaintiffs
objections.
Dr. Doty claims the trial judge properly
refused to ask the questions posed by
Corinne's attorney as these questions would
have improperly introduced the issue of insurance. Though Corinne's requested questions
did not directly refer to insurance, Dr. Doty
claims that because they focused on potential
"tort-reform" bias, the questions indirectly
suggested that Dr. Doty carried liability insurance and thus were properly excluded on that
basis.
Recently, many jurisdictions have been
faced with the issue of when a plaintiff may
infuse insurance into voir dire questioning.
The issue of insurance-related voir dire
questioning has arisen in three distinct situations. First, plaintiffs have sought to inquire
into prospective jurors' relationships with
insurance companies. See, e.g., Broberg, 782
P.2d at 200; Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458; Saltas v.
Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1940); Balle
v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224, 22732 (1932). Second, plaintiffs have requested
permission to determine whether jurors have
been exposed to a specific, identifiable media
report or advertising campaign; often where
insurance companies have funded such a
campaign to convince the public of the "evils"
of modern tort law and the impact of large
jury awards on insurance premiums. See, e.g.,
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447; Yost, 594 P.2d at 68990. Finally, plaintiffs have sought to inquire
of jurors as to their general knowledge about
and attitudes toward medical negligence and
ton reform without regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report. See,
e.g., Hafen, Til P.2d at 458-59; Barton v.
Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508, 71 Cal. App.
3d 484, 508-09 (1977). In this case, both the
second and third categories described above
are at issue.
The underlying concern in each of these
situations is whether discussing insurance in
front of jurors may lead the jurors to infer
that the defendant carries liability insurance.3
Utah courts have never adopted a rule that
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discussion of insurance is per se improper, but
instead have recognized that whether a plaintiff may discuss insurance with the jury must
be evaluated from the particular facts of the
individual case.
[P]laintiff in a personal injury or
death case, if acting in good faith
for the purpose of ascertaining the
qualifications of jurors, and not
merely for the purpose of informing
them that defendant is insured, may
in one form or another inquire of
prospective jurors on voir dire
examination with reference to their
interest in or connection with insurance companies.
Balk, 17 P.2d at 229. More recently, this
court has recognized that the issue of insurance voir dire questioning involves a delicate
balancing of the respective interests of the
parties, and that plaintiffs must conduct any
insurance-related inquiry in good faith.
Brobcrg, 782 P.2d at 200-01.
Both Corinne and Dr. Doty principally rely
on the reasoning in the 1979 Montana
Supreme Court case of Borkoski v. Yosu 594
P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979), as determinative of
whether ton-reform inquiry should be
allowed during voir dire.4 In Yost* a medicalmalpractice action, the plaintiff sought to
pursue a line of inquiry during voir dire to
determine the existence of juror bias as a
result of a specific national advertising campaign by insurance companies. The advertising
campaign had run in several national magazines during the time when the jury was impaneled. Plaintiffs counsel requested
permission to examine prospective
jurors with a line of inquiry to
determine whether any prospective
jurors have been exposed to, have
observed, or are aware of the national campaign by leading insurance
companies, directed particularly at
prospective jurors, to the effect that
large jury verdicts are in fact paid
by the general public at large and
constituted "windfalls" to the recipients.
Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The trial court
denied plaintiffs motion, but did allow plaintiffs counsel to "inquire as to each juror
whether or not they feel that doctors are
unnecessarily or professional people are unnecessarily oppressed by suits or large verdicts."
Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court
held that the trial court should have allowed
the line of questioning as to the insurance
^companies' advertising campaign. The court
held that:

45

[Tin appropriate cases, an attorney
upon voir dire may inquire of prospective jurors whether they have
any business relationship with insurance companies and whether they
are policyholders of an insurance
company named as a defendant or
of a mutual insurance company
involved in the case. [Further],
upon a proper showing of possible
prejudice, an attorney may inquire
whether a prospective juror has
heard or read anything to indicate
that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in
personal injury cases result in
higher insurance premiums for
everyone; if so, whether the prospective juror believes such materials;
and if so, whether that belief will
interfere with the juror's ability to
render a fair and impartial verdict.
Depending on the responses received to these inquiries and subject
to the discretion of the trial court,
limited follow-up inquiries may be
made.
Id. at 694. The court adopted this rule because
[wjhen insurance companies inject
the issue of insurance into the
consciousness of every potential
juror through a high priced advertising campaign, ... they threaten
every plaintiffs right to an impartial jury.... In such cases, it is only
fair that attorneys have some means
to secure this right for their clients.
Liberal voir dire is the best means
to this end.
Id. (citations omitted). The Yost court was
dealing with a particular advertising campaign.
In this context the court explained that when,
during voir dire, a party inquires about particular advertisements and specifically interjects
the issue of high insurance premiums, the
questions are proper only where counsel first
asks certain general introductory questions.
Counsel must first ask questions to determine
if the prospective juror has read anything that
might affect the juror's impartiality, or
whether the juror regularly reads any of the
magazines or publications that have printed
the prejudicial material. If "no positive responses are received to these introductory inquiries, there is no reason to pursue further the
line of inquiry we have approved above." Id.
at 695. Finally, the Yost Court imposed a
"good faith" requirement on plaintiffs
counsel: counsel cannot merely be attempting
to suggest to jurors that the defendant carries
liability insurance. Id.
The Yost court, however, found the trial
court's refusal to allow the inquiry on voir
dire was harmless error. The court pointed out
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that the ad campaign complained about by the
plaintiff focused on the size of the jury award,
and at no point suggested "that juries should
not find a party negligent in the first place." Id.
Thus, the Yost court apparently believed
that any bias created by the ad campaign
would only manifest itself when the jury
considered the amount of damages. Because
the Yost jury found no liability, the court
found the error harmless.
The Yost court was not faced specifically
with the issue of what questions about general
tort reform are permissible when the plaintiff
cannot show the existence of a specific tortcrisis advertising campaign or article, but
instead wants to uncover information about
the potential juror's exposure to general information on medical negligence and tort
reform for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Despite the Yost court's
failure to address this issue, however, its
approach suggests that general inquiry about
tort reform and its effect on juror impartiality-that does not mention or discuss insurance
unnecessarily—would be appropriate. Id. at
695.
Dr. Doty claims that the trial judge did not
err in voir dire because the judge asked appropriate introductory questions as instructed by
Yost and as adopted in Doe v. Hafen, 772
P^d 456 (Utah App. 1989). In Hafen, a
motorcycle-automobile collision injury
action, the trial court asked the jury "whether
anyone had read or experienced anything that
would affect the amount of compensation they
would be willing to award in a verdict/ Id. at
458. The plaintiff objected to this
"generalized" voir dire question, arguing that
the question was insufficient "to reach any
deep-rooted bias caused by 'ton reform
propaganda.'"5 Id. Rather, plaintiff wanted
the judge to ask "specifically whether the
prospective jurors had read any such 'tort
reform propaganda.*" Id.
The Hafen court upheld the trial court's
refusal to ask the proposed "tort reform"
questions under an abuse of discretion standard. The court ruled that the question the
trial court asked was sufficient. Id. at 459. We
do not disagree with the holding of Hafen.
However, in reaching its conclusion, the Hafen
court relied upon Yost's treatment of
questions concerning specific media accounts
(i.e. the second category of insurance questi o n s ^ supporting its decision that the plaintiff must ask one of two alternative general
questions, to determine potential juror bias,
before proceeding with more specific "ton
reform bias" questions about specific anicles:
[Yosf] held that before any specific
questioning about the anicles would
be allowed, either of two alternative
types of preliminary questions must
be asked: "[WJhether the prospec-
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tive juror has heard of or read
anything ... which might affect his
ability to sit as an impanial juror
... or ... whether the prospective
juror reads any of the magazines or
newspapers in which it has been
demonstrated that the ... articles
had appeared."
We adopt the analysis in [Yost] and
apply it to the instant case.
Id. at 458-59 (quoting Yost, 594 P.2d at
695)(citations omitted).
We find the Hafen panel's reliance on the
yosf analysis somewhat confusing. Unlike
Hafen, which dealt with the third category on
insurance questions, Yost dealt with the
second voir dire "insurance" category where
the plaintiff clearly established that the defendant's insurance company had launched a
specific, contemporaneous ton reform advertising campaign.
In Hafen, the plaintiff was merely attempting to discover, by a generalized tort-reform
question nor tied to insurance premiums,
whether potential jurors had been exposed to
ton-reform information in general. This was
precisely the type of preliminary question
approved in Yost. See 594 P.2d at 695. In
short, Ha/en's reading of Yost failed to distinguish between the second and third category
of voir dire insurance-tort reform questions,
and oversimplified the analysis of insurancetort reform voir dire questions by grouping
these two categories together. Thus, to the
extent the Hafen opinion can be read as per se
nor allowing general questions as to whether
juror have read or seen media reports concerning medical negligence or ton reform where
insurance is not specifically interjected, we
reject it.
In view of this analytical framework, we
now turn to the case before us. Corinne's
objections to the court's voir dire were twofold. First, Corinne objected to the trial
court's failure to inquire as to the juror's
knowledge of a specific Time magazine article
on tort reform and insurance premiums.
Second, Corinne's counsel objected to the
trial court's failure to ask general questions
designed to discover if any potential juror had
been exposed to medical negligence or tort
reform information in general. In this case,
both of these objections go to the issue of
Corinne's ability to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.
Under the first issue-whether the trial
court should have questioned jurors concerning the Time magazine article-the Yosf
analysis is instructive because, like Yosr, this
issue fits into the second "insurance" voir dire
category outlined above. In Yosr, plaintiffs
counsel demonstrated that defendant's insurance company, the real party in interest, had
participated in a contemporaneous, nation-
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wide advertising campaign designed to influence the public concerning the "evils" of large
jury awards. Yosr, 594 P.2d at 694. Because
the advertising raising was ongoing at the time
the jury was impaneled, the Yost court held
that plaintiffs counsel had established sufficient foundation that counsel should have
been allowed to question jurors as to their
exposure to the campaign. The Yost court held
that in such circumstances, before an attorney
may question jurors as to their exposure to
advertisements and media reports, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the jurors are likely to
have been recently exposed to such propaganda. Id. We adopt Yost's reasoning, and
thus hold that before a plaintiff may inquire
as to a juror's exposure to a specific article or
advertisement raising specifically the issue of
the need for tort reform and its relationship to
high insurance premiums, the plaintiff must
lay a foundation showing that the juror is
likely to have been exposed to the material,
and further that the material was published
recently enough so that the juror will likely
remember reading it.
In this case, the Time article was threeyears old when the jury was impaneled. Thus,
jurors were not likely to remember having
read the article. Corinne's proposed question
asked jurors whether they had 'read Time
magazine in March, 1986.* We find it unlikely
that, in 1989, any jurors would be able to
accurately respond to such a question. Accordingly, because jurors were unlikely to have
recently read the Time article or to remember
having read it, we do not find the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to inquire about
the specific article.
Corinne's second objection, however, is
more problematic. Corinne's counsel presented several general questions inquiring as to
jurors' exposure to information on tort
reform and lawsuits against doctors. The
questions fit the third "insurance'' voir dire
category described above. As explained, determining whether an insurance voir dire question such as this should be asked requires a
balancing of the relative interests of the parties
in light of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. In tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, we
cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors
may have developed tort-reform biases as a
result of an overall exposure to such propaganda. See Yosr 594 P.2d at 694. Accordingly,
in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has a
legitimate interest in discovering which jurors
may have read or heard information generally
on medical negligence or tort reform.
Here, the trial judge did ask questions sufficient to ferret out actual tort reform biases.
However, Corinne claims that the court's
questions did not allow her sufficient information to exercise her peremptory challenges.
Specifically, Corinne wanted to know which of

the potential jurors had been exposed to tort
reform propaganda—even if the potential
jurors believed that such exposure had not
changed their attitudes or biased them. We
conclude she should have been allowed such
an opportunity. The judge stated: "many of
you have heard and read articles, and there
have been television programs, with regard to
negligence on the part of doctors. Do any of
you have any strong feelings as a result of
seeing or reading anything about medical
negligence that would make it so that you
couldn't be fair and impartial here today?"
Had the trial judge first asked jurors which of
them could recall exposure to such articles and
programs, Corinne would have had an opportunity to identify jurors who had been
exposed to such information. Further, this is
the type of general preliminary question approved in Yosr. See id. at 695. However, rather
than seek responses to such a question, the
trial judge instead focused on the issue of forcause type bias by asking whether jurors felt
they could be impartial and fair. The trial
judge's line of questions ignored Corinne's
need to gather information to assist in exercising her peremptory challenges.
Reason suggests that exposure to tortreform propaganda may foster a subconscious
bias within certain prospective jurors, and,
had Corinne been able to identify those jurors
exposed to such propaganda, she could have
more intelligently exercised her peremptory
challenges. Furthermore, we note that
Corinne's requested questions made no
mention of insurance premiums and thus, the
risk of prejudicing Dr. Dory's interests under
this proposed inquiry was much less than in
Yost. In sum, we believe the trial court should
have asked the potential jurors some of the
questions proposed by Corinne about their
exposure to ton-reform and medical negligence propaganda-not just if they had been
biased by the exposure.
Our conclusion that the voir dire was
unduly restrictive does not end our inquiry.
Next, we must determine if the error was
sufficiently prejudicial to Corinne to merit a
new trial. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled
that harmless errors are those "which, although properly preserved below and presented
on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that
we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
120 (Utah 1989).
Initially, Dr. Doty contends that because the
jury found no cause of action for negligence,
any voir dire error must be considered harmless. Dr. Doty relies on Yost, which held that
because the jury found for the defendant on
the issue of liability, any failure of the judge
to question the jurors regarding tort-reform
propaganda was harmless. Yosr, 594 P.2d at
695. Dr. Doty, however, fails to recognize an
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important distinguishing factor between Yost
and this case. As explained above, Yost dealt
with a very specific and unique situation—
the direct impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nation-wide advertising campaign on potential jurors. Because the advertising campaign in Yost advocated lowering jury
awards, and did not focus on liability, the yosr
court believed that a biased jury would
manifest their bias by first finding liability and
then improperly limiting the damage award.
Accordingly, the Yost court held that when
the jury found for the defendant, such finding
was not a result of bias created by the advertising campaign.
In this case, any jury tort-reform bias
cannot be traced directly to a single, recent
advertising campaign, but may have arisen
from an overall exposure to media reports and
insurance advertisements. To adopt the Ybsr
conclusion, as advocated by Dr. Doty, would
be an over-simplification of the harmlesserror rule. We cannot assume that a jury
would manifest its bias by only reducing
damages. It is equally likely that a biased jury
might act on its bias by finding the defendant
not negligent.
Notwithstanding Dr. Doty's misreading of
ybsr, we believe the trial court's error in
denying Corinne's general tort-reform
medical negligence questions was harmless.
Given the totality of the circumstances, we are
not convinced that had the trial judge inquired
as to the panel's exposure to tort-reform
propaganda, thus allowing plaintiff to more
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges,
the jury verdict would be different. In light of
the extensive, two-hour voir dire, the strong
evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and
considering the totality of the circumstances,
we cannot say that Corinne has met her
burden of showing prejudicial error.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Finally, Corinne contends the trial court
should have granted her motion for a new trial
as there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury's verdict. T o successfully attack the
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the
evidence supporting the verdict and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to that verdict, the
evidence is insufficient to support it." Von
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah
1985). "We accord due deference to the jury
as the fact finder and do not substitute ourselves in this role. 0 Israel Pagan Estate v.
Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah App. 1987),
cerr. dismissed, Israel Pagan Estate v. Capital
Thrift & Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989).
Corinne has not met her burden of marshalling the evidence, and therefore we affirm the
jury verdict finding Dr. Doty was not negligent.*

CODE* co
PTWO

'

U u h

Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. At trial, Corinne's attorney apparently objected
to the impaneling of one juror on the grounds that
the juror's spouse was employed by an insurance
company, and also that counsel had not been
allowed to question the juror concerning this employment. The only mention of this issue on appeal is
in a short statement in the "issues* portion of
Corinne's brief. Because Corinne has not sufficiently briefed or argued this issue on appeal, we
decline to address its merits. Generally, this court
will not manufacture a legal argument for an appellant who fails to brief or argue an issue. See English
v. Standard Optical Co., 164 Utah Adv.
Rep. 41, 44 (1991); Cardin v. Morrison-Knudscn,
603 P.2d 862,865 (Wyo. 1979).
2. Rule 61 reads:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is grounds for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court
at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the
substantialrightsof the parties.
3. The traditional logic is that a jury may be more
likely to find for the plaintiff or increase a plaintiffs damage award if the jury knows the defendant
has insurance. Balle v. Smith, 17 P.2d at 229. This
per se "insurance* rule developed during a time
when liability insurance was uncommon. "When the
rule against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the existence of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a 'hush, hush' policy
could be effective." McCormick, Evidence §201 at
481 (2d ed. 1972).
More recently, however, courts have begun to
question this traditional "insurance" rule. Causey v.
Comcbus, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468, 472
(1958). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
noted:
The word 'insurance" is not outlawed
from the courtroom as a word of
magical evil. Jurors are not unaware
that insurance is at large in the world
and its mention will not open to them a
previously unknown realm. It is in fact
more realistic for the judge to dissolve
the phantom by open talk in the courtroom than to have it run loose in ahe
unconfined speculations of the jury
room. The court has wide control over
the voir dire and can adequately safeguard the inquiry by explaining to the
jurors the limited scope and purpose of
the examination and thus eliminate any
implication of the existence or relevance
of insurance in the case before it.
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Kieman v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 782 (3d Cir.
1%5).
There can be little question that even unsophisticated jurors will suspect the existence of insurance.
"Pine general prevalence of liability insurance for
automobile injuries is known to the jurors; hence,
for the law to forbid any disclosure of it in the
course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of
hypocritical futility." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§282a at 169 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); see also Silver
State Disposal Co. v. Shelley, 105 Nev. 309, 774
?.2d 1044, 1047 (1989) (jurors are likely aware of
insurance coverage). Accordingly, the underlying
rationale for the insurance rule has been greatly
eroded as, today, corporations and individuals
almost universally purchase insurance.
4. This court has previously considered Yost persuasive. See Ha/en, 772 P.2d at 459.
5. In Hafen, the plaintiff also objected to the trial
court's refusal to ask the jurors (1) certain general
background questions such as their level of education and the types of magazines thev read, and (2)
whether any jurors had an employment or financial
relationship with an insurance company. These
questions, however, raise different concerns and
issues than those presented by the instant case.
6. Although Corinne has failed to marshal the evidence in support of her sufficiency of the evidence
claim, review of the trial record shows that, even
had Corinne properly marshaled the evidence, there
nevertheless is ample evidence to support the jury's
verdict in favor of Dr. Doty. At trial. Dr. Dory's
counsel called two expert witnesses to testify, and
counsel also read the deposition of another expert
witness to the jury. Further, Dr. Doty himself
offered expert testimony. Both of Dr. Dory's wellquaiified experts testified that the injury Corinne
sustained to her nerve during surgery could have
occurred in the absence of negligence, and that such
nerve injury is a risk that sometimes cannot be
avoided with this surgical procedure. One of Dr.
Dory's experts testified that during his surgical
experience, he had had several patients who sustained comparable nerve injury during similar procedures that were adequately performed. The jury also
heard the deposition of another expert surgeon who
stated that he has seen similar injuries numerous
times in practice without any medical negligence.
Finally, Dr. Doty testified that he performed
Corinne's surgery in compliance with a reasonable
and prudent standard of care. Dr. Doty opined that
the nerve likely was damaged as a result of tension
brought to bear on the nerve because the ductus was
large and because the patient suffered from high
blood pressure.
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U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
xMAJESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANY; The
Lockhart Company; Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 890379-CA
FILED: October 16, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Leonard H. Russon
ATTORNEYS:
Harold A. Hintze, Paul T. Morris, and J.
Richard Catten, West Valley City, for
Appellant
Robert S. Campbell, Matthew C. Barneck,
Clark W. Sessions, and Paul T. Moxlcy,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellant West Valley City appeals from a
judgment awarding compensation for condemned property to appellee Majestic Investment
Corporation. We affirm.
FACTS
Majestic Investment Corporation held interests in two parcels of property located in
West Valley City which Majestic leased from
Henry S. Pickrell and Barbara M. Pickreil (the
Pickreils). Majestic built two commercial
buildings on the property and leased them in
turn to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
(Prudential) and The Lockhart Company
(Lockhart). West Valley City brought this
action to condemn Majestic's interests by
right of eminent domain. West Valley City
had previously acquired the PickreHs' interests
in the property.
Majestic and the Pickreils executed a lease
for the underlying real estate (the ground
lease) for a term of thirty-five years, commencing May 1, 1975. The base rent for the
combined parcels was S750 per month, with
provisions for upward adjustment arthe 11th,
21st, and 31st years of the lease. The ground
lease contained a clause providing that in the
event of condemnation the ground lease would
terminate and the parties' respective rights
and obligations would "be adjusted as of the
time of such condemnation." The lease also
contained a formula for calculating Majestic's
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant-appellee Dr. Donald B. Doty ("Dr. Doty"), by and
through his counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and this Court's notification dated
November

14, 1991, submits his response brief

to plaintiff-

appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court
should not grant plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing since (1) she
improperly raises for the first time in her petition arguments not
previously posed on appeal; (2) this Court applied the appropriate
and well-recognized standard of review on appeal and correctly
concluded that any error below was harmless; and (3) plaintiff
misunderstands her duty on appeal and poses arguments unsupported
by law or facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOP PRTOAPTNG MUST BE
DENIED SINCE SHE FAILED TO RAISE ON APPEAL THE
ARGUMENTS SHE NOW ASSERTS FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN HER PETITION
This

Court

has

heretofore

considered

the

efficacy

and

appropriateness of a petitioner raising issues for the first time
in a petition for rehearing.

In State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100,

1112 (Utah App. 1990), this Court ruled that it will "ordinarily
. . . not consider arguments presented for the first time on
petition for rehearing, and [it is] especially loathe to revisit a
decision once rendered when the party seeking reconsideration
intentionally did not present [the Court] with particular arguments

in a more timely fashion."

(Citation omitted.)

This rationale

fully comports with the Court's "standing aversion to considering
for the first time at some later stage issues that could have been
raised at an earlier stage."

Ld.

And this rule applies to

theories, arguments and claims posed in a petition for rehearing
that are at least tangentially connected to but were not raised in
regard to arguments or theories considered previously on appeal.
See id.
Importantly,

although

this Court in Sampson

granted the

petition for rehearing therein, it did so only after considering
(1) the burden the petitioner held when confronted with "multiple
issues of . • . magnitude" in what was a criminal case: (2) the
significance of the issue presented; (3) and the fact that the
United States Supreme Court in the interim had evidently issued an
opinion with "helpful authority" "not available at the time of
initial argument."

See id. at 1113.

Nevertheless, this Court

stressed that the circumstances of granting that petition for
rehearing

were

"unique"

and

future

parties

were

explicitly

cautioned "that the complexity of issues, the length of briefs, or
tactical choice to initially avoid issues on appeal will normally
not suffice to induce [the Court] to consider issues raised for the
first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made."
Id. at 1113 n.21.
Applying this correct principle of appellate review to this
civil case compels the denial of plaintiff's petition for rehearing
on both grounds now raised. Indeed, nowhere in plaintiff's initial
brief on appeal did she argue that the harmless error standard
2

cannot be applied when considering voir dire issues or that the
claimed defect in the jury selection process is always per se
reversible error given the constitutional status of the jury
system*

In fact, on page 2 of her initial brief on appeal

plaintiff stated that "there are no constitutional provisions.
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this appeal."

(Emphasis added.) Also, plaintiff

herself implicitly urged the Court at length in her brief to apply
the harmless error analysis and conclude that notwithstanding this
correct standard of review the error in limiting the jury voir dire
was not harmless under these specific facts.
Initial Brief at page 12.

See Plaintiff's

And plaintiff even urged the Court to

apply on appeal its opinion in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct.
App. 1959), which cites with approval and adopts a decision by the
Montana Supreme Court applying the harmless error analysis to the
very claims of improper jury voir dire plaintiff raised.

(See

pages 10-11 of Plaintiff's Initial Brief arguing application of Doe
v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), adopting the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in Borkoski v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594
P.2d 688 (1979), which applies the harmless error analysis to jury
voir dire issues directly relevant to this case.)
Further, although in his response brief, appellee Dr. Doty
explicitly stressed in a separately identified argument that any
error in the trial court's exercise of its discretion concerning
voir

dire was harmless

and that

this

standard

applied,

see

Appellee's Response Brief at pages 17-18, plaintiff utterly ignored
this argument on appeal and failed to respond or challenge the same
3

in her reply brief.

In short, although plaintiff for the first

time in her petition now wishes this Court to consider that a test
different from the harmless error analysis "applies where the jury
selection process is impugned,H

see Appellant's

Petition for

Rehearing at page 3, she (1) failed and chose not to raise this
argument on appeal even though appellee specifically emphasized the
same and (2) cannot even meet the Sampson standard for considering
the argument now, which standard this Court has even claimed will
"normally not suffice to induce [it] to consider issues raised for
the first time on a request to reconsider a decision already made."
Similarly, as to plaintiff's second point in her Petition for
Rehearing, plaintiff likewise never raised on appeal her novel
albeit confusing argument that because she allegedly "presented a
prima facie case" below she is somehow entitled to a new trial
before an unbiased jury.

Either this obtuse argument allegedly

supported by plaintiff's citations to evidence she believes favors
a verdict in her favor (1) was never raised in plaintiff's initial
briefs on appeal and thus should not be considered by this Court
now, or (2) is merely a restatement of plaintiff's previously
offered "insufficiency of the evidence" claim which failed and
still fails to meet this Court's rule requiring plaintiff to first
marshall evidence in favor of the jury's verdict.
Since under either theory plaintiff cannot be allowed to
attempt by her petition for rehearing what she chose not to urge in
her original briefing on appeal, plaintiff's petition for rehearing
must be denied.
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POINT II
EVEN IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO ANALYZE THE
ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN HER PETITION FOR REHEARING. THIS COURT
APPLIED THE WELL RECOGNIZED AND CONTROLLING
HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD OF REVIEW INVOLVING
JURY VOIR DIRE ISSUES
Even if this Court chooses to consider the new arguments
plaintiff raises for the first time in her petition for rehearing,
plaintiff's petition for rehearing cannot be granted as a matter of
law.

It is a well recognized appellate review principle that the

harmless error analysis applies in considering whether a trial
judge's

failure to pose questions on voir dire to the jury

necessitates a retrial. Indeed, in concluding that it was harmless
error for the court to refuse to voir dire prospective jurors about
whether they would be influenced by testimony which would be
presented at trial, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the
other courts as observing:
"All circuits appears to be in agreement that
the refusal to ask the question of whether the
prospective jurors would be unduly influenced
by the testimony of a law enforcement officer
does not always constitute reversible error:
that question hinges upon such factors as the
importance of the government agent's testimony
of the case as a whole; the extent to which
the question concerning the venire person's
attitude toward government agents is covered
in other questions on voir dire and on the
charge to the jury; the extent to which the
credibility of the government agent-witness is
put into issue; and the extent to which the
testimony
of the government
agent
is
corroborated by non-agent witnesses• "
United States v. Gelb. 881 F.2d 1155, 1164 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Baldwin. 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.
1979)).

Thereafter the court ruled that if the trial judge
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"committed an error by not questioning jurors about the influence
of official testimony, it was harmless" given the totality of the
evidence and circumstances in that case. See id. at 1165 (emphasis
added).

This rule that the harmless error standard applies in

cases where a trial court allegedly fails or refuses to pose
questions on voir dire has been repeatedly recognized.

See, e.g.,

United States v. Noone. 913 F.2d 20, 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) (no
reversible

error

involving

court's questioning

on voir

dire

applying both harmless error and plain error standards); United
States v. Victoria-Pequero, 920 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 1990) (trial
court's refusal to ask prospective jurors questions on voir dire
amounted to harmless error given the government's strong case,
testimony presented, the trial judge's rulings and the voracity of
other testimony); United States v. Nash. 910 F.2d 749 (11th Cir.
1990) (court's admonitions to jury rendered harmless any error
resulting from its failure to ask proffered questions); United
States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (United State
Supreme Court rejected per se reversible error rule when trial
court refuses to question prospective jurors about racial or ethnic
prejudice

and

indicated

that

case-by-case

analysis

of

all

circumstances is required in determining whether error in refusing
to question juries in voir dire is harmless); Chase v. United
States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1962) (even if trial judge abused
his discretion in conducting voir dire by failing to ask jurors
questions proposed, omission was harmless error); United States v.
Pappas. 639 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1980) (trial court's refusal to
ask questions in voir dire was harmless error); Horsey v. Mack
6

Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844, 846-49 (3d Cir. 1989) (court did not
commit per se reversible error when it refused to ask jurors
insurance questions posed and court's failure to conduct voir dire
as suggested did not constitute manifest injustice sufficient to
establish plain error).
And in analyzing a decision by the United States Supreme Court
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d
437, 439-41 (8th Cir. 1988), noted that the harmless error test
even applies in a felony murder case where a juror inadvertently
fails to disclose on voir dire information which would assist
counsel

in

exercising

peremptory

challenges

and which

error

defendant claimed denied him his constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury.
Importantly, this case as with the others noted above involved
analogous critical liberty rights and claims of constitutional
deprivation of rights to a fair and impartial jury trial.

Yet in

addressing these issues and claims, the United States Supreme Court
has reiterated:
A litigant is entitled to a fair trial but not
a perfect one, for there are no perfect
trials. . . . We have also come a long way
from the time when all trial error was
presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were
considered "citadels of technicality."
The
harmless-error rules adopted by this court and
congress embody the principle that courts
should exercise judgment in preference to the
automatic reversal for "error" and ignore
errors that do not affect the essential
fairness of the trial.
See McDonouah Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548
(1984), 553.

Thereafter, in acknowledging the importance of voir
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dire in assisting parties in exercising peremptory challenges,
Justice Rhenquist delivering the opinion of the Court stated:
A trial represents an important investment in
social resources, and it ill serves the
important end of finality to wipe the slate
clean simply to recreate the peremptory
challenge process because counsel lacked an
item of information which objectively he
should have obtained from a juror on voir dire
examination.
See id. at 555-56.

And, although Greenwood involved a juror's

nondisclosure of information on voir dire, it is as analogous to
this situation as those cases cited by plaintiff in her petition
for rehearing involving error in forcing counsel on a case to
exercise a peremptory challenge when the voir dire indicates the
juror should have been removed for cause.

See cases cited in

Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at pages 2-5.
Also, courts have routinely applied the harmless error test in
other

analogous

situations

involving

claims

of

affecting the constitutional right to a jury trial.

impropriety
See, e.g.,

Pappas. 639 F.2d at 3 (court's refusal to permit lawyers or court
reporter to attend side bar exchange with jurors during voir dire
was harmless error); United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131
(3d Cir. 1980) (exclusion of defendant during

jury selection

harmless error given circumstances of case); United States v.
Lussier, 929 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1991) (failure to comply with
federal statute regarding jury selection harmless error); United
States v. Pavne, 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991) (failure to give
jury instruction harmless error); United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d
1191 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (jury conduct was harmless error); Davis &
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Cox v. Suma Corp., 751 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1985) (harmless error
occurred in striking request for jury trial); United States v.
Vallei-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977) (nonconstitutional
errors are measured against less than a per se reversible error
standard)•
In addition, although plaintiff essentially urges this Court
to rule that any error involving the jury selection process must be
prejudicial and require automatic reversal, error involving the
jury voir dire process has not been articulated by our courts as
per se prejudicial and the cases plaintiff cites in support of her
proposition are inapposite and ignore the analyses of applicable
Utah case law.

While there is not space to fully analyze the

inapposite nature of the cases plaintiff cites in support of her
position, a plain reading of those decisions clearly indicates as
such.1

Also, in the cases plaintiff cites the Court did not

discuss the harmless error analysis in reference to the voir dire
issue now posed by plaintiff for the first time in her petition for
rehearing.

And there is no doubt that the issue of whether a

x

For instance, in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the
Court held that the judge at a judge grand jury hearing could not
later preside at a contempt hearing. The case of Miller v. City of
Mission, Kansas, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983), likewise considered
an issue involving a public hearing. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), the Court held that removing jurors based on race is
violative of the Constitution, and in Hornsby v. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the Court actually
applied the harmless error analysis in some respects. See 758 P.2d
at 934 n.3. Also, in State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980),
and Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court merely held that forcing a defendant to remove by
peremptory challenge jurors whose answers to voir dire mandated
removal by cause was prejudicial error.
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directed verdict was properly entered as analyzed by the Utah
Supreme

Court

in

Management

Commission

of

Gravstone

Pines

Homeowners Association v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah
1982) (cited by the plaintiff) is entirely different from the issue
of whether the trial court's refusal to pose questions in voir dire
is harmless error.
More importantly, plaintiff has erred in her petition for
rehearing in implying that the Utah Appellate Courts have applied
a different test when the jury selection process is involved and
that all of the cases cited by this Court in its issued decision
herein are distinguishable since they Hall involve the exclusion or
admission of evidence."

See Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at

pages 2-5. This is wrong.

In entering its decision in this case,

this Court correctly set forth the standard that
in order to reverse [the Court] must also find
the error was sufficiently prejudicial to
plaintiff to merit a new trial. Utah R. Civ.
P. 61 (1991); see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 120 (Utah 1989); Borkoski v. Yost, 182
Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979). Further,
the party seeking the new trial has the burden
of showing that the error was not harmless.
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah
1987).
Evans v. Dotv, 171 U.A.R. 43, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Contrary to
plaintiff's allegations in her petition that this Court lacks a
basis for its determination that the harmless error standard
applied, the above-noted quote demonstrates ample support for this
Court's correct decision.

Indeed, Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure cited herein by this Court is entitled "Harmless
Error" and expressly indicates that the harmless error standard
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applies in considering any "error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties.-

(Emphasis added.) And certainly the Court's refusal to

give requested voir dire instructions falls within the Rule 61
standard of a ruling or order omitted by the court.2

Further, as

also cited as support by this Court in its opinion the Otah Supreme
Court in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), has held that
the harmless error analysis applies in considering analogous
critical

constitutional

claims

of

ineffective

counsel.

Id. at 118-19 and 124 at n.5.

assistance

of

And this fact entirely

controverts plaintiff's erroneous statement that "Verde [cited by
this Court in its opinion] and the cases cited therein all involve
the exclusion or omission of evidence."

Plaintiff's Petition at

page 3.
Similarly, this Court also relied in its issued opinion upon
the case of Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979),
which had been cited and argued by plaintiff on appeal. As this
Court is intimately aware, in Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), this Court found the reasoning in Borkoski "compelling"
and even adopted its analysis and applied it to that case. See id.
at 459; Evans v. Dotv, 171 U.A.R. 43, 49 n.4 ("This Court has
previously

considered

Borkoski

persuasive.").

Importantly,

however, although this Court has already found Borkoski compelling
and has adopted its analysis and although on appeal plaintiff
herein even urged application of that case, plaintiff has failed to
2

Obviously, plaintiff cannot claim that this rule does not
govern the procedure in Utah's appellate courts. Cf^ Utah R. Civ.
P. 1.
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acknowledge that Borkoski applied the harmless error analysis to
the very voir dire error plaintiff now claims for the first time is
prejudicial per se.

In fact, although the Court in Borkoski

acknowledged the constitutional right of a fair and impartial jury
and recognized the claim that the trial court erred in not allowing
examination of the jurors as to whether any had been exposed to
national campaigns by leading insurance companies, the Court ruled:
Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusions do
not avail Borkoski on this appeal.
Even
though we accept Borkoski's arguments, it is
undeniable
that
the
purpose
of
the
advertisements was to reduce the amount of
damages awarded by a jury. At no point is it
suggested, either by Borkoski or in the
advertisements themselves that juries should
not find a party negligent in the first place.
The ads speak only to damages, not liability.
Here, the jury found defendant doctors not
liable at all. The jury did not even reach
the question of damages.
In such a case,
Borkoski's arguments lose their vitality, and
any error committed must be viewed as harmless
and not grounds for reversal. Rule 61, N.R.
Civ. P.
594 P.2d 695 (some emphasis deleted and emphasis added).

Also,

this Court in its decision in this matter lastly cited the Utah
Supreme Court decision of Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah
1987), wherein the Court applied Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the harmless error analysis against the defendants'
analogous claim that they were denied a fair trial when the trial
court failed to explain to the jury defendants' absence on the
final day of the trial.

Id. at 153-54.

Not only then does this Court's issued decision in this matter
clearly provide ample support for its correct conclusion that the
harmless error standard applies, but the Utah Supreme Court has
12

also otherwise applied the harmless error test in considering
analogous issues involving the inviolate constitutional right to a
jury trial. See, e.g., Verde. supra; Welch Transfer & Storaaing v.
Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) (denial of a jury trial was
harmless error as a matter of law given facts presented); Goode v.
Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 639-41 (Utah 1987) (any error
committed by trial court in refusing to give plaintiff's requested
instruction was harmless given facts in case); accord Ashton, supra
(Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting and joined by JJ. Durham
and Stewart) (error in jury instruction did not require reversal
and was harmless error and not abuse of discretion).
Given the foregoing, there can be no question that this Court
has applied the proper standard of review in this case as set forth
by court rule, case law urged by the plaintiff herself on appeal
and previous decisions by the Utah Appellate Courts.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN HER PETITION CONCERNING THE PRIMA FACIE
CASE STra AT.T.POBDLY PRESENTED LIKEWISE LACKS
MERIT
Plaintiff's argument raised for the first time in Point II of
her Petition for Rehearing should not be considered by this Court
for the reasons stated in Point I, supra.

Nevertheless, if the

Court chooses to evaluate the same, plaintiff's petition for
rehearing should not be granted for the following reasons.
First, although plaintiff states that Mthis court improperly
invaded the province of the jury by holding that a second jury
would reach the same result as the first," in actuality this Court
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ruled that(l) due deference must be accorded the jury and its
decision; (2) plaintiff has not met her burden of marshaling the
evidence

supporting

the

verdict

before

she

is

allowed

to

demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the same;
and (3) it is not convinced that had the trial judge inquired on
voir dire as plaintiff requested/ the jury verdict in this case
with this jury and this evidence "would be different."
v. Doty, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. at 48.

See Evans

Contrary to plaintiff's

opinion/ such conclusions properly recognize the sanctity of the
jury process and its verdict and the jurisprudential error that
occurs when an appellate court "second-guesses" the same.
Second/

plaintiff

has offered no legal

support

for her

allegation that the mere presentation of a prima facie case somehow
entitles her to a new trial before an unbiased jury. And plaintiff
has likewise improperly leaped to the conclusion that this jury was
biased when the record is devoid of evidence to support this claim.
Finally/

plaintiff

seems

to misunderstand

the

critical

principle controlling this Court's review on appeal and her failure
to meet her responsibilities in respect to that standard of review.
Indeed/ if plaintiff's claim is not a new argument untimely stated
for the first time in plaintiff's petition for rehearing/ it must
be a restatement of plaintiff's claim in her initial brief that
"the trial court abusefd] its discretion in denying plaintiff's
motion for a new trial where the jury verdict was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence and was apparently based on
speculation."

See Plaintiff's Initial Brief at page 2.

However/

as set forth in this Court's opinion/ before plaintiff can attack
14

the verdict and claim it was based on speculation, plaintiff must
marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict.3 Nevertheless,
plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence below and now merely
recites in her petition for rehearing her view of evidence which
allegedly supports allegations raised in her complaint. Indeed, it
is as if plaintiff again expects that by merely recanting evidence
in support of her claim she can somehow convince the Court to
ignore its controlling standard of review and speculate that the
jury should have properly returned a verdict for her.
Given the nonsensical nature of plaintiff's second point in
her petition for rehearing and the fact that it is raised for the
first time, this Court should deny plaintiff's petition.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's

arguments raised

for the

first time in her

petition for rehearing should not be considered by this Court as a
basis for granting the same. Further, on their merits, plaintiff's
arguments fail given the controlling principles of law and the
facts as they exist in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of November, 1991.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

^ DavitfTi. Epperson
Jaryl L. Rencher
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Doty

3

Dr. Doty reiterates that the evidence clearly supports the
conclusion that the trial court's verdict was proper.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff:
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120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, UT 84603
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APPENDIX E

JACKSON HOWARD (1548),
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872), and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

S:Evans-ds.lo
Our File No. 15,767

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CORRINE EVANS by and through
her guardians ad litem J. BLAKE
EVANS and DONALEE J. EVANS,

DOCKETING STATEMENT
(Subject to Assignment
to Court of Appeals)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

DR. DONALD R. DOTY,

Case No.

Defendant-Appellee.
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiffsappellants hereby submit the following Docketing Statement:
1.

Jurisdiction.

This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case.

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989).
2.

Nature of Proceeding. This appeal is from the final order of the district

3.

Date of Judgment.

court.
The trial occurred from May 9 to May 15, 1989.

The formal Judgment on the Verdict was entered on May 25, 1989. Plaintiffs served a

Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial on May 18, 1989.

The Order Denying

Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV or New Trial and Order Modifying Costs Award to
Defendant was entered on September 12, 1989. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal
on October 12, 1989.
4.

Statement of Facts. Defendant was employed by plaintiffs to perform an

operation on Corrine Evans to correct a silent patent ductus on the left aricular vent
of the heart.

Corrine was two years old at the time of the surgery.

During the

surgery, defendant severed the left recurrent laryingeal nerve, resulting in a compressed airway and a paralyzed left vocal chord. The injury cause is permanent and
debilitating.
5.

Issues Presented,
a.

Were plaintiffs entitled to a directed verdict where the expert

testimony established and the defendant admitted that the most probable cause of the
injury was defendant's negligence in severing Corrine Evans* nerve and that the
possibility of a non-negligent severing of the nerve was so remote as to be speculative?
b.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs'

motion for a new trial where the great weight of the evidence was in favor of
plaintiffs, the defense counsel made improper and prejudicial closing arguments, and the
jury deliberations were so short that the jury could not have thoughtfully weighed the
evidence?
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c.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion, or apply the wrong

standard in exercising its discretion, in refusing to allow plaintiffs* counsel to directly
question prospective jurors during voir dire examination?
6.

Assignment to Court of Appeals.

This case is subject to assignment to

the Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs elect to present no arguments as to whether the case
should be so assigned.
7.

Determinative Statutes.

Plaintiffs are not aware of any statutes, rules,

or cases which are determinative of the issues presented on appeal.
8.

Related or Prior Appeals. There are no related or prior appeals.

9.

Attachments.
a.

Judgment on the Verdict.

b.

Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial.

c.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV or New Trial and

Order Modifying Cost Award to Defendant.
d.

Notice of Appeal.

DATED this Z fe^dav of October, 1989.

JACKSON HOWARD,
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this

3 * ^ dav of October, 1989.

David H. Epperson, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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David H. Epoerson, #1000
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. 3ox 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORRINE EVANS, by and through
her guardians ad litem J.
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J.
EVANS,

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DR. DONALD B. DOTY,

Civil No: C36-8392

1
Defendant.

)

Judge John A. Rokich

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before
a jury in the court of the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court, on May 9, 10, 11, 12 and 15, 1989;
plaintiff Corrine Evans having appeared in person and by and
through her guardians ad litem, J. Blake Evans and Donnalee J.
Evans, and being represented by counsel, Jackson Howard, Esq. and
Kevin Sutterfield, Esq.; and the defendant, Dr. Donald B. Doty,
having appeared in person and by his counsel, David H. Epperson,
Esq., and evidence having been produced by each on behalf of the
plaintiff and the defendant, and the Court having empanelled the

jury, and having instructed the jury on the law applicable to the
issues raised upon the pleadings of the parties, and the Court
having submitted said issues to the jury on a special verdict,
and counsel having argued on behalf of the respective parties and
there jury having thereupon retired to consider the matter, after
deliberation thereon the jury returned a Special Verdict as
follows:
We, the jury in the above entitled
action, answer the questions submitted to
us as follows:
1. At the time and place of the
incident in question and under the
circumstances as shown by the evidence,
was the defendant Dr. Donald B. Doty
negligent?
ANSWER;

Ho.

2. Was such negligence a proximate
cause of injury to plaintiff, Corrine
Evans?
ANSWER:

No.
•

*

*

Dated and signed this 15th day of May,
1389, at Salt Lake City, Utah. David D.
Williams, Foreperson.
Thereafter, the Special Verdict of the jury having been
received by the Court and the jury having been polled, and the
above answers having been unanimously affirmed by all eigiit of
the eight jurors,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant,
Dr. Donald B. Doty, i s awarded judgment i n his favor and against
the p l a i n t i f f ,

no cause of action; together with c o s t s i n an

amount t o be determined by the Court upon submission of A f f i d a v i t
and Memorandum of defendant.
DATED t h i s ^CH~ day of May, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HOtf. JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
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MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this 3^)~~

day of May, 1989, to:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
P. 0.- Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

• >• '
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M*-

JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (3872) for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 Ease 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991

O:£vaxa-Mo.lo
Our File No. 15,767

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CORRINE EVANS, by and through
her guardians ad litem, J.
BLAKE EVANS and DONALEE J.
EVANS,
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT N.O.V. OR
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C86-8392

DR. DONALD B. DOTY,
Defendant.

Pursuant to the provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59, plaintiff hereby
moves the Court for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new triaL The grounds for this motion are set forth in the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities filed herewith.
DATED this If)

day of May, 1989.

JACKSON HOWARD a n ^ ^
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD, for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this

VQ day of May, 1989.

David H. Epperson, Esq,
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
175 South West Temple
#650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant

, f

M Jj P 4 p Mr>
Qal
^H7R ETARY

2

D a v i d H. E p p e r s o n , #1000
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant
4 T r i a d C e n t e r , S u i t e 500
P . 0 . Box 2970
S a l t L a k e C i t y , Utah 84110-2970
Telephone:
(801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CORRINE EVANS, b y and t h r o u g h
h e r g u a r d i a n s ad l i t e m J .
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J .
EVANS,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW
TRIAL AND ORDER MODIFYING
COST AWARD TO DEFENDANT

vs.
DR. DONALD B. DOTY,

C i v i l No:

Defendant.

C86-8392

Judge J o h n A. Rokich

P l a i n t i f f ' s motion f o r JNOV o r new t r i a l and t o t a x c o s t s
came o n r e g u l a r l y f o r hearing b e f o r e t h e Honorable John A.
R o k i c h , Judge o f t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, on August 3 ,
1989 a t 9 : 1 5 a.m.

Corrine Evans and her g u a r d i a n s ad l i t e m ,

J.

B l a k e Evans and Donalee J . Evans were p r e s e n t and were
r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r a t t o r n e y , Jackson Howard, Esq.

Defendant

D o n a l d B. Doty, M.D. was p r e s e n t and was r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s
a t t o r n e y , David H. Epperson, Esq.

The Court, h a v i n g r e v i e w e d t h e

memoranda o f f a c t and law f i l e d by e a c h p a r t y i n support o f

their

respective positions, and the Court having heard oral argument
from counsel for each party, and the Court having taken the
matter under advisement;
And the Court having issued a written opinion on August 17,
1989 finding as follows:
The Court now rules on the matters heretofore
under advisement to wit:
"Plaintiff's motion for judgment NOV or new
trial is denied there was substantial
evidence presented to the jury upon which to
support their verdict.
The jury, based upon the testimony of the
experts, could and evidently did conclude
that the surgical procedure of reflection
and peeling back the tissue from the ductus
was appropriate; that in such a procedure,
the nerve could be stretched to a point which
would cause the nerve to cease to function
and injury could occur without negligence on
the part of the defendant.
Defendant's motion to strike memorandum of
costs and disbursements or tax costs is
granted in part, defendant is entitled to his
jury fees of $50.00, witness fees to wit;
$14.00 per day plus mileage at .30 cents per
mile."
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion
for judgment NOV or new trial is denied; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant is awarded costs to
include jury fees of $50.00, witness fees of $14.00 per day, plus
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mileage at .30 cents per mile for the appearance of Dr. Garth
Orsmond, Dr. William Gay, and Dr. Dean ZoBell.
DATED this

tl

day of August/ 1989.
BY THE COURT:

*/

HON. JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
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MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this

day of August, 1989, to:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 778
Provo," Utah 84603
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JACKSON HOWARD (15 18),
K E V I N J. SUTTERFIELD (3872) and
I ESI IE W. SLAUGH (3752), for:
I I I • ' ? LRD. LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Screec
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801)373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4S91

^ T !"i""li 1 ! i* i n ,
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Ou? File No. 13,767
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PI i Mr THipn ii men.i n ^ T R i n ror F T OF *,» I T I »KE r n r v n

CORRINE EVANS by and through
her guardians ad litem J.
BLAKE EVANS and DONALEE J.
EVANS,
Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
DR. D O N A L D R DOT Y,
Defendant

Civil No, C86-8392
Judge John A. Rokich.

• Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah Lrom the
Judgment on the Verdict entered on, May 25, 1989, and the Order Denying Plaintiffs
J.

a I: • 11 J I fO "I!i 3i I I" : • a I i la 1 a n ::i Or d :M: I! lodif ;; > ing Cost \ wz

September 12 , 1989, entered b'j the Third Judicial District Cotut ji ^

'niprr I
^ A ' County,

State of Utah, the Hon. John A. Rokich, and from all other adverse rulings and orders
in this matter.
DATED this / /

day of October. 1989.

JACKSON ^HOWARD, ^
KEVIN J. SLTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this / 7— day of October, 1989.
David H. Epperson, Esq. (1000)
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CORINNE EVANS, by and through
her guardians ad litem
J. BLAKE EVANS and
DONALEE J. EVANS,

:
:

Case No. 900132-CA

:

Oral Argument
Priority 16

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DR. DONALD B. DOTY,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The jury ente'red its verdict on May 15, 1989 (R. 162, 164)
and a formal Judgment on the Verdict was entered on May 25, 1989.
(R. 295-97.)

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial

was served on May 18, 1989. (R. 280-81.)

The motion was denied

by order entered September 12, 1989. (R. 327-3 0.)

Plaintiff's

Notice of Appeal was filed October 12, 1989. (R. 331-32.)

The

Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1990). The Supreme Court transferred
the case to this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. fi 78-2-2(4).
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

allow the plaintiff to voir dire the jurors concerning their
exposure to information relating to a claimed insurance crisis and
to tort reform arguments? The issue is reviewed by this Court for
an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

allow plaintiff to voir dire a juror regarding discussions between
the juror and his wife relating to the wife's employment as an
insurance adjustor?
abuse of discretion.
3.

This issue is reviewed by this court for an
Id.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

plaintiff's motion for a new trial where the jury verdict was
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was
apparently based on speculation? The standard of review is for an
abuse of discretion.

Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil action to recover

damages for medical malpractice.

2

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff

filed her complaint on November 4, 1986. (R. 2-5.)

Following

discovery, the case was scheduled for trial commencing May 9,
1989. (R. 60-63.)

Shortly before trial, on April 14, 1989,

defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude documents
referring to claimed settlement negotiations. (R. 71-78.)

The

court granted the motion on the opening day of trial over plaintiff's objections. (Tr. vol. 7, pages 50-53.)
The case was tried before a jury on May 9-11, and May 15,
1989. (R. 116-19, 164.)

Following the instructions and closing

remarks, the jury retired to deliberate. (Tr. vol. 8 p. 50.)
Plaintiff immediately called the court's attention to the fact
that during closing arguments defense counsel had argued to the
jury that the defendant "did the best he could.11 fid, pages 50,
42.) The court recalled the jury and instructed them that it was
not a defense that the defendant did the best he could. (Id. p.
52; R. 218.)

The jury thereafter returned to deliberate, and

following only 20 minutes of deliberation returned with a verdict
against the plaintiff. (Tr. vol. 8, p. 58; R. 262-63.)
Plaintiff served her Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial
on May 18, 1989. (R. 280-81.)

A formal Judgment on the Verdict

was entered May 25, 1989. (R. 295-97.)

Following oral argument

on the motion (R. 325), the court denied the motion by order
entered September 12, 1989. (R. 327-30.)

Plaintiff filed her

notice of appeal on October 12, 1989. (R. 331-32.)

3

C.

Statement of Facts. Plaintiff

(hereinafter

Corinne

Evans

,f

Corinne") was born January 6, 1982, six weeks

premature. (Tr. vol. 1, p. 9.) She suffered from Downfs Syndrome.
(Tr. vol. 3, pages 4-5.)

In October, 1983, she was hospitalized

for pneumonia. (Id. p. 6.)

It was subsequently discovered that

she also had reversible pulmonary hypertension, which is an
increase in the pressure in the artery leading from the heart to
the

lungs.

(Id., p.

14.)

She was

placed

on

night

time

supplemental oxygen in an effort to relieve the hypertension.
(!£• i P* 15-16.) It was ultimately determined that a cause of the
hypertension was a patent ductus arteriosus. (Id. 18-21.)

The

ductus arteriosus is a blood vessel which normally functions to
bypass the lungs of an infant prior to birth, when the lungs are
not used. (Tr. vol r 2 (Doty), p. 54.) After birth the lungs start
operating and oxygenating blood, and the ductus normally spontaneously closes. (Id. p. 55.) In some patients the ductus fails
to close, resulting in a condition called a patent ductus arteriosus, or PDA. (Id.) A common effect of a patent ductus arteriosus
is a marked increase in the normally low pressure in the pulmonary
artery leading into the lungs. This condition is called pulmonary
hypertension. (Id., p. 55-57.)
Defendant was selected to operate on Corinne to correct the
patent ductus.

The surgery was conducted on March 30, 1984;

Corinne was two years two months old at the time. (Id., p. 22;
Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 23.)

4

At issue in this case is damage to the recurrent laryngeal
nerve, which normally runs along the surface of the ductus. (Tr.
vol. 2 (Doty) p. 33.)
The nerve was permanently damaged during the surgery.
p. 25, 113.)

fid,

The testimony relating to how the injury occurred

is discussed below in connection with the argument.

As a result

of the injury to the nerve, Corinnefs left vocal cord is permanently paralyzed (Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 33.),

and she has an

inspiratory stridor, which is a noise when breathing.
3 (Glade) p. 25.)

(Tr. vol.

The paralysis affects her voice (Tr. vol. 2

(Doty) p. 112), but the paralysis also mostly affects her ability
to breath.

The paralysis causes the left vocal cord to fail to

open during breathing (Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 42), and as a result
Corinne received twenty-four hour a day oxygen therapy for two and
one-half years (Id. p. 66; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade) p. 42, 53), and
continues to need night time oxygen to prevent further pulmonary
hypertension.

(Tr. vol. 1 (White) p. 24-25; Tr. vol. 3 (Glade)

p. 69, 122-23.)

There is no further surgery which would be

advisable to correct the situation (Tr. vol. (White) p. 74), and
it is possible that Corinne will need night-time oxygen the rest
of her life.

(Id. p. 75.) Corinne*s medical expenses at the time

of trial were approximately $40,000.00.

5

(Trial Ex. 40-P, 65-D.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff contends she did not have a fair trial. Plaintiff
was denied the right to adequate jury voir dire concerning jury
exposure to tort reform information.

Utah case law holds that

questioning such as that requested by plaintiff should be liberally allowed, and is required where plaintiff has submitted
evidence of specific publications which contain tort reform or
insurance crisis information. Plaintiff presented such evidence,
but was improperly denied the right to question the jury concerning it.
Plaintiff was further improperly denied the right to question
two prospective jurors concerning

information they may have

received regarding tort reform or the insurance crisis.

The

spouse of one prospective juror was an employee of an insurance
company, and the other prospective juror lived with a physician.
The evidence established that there were three possible
causes of the injury to plaintiff, all of which were under the
exclusive control of defendant.

Two of the possible causes would

have involved negligence by the defendant.

Defendant testified

he did not know which of the three possible causes occurred, but
believed it was the one possibility which did not involve negligence.

The jury, after only 20 minutes of deliberation, agreed

with defendant's speculation.
The great weight of the evidence in this case showed that the
plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant.

6

The trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff1s
motion for a new trial.

The abuse of discretion is particularly

apparent when coupled with the errors in jury voir dire.

In

addition, the jury deliberated only 20 minutes, evidencing a
failure to adequately consider the evidence and suggesting an
improper or partial jury.
Plaintiff did not receive a fair trial, and this case should
be remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RESTRICTED VOIR DIRE
OF THE JURY.
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion Zu Failing To Allow
Questioning Of The Jurors Regarding Exposure To Tort Reform And
Insurance Crisis Propaganda.
Plaintiff submitted a list of proposed voir dire questions
and requested that the prospective jurors be questioned concerning
their exposure to claims of a need for tort reform or to claims
of an insurance crisis.

Some of the specific areas of inquiry

were as follows:
13. Have you read magazine or newspaper
articles or other literature about medical
negligence?
14. Did any of you read Time magazine
in March, 1986?
15. Have you ever signed any petition
on the issue of negligence?

7

16.
Have you seen anything in your
doctors office about negligence?
17. Have you discussed this subject with
your family doctor or friends?
(R. 137-44.)
Rather than complying with plaintiff's request to ask who had
been exposed to insurance and tort reform propaganda, the trial
court only inquired concerning the ultimate conclusion of whether
persons believed they were biased as a result of such information.
The court asked the following:
Now, many of you have heard and read articles,
and there have been television programs, with
regard to negligence on the part of doctors.
Do any of you have any strong feelings as a
result of seeing or reading anything about
medical negligence that would make it so that
you couldn't be fair and impartial here today?
(Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) pp. 30-31.)
In response to the courtfs question, two prospective jurors
did assert that they were biased
excluded for cause.

(R. 152.)

(Id.), and the jurors were

While the court's question may

arguably have been sufficient to determine whether a juror should
be excused for cause, it was not sufficient to allow plaintiff to
meaningfully

exercise

her peremptory

challenges.

Plaintiff

renewed and preserved her objection at the conclusion of voir dire
examination.

(Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) p. 48.)

The claim of

error is reviewed by this court for an abuse of discretion.
v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

8

Doe

The voir dire examination of a jury has two purposes.

The

first is "the detection of actual bias/1 and the second is "the
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory
challenge.w

State v, Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)

(citations omitted). The distinction between the two purposes of
voir dire was further explained by the court in State v. Worthenr
765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) as follows:
Although a trial judge has some discretion in limiting voir dire examinations, that
discretion should be liberally exercised in
favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors. Indeed, the
fairness of a trial may depend on the right
of counsel to ask voir dire questions designed
to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and subconscious. even though thev
would not have supported a challenge for
cause. . . . Juror attitudes revealed during
voir dire may indicate dimly perceived, yet
deeply rooted, psychological biases or prejudices that may not rise to the level of a forcause challenge but nevertheless support a
peremptory challenge.
765 P.2d at 845 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis
added).
The trial court in this case may have adequately covered the
first purpose of voir dire, but ignored the second.
Numerous Utah cases have addressed plaintiff requests for
jury voir dire examination concerning exposure to tort reform and
insurance propaganda.

The issue was most recently considered in

Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The plaintiff

in that case sought to have the jury questioned concerning tort

9

reform propaganda, or "newspaper and magazine articles that blame
the high cost of insurance and the resulting loss of certain
medical personnel on large-dollar jury damage awards."

772 P.2d

at 458. The trial court denied the requested examination, and the
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the case of Borkoski
v. Yost. 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979). The £oe court stated
as follows:
In Borkoski. the Montana Supreme Court
balanced the problem of selecting an impartial
jury, after exposure to such articles, against
the prejudice injected into the trial by the
questioning itself, particularly where the
extent of the exposure was not initially known
to the court. Borkoski held that before any
specific questioning about the articles would
be allowed, either of two alternative types
of preliminary questions must be asked:
"[W]hether the prospective juror has heard of
or read anything which might affect his
ability to sit as an impartial juror or
whether the prospective juror reads any of the
magazine or newspapers in which it has been
demonstrated that the articles had appeared."
Borkoski. 594 P.2d at 695.
772 P.2d at 458-59 (ellipses omitted). The £oe court further explained in a footnote that "in adopting the Borkoski rule, we do
not imply that counsel must show both prerequisites.

The pre-

requisites are alternatives so only one or the other must be
shown."

772 P.2d at 459 n. 4.

Initially, it must be observed that the need for balancing
expressed by the Borkoski court did not exist in the instant case.
The trial court acknowledged that articles and television programs
concerning

medical

negligence

existed.

10

(Tr. vol.

7

(jury

selection) at pp. 30-31.)

Where the existence of these types of

articles had already been interjected into the voir dire questioning, the concern of prejudicing the jury by discussing the topic
is eliminated.

The court should have accordingly been more

inclined to allow additional questioning into this area. This is
especially so where two prospective jurors indicated avenues by
which they may have been exposed to such propaganda over a period
of time.
12.)

Potential juror Grice lived with a physician.

(Id. p.

Potential juror Kuhn, who was eventually empaneled on the

jury,*was married to an employee of an insurance company.

(Id.

p. 8, 45, 48.)
Even under a strict reading of the Borkoski standard, the
trial court's limitation of jury voir dire cannot be justified.
Plaintiff identified at least one specific magazine which had
contained assertions of a link between high damage awards and the
cost of insurance.

A copy of the article, which appeared in a

March, 1986 issue of Time, is attached in Appendix MAM.

Plaintiff

proffered additional specific publications, but the trial court
refused the proffer.

(Tr. vol. 7 (jury selection) at p. 48.)

Under the circumstances of this case, where plaintiff had laid an
adequate foundation, the trial court was required to allow plaintiff to question the jury regarding their exposure to these types
of publications.

It was not enough to simply inquire whether the

jurors felt they were biased.

The insidious nature of such

publications is that their effect may be subconscious. The trial
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court clearly erred in failing to allow plaintiff to inquire into
those areas.
Plaintiff acknowledges that she has the burden of also
showing that the erroneous limitation of jury voir dire prejudiced
the plaintiff.

Utah R. Civ* P. 61.

The record in this case

demonstrates that the error was not harmless.

As demonstrated

more fully below in Point II of this brief, there were three
possible ways

in which the injury

to plaintiff1s

laryngeal nerve could have been damaged:

recurrent

the nerve could have

been severed by the defendants scalpel, the nerve could have been
ligated along with the ductus, or the nerve could have been
spontaneously damaged as a result of the tension on the nerve and
the movement of the ductus during the operation.

Dr. Doty ack-

nowledged that he might be considered negligent if the nerve was
damaged through the first two methods.

Only Dr. Doty was in a

position to know how the nerve was damaged, and he testified that
he had no way of knowing how the damage actually occurred.

He

understandably opined, however, that he believed it occurred in
a non-negligent fashion.
Where the verdict of the jury was thus dependent upon the
jury adopting the defendants speculation as to the cause of the
injury, it cannot be said that the error in limiting jury voir
dire was harmless, especially in view of the fact that the entire
jury deliberations in a lengthy trial with more than seventy
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exhibits were only 20 minutes.

Plaintiff is entitled to a new

trial before an impartial jury,
POINT II
THE VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE AND PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.
The granting of a new trial based on sufficiency-of-theevidence grounds represents an issue of fact. Therefore, in this
circumstance, the trial court is vested with "some" discretionary
powers, and the appellate court should "reverse only when that
discretion is abused."

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah

1988). The general rule is that the reviewing Court "will presume
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised
unless the record

clearly

shows the contrary."

Goddard v.

Hictafian. 685 p.2d 530, 534 (Utah 1984) (quoting State Road Commission v. General Oil Co., 22 Utah 2d 60# 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719
(1968)(emphasis added).

Furthermore, an appellate court will

reverse if "it is reasonably convinced by the court record that
the trial judge's ruling probably amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice." Worthinaton v. Bvnum, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d
599, 603 (1982).
In determining whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice or whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial on an insufficiency-of-theevidence challenge, the. Court must review the evidence "in the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed [at trial]. . .
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."

If the Court concludes that "the evidence is insufficient to

support the verdict," the Court must reverse. Hansen 761 P.2d at
17.

The moving party carries the burden of proof and "must

marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict" and then show
that the evidence cannot support the verdict. Price-Orem Inv. Co,
v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986).
A review of the record shows that on direct examination the
defendant and his expert admitted that the recurrent laryngeal
nerve was damaged during the surgical procedure performed by
defendant Doty.

(Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p. 23; tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p.

25) . This conclusion was based on the fact that Corinne had no
pre-operative symptoms which would indicate damage to the nerve
had already occurred.

(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 79).

Defendants

expert witness, William Gay, testified that he believed the most
likely explanation for the cause of injury was that "in mobilizing
the tissues from around the ductus, the stretch was put on the
nerve and the nerve was damaged in that way."

(Tr. vol. 5 (Gay)

p. 23.)
After reviewing a treatise which he co-authored, Dr. Gay
further testified that damage to the recurrent laryngeal nerve was
one of the more frequently occurring complications in a patent
ductus procedure.

He testified that blunt trauma, which he

characterized as caused by "putting traction on the nerve" during
the

surgical

procedure,

paralysis of the nerve.

would

occasionally

cause

temporary

However, Dr Gay further testified that
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he had never conducted a patent ductus surgery in which blunt
trauma had caused permanent nerve paralysis.

When questioned

about whether it was possible for blunt trauma to cause permanent
paralysis, he stated that he was "certain that it could.11

(Tr.

vol. 5 (Gay) p. 25-26.)
On cross examination, Dr. Gay again testified that in his
years of experience, he had never seen permanent paralysis caused
by blunt trauma to the laryngeal nerve.
29).

(Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p.

When questioned on why, then, he believed that blunt trauma

was the cause of Corinnefs*paralysis, Dr. Gay stated that he was
relying on recorded reports.
additional

evidence

of

any

(Tr. vol. 5 (Gay) p.
reports

or

specific

29).

incidents

No
of

permanent paralysis caused by blunt trauma to the nerve were
entered into evidence.
Defendant himself testified that there were three possible
ways by which permanent damage to the laryngeal nerve could occur.
The three ways are as follows:
(1)

The

nerve

could

have

been

severed

by

an

operative

instrument during the surgical procedure;
(2)

The

nerve

could

have been

ligated

with

the

patent

ductus; or
(3)

The tension and pressure on the nerve itself could have

traumatized the nerve severely enough to cause permanent damage.
(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) pp. 83-34).
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By

the

defendant's

own

admission,

the

first

two

causes—severing or ligating the nerve—might be negligent.

(Tr.

vol. 2 (Doty) p. 84.) The third cause—blunt trauma severe enough
to cause permanent paralysis—would be the only non-negligent way
the injury could have been sustained.

Notwithstanding his self-

serving opinion, the defendant proffered no specific evidence or
cases to establish that blunt traumatization of the recurrent
laryngeal nerve during patent ductus surgery had ever caused
permanent paralysis in other patients.
Defendant was identified as an author of a treatise and one
of the authorities on this type of surgery.

His text and others

described the fact that the laryngeal nerve should be identified
and isolated from the area prior to ligation of the ductus, and
extra care should be taken to make sure the nerve is not involved
or damaged in the surgery.

(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty) p. 19, 21, 24.)

Notwithstanding this fact, defendant's operative report fails to
document that the laryngeal nerve was identified or isolated by
the defendant.

(Trial Ex. 9-P, attached in Appendix "B".)

Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Robert A. Achtel, testified
that failure to identify and/or isolate the laryngeal nerve is
negligent.

Dr. Achtel was cross-examined by defendant's counsel

regarding an article in the Journal of American
Cardiology that

referred

College of

to two patients who suffered

left

recurrent laryngeal nerve paralysis in association with pulmonary
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arteriohypertension.
these cases.

There was no surgery involved in either of

These were the only documented

or identified

references by any expert to laryngeal nerve damage not caused by
nerve severage damage or ligation during surgery.

Dr. Achtel

pointed out that these individuals were 37 and 57 years of age
respectively. He further testified that he had never seen a child
with a recurrent laryngeal injury caused by internal compression
or trauma, (Tr. vol. 6 (Achtel) p. 46-47), and that it was unfair
"to compare apples to oranges;

a 57-year-old woman is not the

same as a little girl."
In summary, both expert witnesses and the defendant himself,
agreed that although it was hypothetically possible that blunt
trauma or compression to the recurrent laryngeal nerve could cause
temporary and perhaps permanent paralysis, none of the witnesses-even with their many years of experience and authorships—could
identify even one case of which they had knowledge where such an
o

injury had been the result of patent ductus surgery. Furthermore,
although there was testimony by defendants expert that he had
read reports which led him to conclude that the paralysis could
be caused by unavoidable trauma and not by a negligent severing
or ligating

of the nerve, there was no supporting

evidence

proffered, nor was there even one case cited as an example.
The great weight of the evidence compels the conclusion that
Dr. Doty was negligent in his treatment of Corinne.

The only

theory upon which the jury could have found in favor of the
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defendant—the blunt trauma or compression theory—was clearly
against the weight of the evidence and required the jury to
improperly speculate as to the cause of the paralysis.

When the

evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding of vital
fact—in

this

case, that

Corinnefs paralysis was caused by

compression or trauma—or the verdict is so against the great
weight and preponderance of evidence as to be manifestly unjust,
the jury verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered.
Malone & Hvde, Inc. v. Hobrecht. 685 S.W. 2d 739 (Tex. App. 1985).
Because H[t]he district court

f

has the power and duty to

order a new trial whenever . . . the action is required in order
to prevent injustice,l,f Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Company. 863
F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) citing 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller,

Federal

Practice

and

Procedure.

2805;

See

also

Worthinoton. 290 S.E.2d at 605, and because injustice was created
by the jury verdict in favor of defendant Doty, the Court abused
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial.
A.

The trial court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's

motion for J.N.O.V.
Although

M

a trial court has some discretion in deciding

whether or not to grant a new trial . . . [a] trial court has no
latitude in passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v.; its decision must
be correct."

Hansen 761 P.2d at 17. Therefore, failure to grant

a motion for j.n.o.v. in a case where such an action is clearly
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warranted constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial
court.
The standard of review is the same for j.n.o.v. as for a new.
trial.

The Court must review the evidence "in the light most

favorable to the party who prevailed [at trial] • • • ••• If the
Court concludes that "the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict," the Court must disregard the jury verdict*

Hansen. 761

P.2d at 17. See also King v, Feredav, 739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah
1987) ; Price-Orem Inv. Co, v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.. 713
P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986).

The Court should "consider whether

anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any
combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party."
McNamar v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1989).

However, the

inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be based on probabilities rather than possibilities and cannot be the result of
mere speculation • and conjecture.

McNamar, 546 N.E.2d at 141;

Tavlor v. Keith O'Brien. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975).

Thus, a

j.n.o.v. ruling is justified when the evidence so overwhelmingly
preponderates in favor of the movant that reasonable persons could
not arrive at a different conclusion.

Anderson v. Gribble. 30

Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973) . See also Southwestern Stationery
& Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp,, 624 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.
1980).
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In applying these judgment n.o.v. standards to the present
case, there is clearly insufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict.

As stated above, there was undisputed expert testimony

that permanent nerve damage, such as that sustained by Corinne,
was consistent with litigation or severance of the left recurrent
laryngeal nerve*

All experts agreed that these two probable

causes of the injury were breaches of the standard of care.
The third possibility—that the permanent paralysis of the
vocal chord resulted from trauma or tension placed on the nerve
during the patent ductus surgery—was so remote that for the jury
to base its verdict on this theory required prohibited speculation
and

conjecture.

Although

the

experts

agreed

that

it was

hypothetically possible for such an injury to occur, none of the
experts could refer to a single case in which blunt trauma resulted in permanent nerve damage.

Defendant testified that the

injury occurred during the operation, that it had to have been the
result of some type of manipulation, that he was the only one who
knew what took place in the operation, and yet he had no explanation for what happened to damage the nerve.

(Tr. vol. 2 (Doty)

p. 27.) As such, the jury verdict was based on possibilities and
conjecture and not upon probabilities as required.

See McNamar,

546 N.E.2d 139; and Tavlor. 537 P.2d 1022.
In short, the evidence in plaintiff Corinnefs favor on the
issue of liability was so overwhelmingly preponderant that a
judgment for Corinne was the only reasonable conclusion that could
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have been reached.

Therefore, the trial court erred in failing

to grant judgment n.o.v.
B.

The haste in which the jury made its decision was

evidence of a casual and nondeliberative process which brings into
the Question the validity of the verdict.
The trial in this case extended over four days. Seventy-two
exhibits (R. 154) and 27 instructions (R. 200-30) were submitted
to the jury.

The jury was cautioned to not make a hasty decision.

(R. 228) , but nonetheless returned with a verdict after only 20
minutes1 absence from the courtroom.
Plaintiff acknowledges that brief jury deliberation may not
always, in itself, be a sufficient basis to support a new trial
motion.

Under the circumstances of this case, however, "where

brief jury deliberation is coupled with a verdict that is contrary
to the great of the evidence . . • it creates a situation where
the district court has an affirmative duty to set aside the
verdict.11 Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co.. 863 F.2d 177, 182 (1st
Cir. 1988) (citing Borras v, Sea-Land Services. Inc.. 586 F.2d
881, 887 (1st Cir. 1978)).
Brief

jury

deliberation

can

indicate

consideration of all issues in the case.

a

lack

of

full

In Kenan v. Moore, 142

Fla. 489, 195 So. 167 (1940), a simple (uncomplex) negligence suit
against a railroad company, the court found that "the record as
a whole indicates that the jury could not in sixteen minutes have
duly considered the evidence adduced and the charges of the court
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under the issues of the case," Jd, at 169. In the present case,
the jury verdict was clearly against the great weight of the
evidence.

There were over 70 exhibits in the case and yet the

jury deliberated less than 20 minutes.

The jury could not have

duly considered the evidence.
In Turner v. Cotham, 361 Mich. 198, 105 N.W.2d 237 (I960),
the trial court granted a j.n.o.v. based on the short deliberation
time

of the

conclusions

jury.

The jury

in Turner

had

as to the fault of the defendant

reached

their

in the guest

passenger action against the host, but were having difficulty
determining an appropriate amount for damages. The jury returned
to the courtroom for court instruction regarding the measure of
damages.

At that time, plaintifffs attorney suggested a §17.700

figure to the jury.

After deliberating only fpijr minutes, the

jury returned with a damage verdict of $17,700,

In granting the

j.n.o.v., the trial court found that "[tJTiis action by jury shows
conclusively that the jury either did not understand or did not
give any attention to the charge of the court regarding the
damages to be awarded.

The defendant was entitled to have tn£

jury give deliberate consideration to the amount of the damages
This certainly was not done.11

that the plaintiff sustained.
Turner. 105 N.W.2d at 237.

A similar occurrence arose in the present case. The jury was
dismissed for deliberation at the end of the trial.
to

Plaintiff's

objections

for
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failure

to

give

In response
one

jury

instruction, the jury was again brought into the court room for
a supplemental instruction.

(R. closing remarks, p. 52.)

The

jury returned to its deliberation and returned in less than twenty
minutes to submit its verdict for the defendant. It is clear that
the jury did not give deliberate consideration to the issues at
bar.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff should be granted a new trial because she did not
receive a fair trial in the first instance. The absence of a fair
trial is evident from the combination of (a) an improper and
restrictive voir dire and jury empaneling process, (b) a verdict
clearly against the weight of the evidence and based upon conjecture and speculation and (c) a jury deliberation of only twenty
minutes•
DATED this

day of June, 1990.

JACKSON HOWARD,
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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COVER STORY

Sorry, Your Policy
Is Canceled
Those dread words echo with numbingfrequency in an America
well on the way to insuring itselfto a silly, shuddering halt

TIME MARCH 24 1986

O

n the Hawaiian island of Molokai pregnant women who
want a doctor in attendance
when they give birth fly to
neighboring Oahu or Maui
The fj\e Molokai doctors who once delivered babies have stopped doing so because
malpractice insurance would cost them
more than the total of any obstetrical fees
they could hope to collect
Will County 111. last week closed its
forest preserves untiJ it can get a new liability policy on them—if that can be
done at all—and Blue Lake Calif (pop
1200) has shut us skating rmk parks and
tennis court Hundreds of other towns in
California and in New York State are
"•going bare That is they simply cannot
get liability insurance
The Texas sesquicentenrual cattle
dnve part of the state s celebration of 150
years of independence from Mexico
bogged down this month after one day on
the road because liability insurance covering the 49 longhorn steers that were involved was doubled and the organizers
could not afford it The dnve resumed last
Fnday with onJy 28 steers whose owners
agreed to pay for the insurance themselves
Century Cartage Co a small truck
line out of Atlanta is still in business only

rate increase for its customers But that
boost came nowhere near meeting the
cost of babihtv-insurance premiums that
doubled to S48 000 last vear and then
leaped to SI 14 000 at the start of 1986
Outrageous 1 Yes Ridiculous 1 In
many cases Unreasonable1 Certainly
And yet the examples represent just a
small sampling from a nstng flood of
problems growing out of what has become
a new national ensis Given the litigious
nature of American society these days
just about any kind of business profession
or government ageno is likely to become
the target of a sun alleging malpractice or
negligence resulting in personal injury
That makes liability insurance the kind
that pavs off on such claims just about as
vital as oil in keeping the economy functioning But in the past two vears liability
insurance has become the kind of resource thai oil *as in the 1970s prohibitively expensive when it can be bought at
all The result is a pinch from which few
can escape—not even liability specialists
like J B Spence or Robert Rearden
Spence a Miami lavever is the kind of
attorney insurers often blame for their
troubles He has *on and earned a
healthv slice of several multimiHion-dol-

sued for malpractice or negligence as is
happening to lawyers more and moie he
would have to pay any coun-ordered
damages out of his ou n pocket There is
no market that will sell me uabilm insurance " says Spence I am going bare and
it is a frightening prospect
Rearden president of Duncan Peek
Inc an Atlanta insurance brokerage
earns commissions selling policies at soaring premium rates But *hen the time
came to renew his own professional Lability pobcy his earner wanted to jack up his
S13 000 premium bv 8610 *o SI23 000
Rearden had to scramble to rind another
company that *ould onh triple his premium cost 'And that s me and I m in the
insurance business' wails Rearden
"That s what I mean *hcn I sa> this crisis
is affecting everybod)
nd how After years of eye
popping damage awards and
shonsigh ted insura nee -com pany practices the US is in
danger of ha\mg its insurance
canceled The cost of this ensis once gen
erally hidden is now hitting home The
S9 1 billion Americans paid last vear in i»abiliiv-msurance premiums was almost
6 0 0 higher than the Dgure as reuenfK as

A

and Space Administration and the Central intelligence Agency. This years total
is sure to show another giant leap.
Every American pays: doctors and
their patients, ski-slope operators and
their patrons, municipal governments
and their taxpayers, those who process
cheese and those who eat pizza, those who
take the bus and those who lease private
jets, those who drill for oil and those who
heat their homes.

Even more insidiously, the problem
threatens the very character of American
life, from the Great Peace March across
the VS. <which came apart last week in
the Mojave Desen. partly because of a
lack of liability coverage) to police patrols
in New York's suburban Rockland County (suspended last week in the towns of
Pienmont and Sloatsburg; 13 officers have
been told to sit at headquarters' desks
while the towns look for a liability insurer
to replace one that has gone into receivership). Factory owners seeking to expand,
entrepreneurs seeking to launch new enterprises, young businessmen seeking to
set up shop: all are running into an obstacle far harder to surmount than high taxes
and interest rates in their pursuit of the
American dream. Liability insurance has
become their most crippling cost.
As a result, doctors have been marching on state capitols. some threatening to
shut down their practices. Industry
groups and insurance companies have
launched loud lobbying and advertising
campaigns. Bills have been introduced or
passed in all 50 state legislatures to limit
liability awards or regulate insurance
practices or both. Congress has held public hearings. But federal and state law*
makers, who have been faced with cutting
through a jungle of conflicting statistics,
arcane accounting practices and tangled
legal theory, have mostly come out baffled. Says South Dakota Republican Senator Larry Presslen "We have not been
able to get past the finger-pointing stage."
Consumer groups point to the insurance companies. When interest rates were
high, they say. insurers wrote policies
with little concern about how they would
make good if claims went up and returns
on their investments went down. Insurers
point to the legal system. Juries, they say.
have been handing out punitive damage
awards that resemble lottery jackpois.

Risky business, life,
Always has been.
But is it
more so these days?
Must be. The horror
stories go on and
on and on...

Lawyers point to the negligence of Big
Business It can be redressed, they say.
only if individuals have a nght to present
their cases to a jury Businessmen point to
changing altitudes. The individualistic
notion of taking risks and accepting responsibility, they say, has been replaced
by a sue-everyone-in-sight reaction to any
accident. What makes the problem such a
nightmare is that, to some extent, all of
the finger pointers have a point.

W

hat it finally boils down
to is a matter of statistical
logic and insurer psychology If a few giant
jury awards, actual or
merely possible, can offset the premiums
on an entire line of insurance, the companies feel they must raise premiums for everybody until there is some hope of making a profit. This means that premiums
may bear no relationship to an individual
policyholders record, and buyers of many
kinds of insurance are suddenly paying
three or four tunes as much as they did a
year or so earlier. Of all places. Hartford.
Conn., known as the insurance capital of
the world because so many earners have
their headquarters there, sa* its own municipal liability coverage slashed to only
$4 million, vs. S31 million in the 1984-85
fiscal year, despite a 20ft nse in total premiums, to S1.8 million.
Some insurers are shying away from
covering certain types of nsks at any
price. If there is no way of figuring what
kind of damages a jury might award to the
parents of a child molested at a day-care
center, for example, then the companies
will find it best to stop writing that kind of
insurance at all. Says James Wood, a
member of a firm of actuaries whose
headquarters are in Atlanta: **If you are
an insurer and have S 100.000 in assets, do
you want to risk those assets to keep day-

Lacrossed Up
As one of only two U.S. makers
of lacrosse equipment, William
H. Brine of Milford, Mass., lets
customers know how to place
reorders by priming his company's phone number on the back
of each helmet. Now the helmets carry another message: a warning that lacrosse is a
dangerous game. In 1984, Brine (photo) paid S8.000 annually forS25 million worth of product-liability insurance. In
December, he received notice that his premium was going
up to S200,000 for just $1 million of protection. Brine is
taking his chances uninsured. "If we have a large judgment against us/* he says, "it could be the end of
lacrosse/*
Other sporting-goods manufacturers face similar dilemmas: many VS. firms have decided to abandon the
manufacture of amateur hockey gear.

Nation
care centers open'* The ansurance problems hav e
swer is probably no. because
plagued lawyers, engineers
you do noi know what you
members of corporate
have to charge when you do
boards and even clergymen
not know what the ultimate
A growing number of clerics
costs of providing coverage
are buying, or having then
nugh: be." Most insurers
churches buy, policies t0
flatly refuse to wnte policies
protect them against suju
to protect companies against
like the one brought by a
suits arising from injuries
California couple who a\.
caused by environmental
tnbuted the suicide of their
pollution. They say they
24-year-old son largely to inept counseling by his pashave no way of gauging the
tors. (That particular suit,
nsk. That complicates furfiled in 1980. was dismissed
thei the question of who will
for a second tune last year,
pay for cleaning up toxicthe case is still being apwaste dumps.
pealed.) Suits against docThe dubious distinction
tors, particularly specialists
of paying the highest increase
such as obstetricians and
on record may belong to Speneurosurgeons, have been
cialty Systems Inc.. a Richmore successful and have led
mond. Ind.. company that
to some of the highest insurspecializes in removing asance premiums. A typicai
bestos from buildings Insurannual premium for an obers are so terrified of any- Manufacturers massing to urge product-liability reform on Capitol HHI
stetrician in Los Angeles is
thing having to do with "There are going to be people who are dumb and stupid."
about S45.000. and for a neuasbestos that they canceled
Specialty's policies three times between boxes). Among the most prominent are rosurgeon in Long Island. N.Y., about
November 1984 and last April, though the those that involve municipal services. $83,000.
nine-year-old company has never been The city council of Blue Island. 111. (pop.
Product-liability insurance presents a
sued. Because customers demand proof of 22.000), last October voted down a 30% major problem for the makers of everyinsurance before they will give Specialty increase in property taxes thought neces- thing from toys to antitoxins. Pertussis
any business, the company wound up buy- sary to pay rocketing liability-insurance vaccine for children ran short a year ago
ing a S500.000 policy from the Great premiums, and the town expects to self- because Connaught Laboratories susAmerican Insurance Co. of Cincinnati, on insure for the 1986-87 fiscal year, taking a pended production for a nine-month periwhich it will pay at least S460.000-in pre- chance that a large judgment might force od during which it could not find insurmiums, an increase of more than 4.900^ taxes up anyway. Five counties in Missou- ance at an acceptable pnee Now Lederle
over the S9.361 premium on its last full- ri closed their jails for several weeks last La bora tones, the only other maker of the
year policy. Says Specialty President Fred- fall, sending some prisoners elsewhere for vaccine, is talking of halting output in
erick Tread way: "About half a million dol- incarceration and releasing minor offend- July if a threatened cutoff of its liability
lars paid to the insurance company for ers outright. The jails reopened after the insurance materializes. Beech Aircraft
counties' sheriffs set up a self-insurance figures the cost of liability premiums at a
virtually nothing.*'
The situation is studded with an end- pool, which was financed by tax money.
stunnong S80.000 on each plane it sells.
Among professionals, malpractice in- Says William Mellon, director of corpoless variety of similar horror stones (see

Strung Out

Bad Trip

When New York City's Roosevelt Island was opened for residential development nearly eleven years ago, pan of its allure was
a tramway that would soon connect the community to midtown
Manhattan in six scenic minutes.
That lifeline was cut last month when the tram's liability premium soared from S800,000 to nearly S9 million a year. Operators shut down the system, forcing some 5250 islanders
to spend up to an hour commuting on buses and subways.
After two weeks. New York State assumed responsibility for the tramway under a "self-insurance" plan that is
increasingly becoming the solution of last resort for municipal services. Many legislators, however, are dubious
about forcing governments to enter the insurance business. Meanwhile^the little tram that couldn't, now can—at
least until somebody sues.

For sponsor PROpeace, the antinuclear Great Peace March between Los Angeles and Washington turned out to be a
movable flop, beset by celebrity
no-shows, cold weather and a
lack of funds that last week
caused the project's collapse. One major headache was the
inability to obtain a S5 million liability policy required by
some municipalities along the marchers' route. Because
they lacked such coverage, 900 or so PROpeaceniks were
denied the use of a schoolyard in Claremont, Calif., where
they had planned to camp their third night on the road
Sponsors of public events ranging from San Francisco's Chinese New Year festival to Maine's Fryeburg country fair have aJso run into trouble securing liability coverage. The main reason: the unpredictable nature of claims
made by audience members, onlookers and participants.

There is one area Of* genraie communications: "The
eral agreement about what
owner-pilot markei has all
has caused the insurance cribui dried up. and one cause
sis: plain old-fashioned
is the cost of product liabilgreed. Ah. bui whose greed?
ity It has driven the price of
Insurers and some of
a new airplane out of the
their customers blame agreach of the average person
gressive lawyers, inventive
who wants to buy one."
judges and soft-hearted JuSome commercial fishing
nes for twisting legal conboats that once sailed out of
cepts of negligence into novPacific Northwestern pons
el shapes to justify excessive
have been put into dry dock
damage awards to people
because owners could not afwho claim personal injury la
ford liability-insurance preton in legal parlancei Avamiums thai commonly have
ricious lawyers they argue,
doubled in the past year
seek outrageously high damor so.
ages for clients who have
Rising premiums are
flimsy cases, so that the lawforcing up prices on a variyers can reap huge continety of services too. Ski-lift
gency fees (if the case fails
tickets are jumping by S2 or
the plaintiffs attorney earns
S3 at many resorts. Through
nothing, bui if it succeeds he
last year Kennestone Hospicommonly takes one-third
tal in Manetia. Ga.. insured
and. on occasion, as much as
itself for the first SI million
50^ of theauardj Says Edof any claims that might be
ward Levy, general manager
made and paid a premium of
of the Association of CaliforS70.000 for additional cover- Workers dismantling playground equipment on Chicago's Northwest Side
nia Insurance Companies:
age up to a maximum of S10 Says the insurer: "Park districts are a tembie nsk/or any earner."
"Lawyers are out to make a
million. Now the premium
has quintupled to S350.000. and on top of canceling liability policies or demanding buck, and they seem to have little concern
that ihe hospital has had to come up with giant premiums. Mission Insurance for the overall societal effects of what they
another SI million for its self-insurance Group, the chief provider of coverage for are doing."
trust fund, because the deductible was day-care centers, abruptly pulled out of
Plaintiffs' attorneys are every bit as
raised to S2 million. Says Executive Di- the business last year. The handful of in- willing to point the finger. Insurance comrector Bernard Brown: "If you come to surers that will suil write day-care policies panies, they charge, are using deceptive
our hospital, you pay the price. It is being insist either on specifically excluding tales of excessive damage awards to justipassed through."
claims for damages arising from sexual fy the exorbitant premiums that they
Day-care centers, which have become abuse or setting up rules for strict supervi- charge the public. Says Browne Greene,
an essential pan of American life in an sion, such as unannounced visits by spe- president-elect of the California Trial
era of two-career families, are a striking cial investigators. Says Suzanne Grace, Lawyers Association: "Theu greed takes
example of how the insurance crunch associate director of the Georgia Day us back to the robber barons of the 19th
may soon affect the lives of many unwary Care Association: "The insurers are tell- century." Many consumer organizauons
citizens. Operators fume that allegations ing us. *We don't care what your record add that insurers are seeking unjustified
of child abuse at a handful of centers have is.' This business has the perceived risk of premium hikes to cover up theu- own bad
management and poor judgment of nsks.
spooked insurers into indiscriminately killing an insurance company."

City Halt

Overboard

Insurance woes have made for a
sorry spectacle in the Northern
California seaside village of
Point Arena (pop. 450). When its
S2 million liability policy expired
in July, village officials decided
to take the chance of going without coverage. A new policy was eventually offered, but at
50% more than the old rate of S6,700. Point Arena declined. Says Tracy Du Pont (photo): "We would be broke."
Fearing personal vulnerability in litigation against the
town, Du Pont's predecessor Kay Spack resigned in August. The town council voted to install wry signs at town
limits warning visitors to "enter at your own risk," but
abandoned the plan when a motel owner threatened to
sue. Less wry is the prediction of some experts that twothirds of California's 440 towns and cities will be forced to
operate without liability insurance by next July.

When the board of Detroit's Armada Corp. meets these days,
the directors could easily fit into
a subcompact car—never mind
a limo. The company, which
produces automotive exhaust
systems, had carried S10 million
in liability coverage for its ten-member board and 28 corporate officers. Last November it was notified that the rate
would increase from S45.000 a year to S720.000. Armada
refused to pay. Fearing exposure to litigation, eight board
members, including Chairman Jerry D. Luptak (photo),
resigned last month. (Luptak remained as president.)
Vice President Lowell Robinson could not recruit
more than two new directors. Says he: "It's getting very
difficult to find qualified people." The number of lawsuits
filed against directors of VS. corporations, by some estimates, has climbed by more than 150% since 1974.
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Nation
Americans have always been a litigious people. Bui there does seem to be a
nse in the number and size of liabilitv
suits facing every type of company, from
soccer-ball makers to cigarette manufacturers. From 1977 to 1981, the number of
civil lawsuits in state courts grew four
times as fast as the population of the U.S.
And in the decade between 1974 and
1984. the number of product-liability suits
in federal courts expanded 680%. The
first million-dollar verdict did not occur
until 1962. but there were 401 in 1984. according to Jury Verdict Research Inc., a
private group. The average verdict in
product-liability cases now tops SI million: preliminary figures for 1985 indicate
that the average verdict in medical malpractice cases also exceeded S1 million for
the first time. These giant awards, insurers say. exert an influence out of proportion to their numbers. They set a target for
plaintiffs and their attorneys to shoot for.
and move defendants to offer high out-ofcourt settlements rather than take a
chance on what a jury might do.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America counters by arguing that the
Jury Verdict Research figures on averages
are distorted by a relatively small number
of huge verdicts. In addition, they say. the
figures count only the initial outcomes of
trials that the plaintiffs won. If defendant
victories, out-of-court settlements and
verdicts reduced on appeal were factored
in. say the lawyers, even the avenge level
of awards would be much lower. ATLA asserts that more than two-thirds of the million-dollar awards compensate victims or
relatives for genuinely serious injuries,
such as death or permanent paralysis, reflecting a laudable determination by juries to see that companies pay the pnee
for misdeeds that once went unpunished.
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In some cases, people are successfully
pressing claims that seem patently silly.
One example: a man who attempted suicide by jumping in front of a subway
train sued the New York City Transit Authority, contending that the motorman of
the subway that hit him had been negligently slow in bringing the train to a
halt. He won S650.000 in an out-of-court
settlement.
Yet much of the lore surrounding the
subject has been exaggerated. ATLA analyzed several cases that insurers regularly
trot out to prove that the system has got
out of hand and found that the facts did
not quite support the versions that have
passed into insurance folklore and public
print, although one or two. even after correction, still sound odd. Some examples:
• According to one frequently cited tale,
a body builder competing in a footrace
with a refrigerator strapped to his back

m*Mi%

Six out of every ten babies born
in Rhode Island draw their first
breath in the Women & Infants'
Hospital of Providence, a 102year-old institution that handles
only obstetrical and gynecological cases. The facility also takes
high-risk cases from nearby hospitals, a practice not calculated to attract insurance salesmen. Women &. Infants' has
managed to hold on to a S3 million primary malpractice
policy, but it has been trying vainly since last October to
renew its S10 million supplemental coverage.
No field in medicine has been harder hit by the insurance crisis than obstetrics. According to the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 73% of its
24,500 members have been sued for malpractice at least
once. To escape the soaring cost of malpractice protection, some 3,000 ob-gyns have abandoned the specialty.

was injured when one of the straps came
loose: he sued several defendants, including the strapmaker. and won Si million.
The facts, according to the lawyers
group: ten athletes competed in a televised stunt race, each with a 400-lb. refrigerator strapped to his back: each received a written contract guaranteeing
that the equipment had been tested for
safety. Franco Colombo, a world-champion body builder, did fall and suffered total
knee displacement that required extensive surgery. At the tnal. testimony
showed that the equipment had never
been tested on anyone of Columbo's size
while running (he is 5 ft. 7 in., much
smaller than anyone else in the race). In
fact, the engineer for the fitness center
that developed the contest said that he
had warned the organizer. Trans World
International, that the whole race was unsafe. Columbo did win slightly less than
SI million from Trans World, but the
strapmaker was not sued because the
strap never broke.
• Another tale allegedly involves a fat
man with a history of coronary disease
who suffered a heart attack while trying
to s u n a Sears lawn mower, sued Sean
and the manufacturer, contending that
too much force was required to pull the
rope, and won SI,750.000 The real story,
the trial lawyers point out. is that a 32year-old doctor, who had no history of
bean trouble, fell victim to a heart attack
after futilely yanking the lawn mower's
starter cord 15 times. A Philadelphia jury
found that the mowers exhaust valve
failed to meet the manufacturer's own
specifications, hindering stan-up to the
extent that the rope indeed had to be
pulled with excessive force. The jury did
award SI,750.000. but the case was subsequently settled for an undisclosed amount.

Crying Shame
The Edith B. Jackson child-care
program operates seven daycare homes, a nursery school
and toddler center for some 45
children in New Haven. Conn.
Affiliated with Yale University,
the widely recognized project
has not incurred a single insurance claim in 13 years in
business. Yet last year the program's liability coverage was
canceled, and the only substitute policy available, for
S2,400, is six times the 1984 premium and specifically excludes coverage for child abuse.
Co-Director Judy Silverman (left in photo) charges
that underwriters are unduly skittish about day care because of a few widely publicized child-abuse cases. But
even she is worrie± *We try to be very careful," she says,
"but I am uneasy. If a case of abuse came up and we were
sued, my co-director and I could be held responsible."

Nation
• Another oft-u*ed example is of two
Maryland men who supposedly put a hotair balloon into a commercial laundry
dryer The machine exploded injuring
both men. who won S885.000 from the
maker of the dryer What actually happened is that the men took the balloon to
a hospital that had laundry equipment designed for industrial purposes The dryer
vibrated violently and then exploded
Both men were injured, one required microsurgery to reattach his hand which
was almost severed The dryers maker
had a patent on a device that would have
stopped the dryer automatically if it began to vibrate excessively but had declined to install the device on the dryer
because of the cost Oddly in this case the
actual award. SI.260.000 exceeded the
figure usually quoted but the lawyers
point out that the common account of the
case ignores the dryer manufacturer s failure to install the protective device
• In yet another celebrated case, a burglar supposedly fell through the skylight
of a school, sued and was awarded
S260.000. plus S 1.500 a month. The full
story, it seems, is that a 19-year-old man
and three friends tried to take a floodlight
orTthe roof of a California high school as a
lark, he fell through the skylight and suffered loss of the use of all four limbs, plus
severe brain damage. The skylight bad
been painted the same color as the roof
and was indistinguishable at night, the
school district knew that it was dangerous
because someone else had been killed falling through a similar skylight at another
school six months earlier, and had scheduled the skyhght for repainting It settled
out of court for S260.000. plus Si.200 a
month initially, to be increased by 3 ^
each year. Still, it seems debatable whether someone should be so generously com-
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pensated for injuries, even that severe,
sustained while committing a theft
Yet whatever the merits of these and
other specinc cases, the insurance companies are correct in their basic contention
an evolution in liability law has led to
higher jury awards and is at least partly
responsible for the nse in insurance rates
One important change* the amounts assessed by junes to compensate for lost
wages, medical payments and the like
now make up a small pan of many liability awards Junes are increasingly likely
to add on far larger amounts for noneconomic damages, that is. for such unquantifiable things as pain and suffering.
Equally significant is the growing size
of punitive damages, which supposedly
serve the same purpose as a dont-everdo-anything-like-that-again fine of the
defendant. Junes sometimes find that a
person s actual damages amounted to

only a few thousand dollars yet decide '
that the corporation at fault should also
pay punitive damages in the millions In
one stanling case now awaiting decision
by the US Supreme Coun. an Alabama
couple sued Aetna Life SL Casually Co..
claiming that it had wrongfully refused to
pay S 1.650 of the wiles hospital bill A
jury awarded them punitive damages of
S3.5 million, or 2.121 times the size of the
disputed bill
Couns and legislatures have steadily
expanded definitions of who can be sued,
and on what grounds These days you usually can sue cits hail, despite the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which holds that
governments cannot be sued without their
consent State laws, and coun interpretations of them, have granted that consent
more and more
Another legal concept being used ever
more widely is that of stnet liability,
which makes possible an award of damages without an> proof of negligence Iniually it was applied, for example, to businesses conducting abnormally dangerous
activities Now it has been expanded to
product-liability cases, a plaintiff need
not prove that the manufacturer of a
product was negligent, only that the
plaintiff was injured while using the product in the manner intended.
More states have also adopted looser
standards of comparative negligence
Even if an accident was panly due to the
plamufTs own negligence, he can successfully sue someone else who also bears
some of the biame. In California, for example, a woman who stumbled in a
church parking lot on the way to a meeting sued the church, the group holding the
meeting and the city, contending that the
lot was not lit well enough Although the
defendants felt she was largely responsi-

Truck Stop

Sawed Off

Tom Leonard's Miami-based
trucking firm, founded bv his
grandfather in 1919. was besieged in recent years b> afleetof
problems, includmgsharptax increases and pnee competition.
The company (1984 sales: S21
million) managed to work around all of them but one: finding the S5 million in liability insurance it was required to
carry. Because many Leonard trucks hauled pans of the
apace shuttle, rockets and other explosives, underwaters
kept hiking rates, limiting coverage and finally refusing to
provide sufficient insurance at any pnee. When his coverage expired last July, Leonard simply shut down.
Insurance is scarce for earners of any hazardous materials, especially if flammable or toxic. "Companies used to
w rue us up with no problem/' says Leonard. "But when
rates changed, we may as well have been child molesters."

The saws, lathes and other
woodworking equipment manufactured by the Oliver Machinery Co. of Grand Rapids are designed to last for years. That sign
of good workmanship is anathema to insurers, who shun hazardous products that can lead to lawsuits over long periods.
"A machine may be 50 or 60 years old, been through a
number of owners." says Company President Dana Baldwin. "But if someone gets hurt on it, we will get sued."
Largely because of that exposure, Oliver's product-liability
premium quadrupled this year, from S72,000 to S282,000.
Oliver swallowed its rate hike, but others cannot; 34 of
the 113 members of the Wood Machinery Manufacturers
of America have left the business. In their place arc small,
single-product companies that do not have the same long
insurance "tail" that often gets caught in lawsuits.

Nation
ble. ail three agreed 10a settlement paving
insurance] 1
her $80,000.
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Perhaps the thorniest concept, one
Dai«mC£ SIKH?
that has become a growing factor in many
. In millions of dollars.
21
cases, is called "joim and several liabilpretax 1
ity.** It allows a plaintiff to sue everyone
11
who might share in the responsibility for
Profits
Iron
an accident, and if any one of the defen15
JB
dants is found to be partially at fault, that
I
defendant may be forced to pay the entire
12
*• ~i
judgment. Originally, it was applied to
f
wrongdoers who had acted in concert, but
*j
*
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now is more often invoked against defendants who acted independently. In prac- i £
tice, it increasingly means that awards fall
J
most heavily on the defendant with "deep
M>(
pockets." often the one carrying the most
i
insurance. The doctrine is now in force in
0
nearly all states.
i i
1
One way to show how these concepts -3
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insurance coverage—is through a classic
1
case settled last year that began with a responsibility for the accident fell on
child's fall and ended with most of Chica- Frank's mother: she allowed the boy to go
go's parks being stripped of certain kinds on a slide he was too young to use. and
of playground equipment. It began in should have been watching him more
1978 *hen two-year-old Frank Nelson closely. But they never formally accused
fell through a wide space at the top of a the mother of negligence in pretrial proslice in a city playground and struck his ceedings: such an argument would not
head on the pavement 11 ft. below. He have succeeded unless they also could
suffered severe brain damage: the left side have convinced a jury that the park disof his body is still paralyzed, and his trict bore no blame whatever. In this case
speech and vision are impaired. Nelson's the park district was the defendant with
family sued the manufacturer of the slide, the deep pockets— S50 million in liability
the contractor who installed it and the insurance—and Fidelity was afraid that it
Chicago Park District. Lawyers contend- would be hit with the largest share of any
ed that the district had been negligent in judgment. Paul Jacob, the insurer's Chifailing to warn against use of the slide by cago branch manager, notes that in Illismall children, in not providing proper nois a defendant who is found to bear any
supervision of the playground and not part of the responsibility for an accident
putting a softer surface under the slide.
can be liable for all of a damage award.
Officials of the park district and its in- Says he: "Showing that any defendant is
surer. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. of not \9c negligent is virtually impossible."
Baltimore, still contend that the primary
Unwilling to risk paying the damages
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a jury might award 10 a child who had
been so severely injured. Fidelity offered a
settlement. It proposed to put up $1.5 million to buy an annuity that will make payments each year to Frank Nelson for the
rest of his life. The family accepted, and
the case was closed without tnal.
But that is not quite the end of the story. Fidelity at first canceled the park district's insurance, but eventually renewed
for much less coverage at a greatly increased premium. "Park districts are a
terrible nsk for any earner to have to assume." explains Jacob. Finally, the park
district, gun-shy because several suits are
still pending against it. began tearing
down all jungle gyms and slides over 61/:
ft. high and caning them out of the city s
513 playgrounds. "Accidents happen no
matter what you do." says Park Dtstnc;
Treasurer Jack Matthews. "In the past,
when Johnny fell off the swings, the park
superintendent took him to the hospital,
and that was the end of it. Nov. the parks
are inundated with suits."
Such cases show how complex and
changing legal doctrines can increase the
nsks faced by insurance companies and
make those risks more unpredictable. But.
as consumer advocates point out. they do
not explain the full story. The legal doctrines in question have been evolving for
many years. The nse in the number of
personal-injury lawsuits and the size of
jury awards has also been gradual. But
apart from medical malpractice insurance, which has been a headache for both
doctors and insurers for at least a decade,
it is only in the past two years that liability
premiums have exploded and policies
have been canceled wholesale.
What happened0 Lawyers and consumer activists charge that insurers are
paying the price—or. rather, trying to

Stiff Drinks

Hung Up

From 5 to 6 p.m., the price of a
Heineken beer at the Red Blazer
restaurant in Concord. N.H..
was S14.75 instead of the usual
S2.25, and a Beefeater's martini
cost S40. Inflation? Son of. The
Red Blazer and some 400 other
New Hampshire bars sponsored an Unhappy Hour last
month to dramatize the rising cost of liability insurance for
liquor retailers. The restaurant's premium had been hiked
from SL000 to S12.000 annually, and its owner hoisted bar
tabs in protest. As courts have held tavern owners at least
partly responsible for damage caused by intoxicated customers, retail liquor outlets have felt the squeeze from insurance companies. But Unhappy Hour prices are not likely
to become permanent: New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner Louis Bergeron argues that( higher premiums
have actually raised bar costs no more than 18c a dnnk.

When a late-winter storm
1
£
dumped nearly 100 in. of snow
on California's Sierra Nevada
k 1 'S
range near Lake Tahoe in March
'* i^^l^^0v .^1
1982, operators of the Alpine
mr |
Meadows ski area closed down
7
their 13 lifts and warned guests
not to venture onto the slopes. When an avalanche struck.
however, it did not bury the ski trails but the parking lot and a
ski-patrol building, killingseven people. The familiesof three
victims sued Alpine Meadows for S10 million in damages.
Last December a jury decided that the reson was not responsible for the tragedy. Nevertheless, Alpine Meadows
did not emerge unscathed: legal fees for the trial totaled some
S700.000, and the resort's 1986 liability premium doubled, to
nearly S800,000. Like other businesses hit with major cost increases. Alpine Meadows passed on the added expense. It
raised the price of a one-day lift ticket from S24 to S26.
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make me puonc pay the price—for their
own mismanagement and bad judgment.
Liability uisurance has always been a notoriously cyclical industry. Says Robert
Hunter, head of the National Insurance
Consumer Organization: "At the lop of
the cycle you write {policies fori everybody, no matter how bad. and at the bottom you cancel everybody, no matter how
good. Its a manic-depressive cycle."
Harsh words, but again containing
some truth. In the best of times, property
and casualty insurers, the kind that issue
liability policies, rarely make much money on underwriting: the premiums collected have exceeded claims paid in only two
of the past ten years. Most of their profits
come from investing the premiums they
collect. Five years ago. when the prime
rate, keystone of the VS. interest-rate
structure, hit an incredible high of 21 lArc.
such investments paid off very, very well.
Insurers grudgingly concede that they
went all out to attract premium income
that could be invested at those towering
interest rates. They wrote liability policies
that posed a high nsk at premiums low
enough to almost guarantee an underwriting loss: competitive rate-cutting slashed
seme premiums by 20rc or more. But the
insurers never got the bonanza they expected. Underwriting losses rose faster
than investment income grew even when
interest rates were at their peak.
Then the bottom fell out. Interest
rates began tumbling in 1981: the prime is
now at an eight-year low of 9**. Underwriting losses ballooned. Foreign reinsurers—Lloyd's of London is the biggestthai indemnify most American casualty
companies against extraordinary losses.
cut back sharply or ran away from the
business entirely, leaving the American
firms to shoulder the losses alone. Finally,
in 1984 underwriting losses swallowed up
investment income entirely and. according to industry statistics, property-casualty insurers suffered an overall pretax loss
of S3.8 billion. It was the first red-ink figure in nine years. In 1985 the pretax loss
increased to 55.5 billion. Some 40 liability
insurers have become insolvent in the
past two years.

L

ike the figures on jury verdicts,
the insurers' profit-and-loss statistics are in sharp dispute. Consumer advocates insist that if adjustments are made for some
quirks in insurance accounting (primarily
involving the treatment of taxes, dividends and the rising paper value of investments), the industry made a net profit every year. The Insurance Information
Institute, indeed, has acknowledged an
industry profit after taxes of SI.7 billion
last year, which it contends still amounts
to a poor return.
The National Insurance Consumer
Organization maintains that the true figure was S3 billion.Given that, the industry's critics argue, the premium increases
now being posted go far beyond what is
justified Sneers Gerry Spencc. a famed
Wyoming trial lawyer (no relation to MiIME. MARCH M !¥*<>

In the Pool
any Americans have experienced
the insurance crisis only at second
M
hand, in the form of rising prices for

j
! goods and services ranging from ski! lift tickets to medical care. When in| sunng their homes and cars, most consumers for once have largely escaped
the cost crunch. Liability coverage for
drivers and homeowners has risen an
average of only 7Vi% annually since
j 1980. about the same as inflation. Says
Sean Mooney. chief economist for the
industry-supported Insurance Inforj maiion Institute: "Personal-liability
premiums haven't taken a quantum
leap, and I don't expect them to."
Behind this stability is a basic principle of underwriting: the larger the
pool of premium payers, the less the
shared risk. Out of 131 million VS. car
owners. 90% carry at least some liability protection, creating a kitty of $49
billion in 1985 against $40 billion in
claims. Similarly, 55 million VS.
homeowners paid S15 billion in premiums last year to offset SI 1.6 billion in
claims. This huge pool of consumers
also makes risk much more predictI able—and therefore rates lower—than
for narrower lines of insurance. Autoi mobile-accident law is relatively well
established, leaving juries with few op! ponunities to award damages wildly
J out of line from similar cases.
j
Personal-liability insurers can still
I be jarred by novel rulings. In 1984 the
j New Jersey Supreme Court held that
homeowners, like saloon keepers, are
responsible for accidents caused by intoxicated guests. So far. the ruling has
had no effect on insurance rates.
I though companies warn that further
j widening of homeowner liability could
eventually increase premiums.
j
Nor do all consumers feel that perj sonal liability rates are being shared
j equitably: eight California plaintiffs
j have filed suit seeking to overturn the
I states 1984 mandatory automobile inj surance law. claiming that policy writers charge excessive rates to residents
of high-nsk neighborhoods, usually in
inner dues, even if applicants have
spotless driving histories. While the
I case is pending. California authorities
j have slopped enforcing the mandatory-coverage statute, which had re1
duced the state's 1.9 million uninsured
vehicles by more than half

ami's J B Spencer. "What the insurance
companies have done is to reverse the
business so that the public at large insures
the insurance companies." Consumensts
often point to the judgment of Wall Street,
hardly a Naderue stronghold. Stock traders bid up the price of property-casualty
insurance shares an average of about 50?f
last year, in the apparent belief that the
industry at minimum is on its way back to
solid profitability.
Well, maybe. But that road to recovery threatens, at least for the moment, to
cnpple large segments of the U S economy and be extremely costly for every
policyholder, taxpayer and consumer Every day brings word of new repercussions:
doctors raising their fees, playgrounds
closing, swimming meets being called off.
transit systems facing financial jolts, fraternities having their coverage canceled.
oil-field service companies closing down.
Amid all of the attendant finger pointing.
a serious search is under way for some
solutions.
elf-insurance is a strategy that
many businesses, professional
people and governments are
exploring (or. more often, being
forced into). But the experience
j of doctors indicates it is not much of a so' lution. In the mid-1970s, doctors organized a number of companies, promptly
dubbed "bedpan mutuals." to write mal[ practice insurance at lower premiums.
j But several of the bedpan mutuals are said
to be in financial trouble, and as a group
! they too are raising premiums rapidly.
I Going bare is an act of desperation: busiI ness executives and professionals who are
I operating without insurance almost unanimously voice deep worry that a single big
lawsuit could wipe them out.
As might be expected, many are seeking new legislation as a solution. But what
line should it take? One approach is called
ton reform, which involves putting limns
I on damage awards in malpractice, negligence and personal-injury cases Advocates insist that this will allow insurers to
get enough of a handle on their potential
nsks to make writing liability policies a
predictable exercise rather than a crapshoot. The leading ideas:
• Put limits on pain-and-suffenng
awards and punitive damages Republican Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky has introduced a congressional bill
encouraging states to cap pam-and-suffenng awards at S 100.000 and to require
that punitive damages be paid to a coun.
as outright fines are. rather than to a
plaintiff and his or her attorney
• Establish stricter standards for proving
who really bears how much of the blame
for an accident or injury. Senator John
Danfonh. a Missouri Republican, is sponsoring a bill that would set uniform federal standards in product-liability cases to
replace the present morass of 50 often
conflicting state laws, it would require a
plaintiff to prove negligence or fault by
! the manufacturer
:
• Either Abolish the doctrine of joint and

S
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several liability or revise it along the lines
of a proposition that Californians will put
to a vote on June 3 The proposition would
make a defendant's share of any painand-suffenng award proportionate to the
defendant's degree of blame; a defendant
found 10 bear 2 5 ^ , say. of ihe responsibility for an accident or injury could be
forced to pay no more than 2 5 ^ of the
damages. That would be more equitable,
but requiring juries to assess proportionate shares of fault among several defendants would add to the complexity of law.
suits and the tune needed to settle them.
• Limit contingency fees, so that lawvers would have less incentive to ,
seek outsize damages for their
clients. Several states are pondering variations on a California law
that sets up a sliding scale in
medical malpractice cases: an attorney can take up to 40/7 of the
first S50.000 of a judgment, but
that share dwindles by stages to
only lOQ of any amount over
5200.000.
• Institute some son of punishment, perhaps a fine, for attorned *; who file frivolous suits. At
minimum, reformers often urge
adoption of the European system.
under which the loser of a lawsuit
usually pays the winner's court
costs.
This last idea has yet to gain
much ground, but different combinauons of the others are being
advanced in several states. The
National Conference of State
Legislatures estimates that
around 1.200 bills have been introduced since last December
dealing with the insurance crisis
in one way or another, and most
contain some sort of ton reform.
On the federal level, besides the
McConncU and Dan forth proposals, a
Reagan Administration study group
headed by Assistant Attorney General
Richard Wiliard is expected to recommend a bill limiting pain-and-suffering
awards and punitive damages: it would
also establish tighter standards for gauging fault to govern suits in federal courts.
(Uncle Sam has more than a bystander's
interest: the VS. was a defendant in more
than 10.000 damage suits in fiscal 1985.
and wound up paying S200 million to
plaintiffs.)
Some 600 members of the National
Association of Manufacturers descended
on Washington last week to lobby for the
Danfonh bill, which besides setting national standards for product-liability suits
would establish a new procedure for
speedy out-of-coun settlement of claims
for economic damages. They first gathered at the Marnott Hotel to swap horror
stories and pep talks. Under present legal
rules, "you re afraid to try anything, put
any new product on the market.'* cned
Gust Headbloom. president of Michigan s
Apex Broach & Machinery Co Peter J.
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Nord. president of Schauer Manufacturing Corp. in Cincinnati, which makes battery-charging machines, drew loud applause by declaring. "There are going to
be people who are dumb and stupid and
screw up no matter what we do." Ohio
Democratic Congressman Thomas Luken showed up to cheer on the manufacturers. Said he: "Probably no recent issue
has snow balled so quickly."
After eating paper-bag lunches, the
manufacturers boarded buses to Capitol
Hill to buttonhole legislators from their
home states. So many Michiganders
packed into the office of Democratic Sen-

ator Carl Levin that several of the businessmen had to perch on upended attache
cases. Levin warned them that "the whole
spirit of Congress is to get away from regulation." but promised to take a careful
look at the Danfonh bill. Plaintiffs* attorneys, needless to say. oppose all ton-reform plans. They commonly accuse insurers of creating a sense of ensis to enact
laws that would deny just compensation
to victims of malpractice or injury. More
troubling, they insist that all the ton-reform ideas would undermine a fundamental pnnciple of democracy: the idea that
any citizen should have unrestneted access to the courts for redress of any gnevances he might suffer. Roben Ha bush,
president of the Association of Trial Lawyers, says of the ton-reform movement.
"In my 25 years in law. this is as serious a
threat to the civil justice system as I have
ever seen. People have decided there is
going to be a hanging, and it is just a question of what tree and what rope."
In all probability, that senously overstates the case Present and farther tnal
lawyers populate state legislatures and

Congress in numbers large enough to
wield formidable blocking power. There
is a question, too. of whether the courts
would uphold any senous tort reforms
that might be enacted. One omen, the
Cook County. III., circuit coun last year
ruled that major pans of a newly enacted
law stretching out damage awards in
medical malpractice cases violated the IIlinois constitution.
The alternative legislative approach
to the insurance crisis is tighter regulation
of insurance companies At the federal
level, tnal lawyers and consumer advocates are pressing for repeal of the insurance industry s exemption from
antitrust laws. That exemption
allows insurers to share information and. according to their opponents, engage in collusive premium-setting policies that would be
illegal in any other industry. In
state legislatures, many proposed
bills wouid enlarge the authority
of insurance commissioners to
block arbitrary policy cancellations and gargantuan premium
increases.. The Florida depanment of insurance has wntten a
proposed bill that would require
insurers to disclose what discounts and surcharges they apply
to premium rates. Without that
information, says Insurance
Commissioner Bill Gunter, "the
rate itself is meaningless." He
adds. "We think insurers need
someone to look over their shoulder and keep them honest."
One mildly encouraging sign
is that a growing number of legislators seem to recognize that, just
as the crisis has no single cause, it
cannot have any single solution.
They are proposing various combinations of tighter insurance
regulation and ton reform. A bill on the
verge of enactment by the Minnesota legislature would set up "joint underwriting
associations** to issue liability policies,
written by the state, to customers who
could not get commercial insurance: any
losses would be picked up jointly by the
state's insurers. But to limit those losses,
the bill also would restnet punitive damages, among other ton reforms.
Some combination of measures seems
needed, and fast. Anything thai affects
matters ranging from the pace of oil exploration to the availability of slides in
Chicago playgrounds must be taken very
seriously. The nation, once proud of its
frontier individualism, has gradually
adopted a no-risk mentality based on the
belief that if anything bad happens, someone should be made to pay. But as damage
awards lose any connection to actual
damages and insurance com pa rues flail
around anxiously, that someone is turning
out to be everyone. —By G+ocfe J. Church
Reported by Am ConsUbb/WMSiwtfton. &
ftltss*// LisvM/AtimU
md Michsei Riley/
,Lo% Angeles
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PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS:
POSTOPERATIVE DIACNQSIS:

Patent ductus arteriosus
Same

PROCEDURE:

Ligation of patent ductus arteriosus

SURGEON:
ASSISrj&T:

D. Docy, H.D.
C. Barry. H.D.

FINDINGS AT SURCERY:

The l e f t p l e u r a l space was occluded w i t h dense
adhesions from previous intrapleural infections.
There was a large patent ductus arteriosus which was three-quarters the diameter of
the descending thoracic aorta. .
DETAILS:

A lateral thoracotomy incision was made on che
left side. The chest was entered through the
bed of the nonresecced 4th rib. We could see that there were dense adhesions between
the parietal and visceral pleura. We therefore carried our dissection in che extrapleural plane which was nearly avascular down to the upper portion of the descending
thoracic aorta. The ductus arteriosus was identified and freed from the surrounding
mediastinal tissues. It was iouhly.ligated with 2*0 silk. A 020 Argyle catheter was
placed in the extrapleural space for drainage purposes. The periosteum of the fourth
rib was reapproximated with interrupted mattress stitch of 2*0 Vicryl. The muscle
f a s c i a l layers were closed with a running stitch of 3*0 Vicryl. The subcutaneous
tissue was closed similarly. The skin was closed with a running stitch of 4*0 PDS
suture. The patient tolerated the procedure well and was returned to the ICU in
satisfactory condition.

D. DOTY, K.D.
DD/ml
D: 03/30/84
T: 04/03/84
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CORINNE EVANS, by and through
her guardians ad litem
J. BLAKE EVANS and
DONALEE J. EVANS,

Case No. 900132-CA

Plaintiff- Appellant,
Oral Argument Priority 16
vs.
DR. DONALD B. DOTY,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE JURY VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE
DAVID H. EPPERSON
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
JACKSON HOWARD,
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P. O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the trial court improperly restrict voir dire of the

prospective jurors concerning possible "tort reform" bias; and
even assuming that the judge did improperly restrict such, was it
harmless error?
II.

Did the trial court improperly deny Appellants' motion

for a new trial, or, alternatively, for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, based on insufficiency of the evidence?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case. This is a medical malpractice

action relating to the surgical repair, by cardio-thoracic
surgeon, Dr. Donald B. Doty of Salt Lake City, of a patent ductus
defect in the heart of a two year old infant with downs
syndrome.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.

A

complaint in this action was filed on November 4, 1986.
Respondent timely filed an answer, and the case was set for jury
trial on May 9, 1989, with the Honorable John Rokich presiding.
On May 9, 1989, the potential jurors were subjected to an
extensive voir dire examination by Judge Rokich and the jury was
selected after two hours of questioning.

The jurors were each

given personal copies of the trial exhibits which they kept in a
binder throughout trial.

Following the instructions and closing

remarks, the jury retired to deliberate. Appellant's Counsel
then asked the court to recall the jury and to add a paragraph to
an instruction which had been deleted earlier by the court at the
- 1 -

request of appellants' counsel. This paragraph stated that it
was no defense for a physician in a malpractice claim that he
-did the best he could."

The court noted that it had only been

stricken based upon appellants' own demands, and the court and
counsel for respondent agreed to a recall of the jury for that
addition.

After the jury was recalled and instructed, they

returned to deliberate.

(Tr. Vol. 8, p. 51.) After a total

deliberation time of 33 minutes, the jury returned a unanimous
verdict in favor of respondent, Dr. Donald Doty.

The jury was

then polled, and each juror confirmed this independent and
unanimous decision.

(Tr. Vol. 8, p. 858); (R. p. 262-63.)

A

formal judgment on the verdict was entered on May 25, 1989.
Appellant

filed a motion for new trial or J.N.O.V., which, after

full briefing and oral argument, was denied by the court by
minute entry dated August 17, 1989.

In denying this motion the

court found that -there was substantial evidence to support their
verdict.-

(R. p. 326, see Add. A.)

on September 12, 1989.

(R. p. 327-30.)

of Appeal on October 12, 1989.
C.

A formal order was entered
Appellant filed a Notice

(R. p. 331-32.)

Statement Of Facts. Appellant, Corinne Evans was born

January 6, 1982, six weeks premature, and suffering from downs
syndrome and a yet to be diagnosed heart defect known as patent
ductus arteriosus.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 5.)

At approximately 18

months of age she was hospitalized for three weeks in October and
November of 1983 at American Fork Hospital with severe pneumonia
complicated by fluid leaking out into the space between the chest
- 2 -

wall and the lung.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 7-8, Vol. 4, p. 35.) This

fluid caused the left side of the chest in the pleural or lung
space to be scarred and fibrosed, resulting in one centimeter of
thickening such that a surgical decortication or clean out was
considered but was not performed at that time.
9-10, Vol. 4, p. 36-39, Vol. 6, p. 25.)

(Tr. Vol. 3, p.

(This scarred lung space

complicated the later surgery by Respondent.)

Corinne was placed

on oxygen and was diagnosed as suffering from extreme pulmonary
hypertension.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 14.)

This causes remodeling of

blood vessels in the lung and they become fixed, and the blood
pressure cannot be dropped to normal.
3, p. 115.)
death.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 64, Vol.

This may then lead to right heart failure and

Without surgical closure of the patent ductus, appellant

would have eventually died from pulmonary hypertension.

(Tr.

Vol. 4, p. 23, Vol. 6, p. 59.)
Respondent Dr. Donald Doty, a pediatric cardio-thoracic
surgeon, was selected to operate on the appellant to correct the
patent ductus arteriosus.

Dr. Doty obtained his medical and

surgical degrees and training at Stanford University Medical
School.

He is a board certified specialist in cardio thoracic

surgery and prior to coming to Utah in 1983 to join the
Dr. Russell Nelson, Dr. Conrad Jensen and Dr. Kent Jones group,
he was on the faculty as a professor at the University of Iowa
for 11 years with 60% of his practice being pediatric cardiology
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 2-4, 30, 31.)

He had performed more than one

hundred patent ductus repairs. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 30.)
- 3 -

The surgery

was timely performed on March 30, 1984 when Appellant was two
years, two months old.

(Tr. Vol. 21, p. 22, Vol. 3, p. 23.)

All experts, including Dr. Achtel for Appellants, agreed
that the patent ductus repair itself was successful, despite a
nerve injury to one vocal cord.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 651, Vol. 3, p.

71, 126, Vol. 6, p. 59, 60, Vol. 4, p. 70.)
Appellant suffers from a low pitched voice, but it is not
distinctly abnormal.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 21.)

She appears

clinically well and has ongoing steady improvement in the left
vocal cord weakness.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 13.)

There is no evidence

that she will need additional treatment for her ductus
arteriosus or lungs.

(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 75.)

In fact, if she lived

at sea level, she would have no need for the small amount of
night time supplemental oxygen she was on at the time of trial.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 22.)
During the surgical repair of the ductus an injury occurred
to the left recurrent laxyngeal nerve which innervates one of the
two vocal cords.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 33.)

This nerve is located

right on the ductus and when the ductus is enlarged or
pressurized that distance is even closer in that individual.
(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 46, Vol. 2, p. 40.)
There are reports in the literature of patients having nerve
palsy effecting one vocal cord merely from stretching of the
nerve from the pressure of an enlaxged ductus and without
surgery.

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 46, Vol. 2, p. 40.)

- 4 -

At surgery Appellant was found to have a huge pressurized
ductus three-quarters the diameter of the descending thoracic
aorta with one quarter the size being most typical. (Tr. Vol. 2,
p. 38, 39.)
At trial each expert said it was a known complication of a
patent ductus arteriosus surgery that damage or injury to the
recurrent laryngeal nerve could occur.

(Tr. Vol. 3, p. 29, Vol.

5, p. 22, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 6, p. 46.)
Dr. Doty said because of all the prior scaring to the lung
and chest wall the recurrent laryngeal nerve in appellant's case
could not be visualized.

The recurrent laryngeal nerve is not

always able to be visualized by the surgeon.
Vol. 5, p. 67.)

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 15,

Dissection and exposure are more difficult with

previous infection.

(Tr. Vol. 4, p. 21.)

The experts said that

a bad result or injury to the nerve, does not mean there was
negligence involved with the surgery.

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 55, Vol.

3, p. 29, Vol. 4, p. 20, Vol. 5, p. 23.)
The experts agreed there were several ways this injury could
have occurred.

One way was pressure of the duct on the nerve,

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 49-50.) or pressure from the surgery itself.

Dr.

Achtel, Appellants' expert said he could not render an opinion
within a reasonable degree of medical probability as to what
injured the nerve. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 50.)
occurred by trauma alone.
necessary for injury.

Injury could have

Cutting or tying the nerve was not

(Tr. Vol. 4, p. 21.)

- 5 -

Dr. Doty and Dr. Gay testified that the nerve injury within
a reasonable degree of medical probability was caused by ordinary
pressure or stretching of the nerve in carefully reflecting the
tissues encasing the nerve away from the ductus and that there
was no breach of care on the part of Dr. Doty.

(Tr. Vol. 5, p.

22-24, Vol. 2, p. 42, 113-114.)
SUMMARY OF THK ARGUMENT
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting
voir dire questions relating to potential Htort reform" bias.
To prevail on this claim, Appellants must show both an abuse of
discretion and that the alleged abuse did not constitute harmless
error.
As Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), makes clear, the questions asked by the trial
judge, when viewed in their totality, and in context with the
remainder of voir dire, were substantively responsive to
Appellants' concerns and were more than sufficient to reveal
"tort reform" bias.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying
Appellants' motion for a new trial or for Judgment N.O.V. where
the court found "there was substantial evidence to support their
[the jury] verdict."

The testimony of Dr. William A. Gay, Jr.,

Dr. Garth Orsmond, Dr. Karl White, Dr. Robert Achtel and
Dr. Doty, provided substantial evidence as found by the court
that "the surgical procedure of reflection and peeling back the
tissue from the ductus was appropriate; that in such a procedure,
- 6 -
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT IMPROPERLY RESTRICT VOIR DIRE
OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS; AND EVEN A S S U M I N G THAT THE
JUDGE DID IMPROPERLY RESTRICT SUCH, IT W A S HARMLESS
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iiffer^p*
;

Joseph v, W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saint Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94,
348 P.2d 935, 938 (1963); see also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
120-21 (Utah 1989).
To prevail on this appeal, Appellants must show both an
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's voir dire of the
prospective jurors and that such error was not harmless.
A.

The Trial Judge Did Not Improperly Restrict Voir
Dire Of The Prospective Jurors.

Turning to the first issue of whether the trial judge abused
his discretion in his voir dire of the prospective jurors, the
Utah Court of Appeals, in addressing a similar claim "that jury
voir dire was inadequate to reveal bias related to . . . 'tort
reform'" propaganda, recently set forth the standard for such
claims of error, stating:
Rule 47(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the court to permit parties to supplement voir
dire with questions that are material and proper.
However, the court has considerable discretion to
-contain voir dire within reasonable limits.w Hornsby
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929,
932-33 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Whether that discretion
has been abused is determined from the totality of the
questioning. Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447.
Note that in determining the reasonable limits of voir dire
in these types of circumstances, judges have to balance "the
problem of selecting an impartial jury, after exposure to such
articles, against the prejudice injected into the trial by the
questioning itself . • ."

Doe, 772 P.2d at 458; see also
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^ n Ostier, supra, this court applied this standard to the
facts i if that case,, stating:
In ixeu ot the plaintiff's proposed questions, the
judge informed the venire that plaintiff's claim m a y
exceed a million dollars and asked if anyone would
object to an award of that magnitude. None did. The
judge also asked if any of the prospective jurors
believed that people should not resort to the court:;, to
settle disputes or recover damages for injuries.
A g a i n , none did. The judge followed wi th a question
9 -

asking whether any believed they were incapable of
rendering a fair and true verdict based on the
evidence. None responded affirmatively* In their
totality, and in context with the remainder of voir
dire, these questions are substantively responsive to
plaintiff's concerns and appear sufficient to reveal
"tort reform" bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 772
P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown an
abuse of discretion in the court's voir dire of
prospective jurors.
Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
In Ostler, which is the most recent Utah case on this issue,
this court found that the above quoted questions were "sufficient
to reveal 'tort reform' bias in the manner discussed in Doe."
Id.

Appellants argument in support of their position or this

issue principally relies on Doe v. Hafen.

(Brief of Appellant,

pp. 9-12.)
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, it is obvious that
the trial judge's questions, when viewed in their totality and in
context with the remainder of voir dire, were substantively
responsive to Appellants'concern of potential juror bias against
large damage awards and were more than sufficient to reveal
potential "tort reform" bias.

In lieu of Appellants' proposed

questions, Judge John A. Rokich initially stated the following:
Nowf of utmost importance to me in this trial is
that we get eight fair - and - impartial jurors. This
may be the only time these litigants get to have their
day in court/ and I'm a firm believer that those who
want to be in court have their day in court and they
are tried by eight fair - and - impartial people. And
so, keep that in mind.
Also, as you answer these questions, keep in mind the
only basis for your decision in this case, the eight of
you who are selected, is from the testimony elicited
from the mouths of people, witnesses, under oath, and
only those documents that I admit into evidence. You
- 10 -

n o t to take into consideration M M 7 ninei t.jxt. J riuemi/i
m a t t e r s t o make your decision
are

S o , w i t h that i n m i n d , your test for b e i n g fair and
impartial is whether y o u c a n s i t h e r e a n d listen t o t h e
e v i d e n c e and make y o u r decision and afford t h e s e
individuals here today as litigants a fair - a n d impartial trial. S o , that's o u r system a n d I trust
t h a t y o u will keep that in mind so w h e n these p e o p l e
leave this courtroom, regardless o f h o w t h e outcome of
t h e v e r d i c t i s , at least they know they w e r e treated
fairly and impartially by this court and b y the jurors,
(«jr. v o l

)

.••Jompt i n m 1.1! P 11 thi«

j i n l i | H r i s k e d 1,

N o w , d o a n y of y o u have a n y b e l i e f s , r e l i g i o u s or
o t h e r w i s e , which would n o t m a k e it p o s s i b l e f o r y o u t
c o m p e n s a t e a person for damages that occurred as a
r e s u l t o f conduct alleged b y t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint
h e r e ; that i s , that t h e child w a s injured as a resu It
of the surgical procedure?
1

I

. .0 stated 1

Now, many of you have heard anc
rticles, and
there have been television programs, with regard to
negligence on the part of doctors. Do any of you have
any strong feelings as a result of seeing or reading
anything about medical negligence that would make it so
that you couldn't be fair and impartial here today.
(Tr.

oJ

7, p

111 1

Lulu jurors indicated that t hey were biased,

and those -jurors were immediately removed for cause by • he crjui •
I IM" I.
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h a v e any btrange feelings about anyone bringing a lawsuit against
a doctor?

(Tr- V o x . J , y . „ w . ; None d i d . T h e jiiidqt

IM 1

stated 1
So j m y role is to instruct y o u o n t h e l a w . Since I
h a v e t o instruct y o u o n t h e law, I have t o a s k y o u ,
d e s p i t e t h e fact that y o u m a y n o t agree w i t h t h e l a w ,
are y o u willing to follow the law as instructed b y this
court? Tf not please raise your hand.
(Tr. "' tal.

"', j 1

! 'I

que s t i o n s w 1l r 1:" H S k <i 1

None did. After the above (and other)
il 11

| nin j1

a1e j :

Now, I have one or two more questions and that is,
and I mentioned this before, but will you be willing to
try this case fairly and impartially based upon the
evidence presented in this case without bias or
prejudice for or against any party? If you can't do
that, please raise your hand,
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 37.) One juror indicated that she could be
biased, and the court removed her for cause.
These questions, when viewed in their totality and in
context with the remainder of voir dire, are clearly
substantively responsive to Appellants' concerns of bias against
large damage awards and are more than sufficient to reveal
potential -tort reform- bias. These voir dire questions asked by
Judge Rokich were substantially more sufficient than those
questions, (quoted above), found sufficient on this issue in
Ostler.

See Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447. Here, Judge Rokich's

questions not only encompassed the areas referred to by the
Ostler court, they expressly referred to the tort reform
propaganda.

In fact, in expressly referring to the tort reform

propaganda, there is a strong argument that Judge Rokich went too
far in his questioning concerning potential tort reform bias and
thereby prejudiced the Respondent.

Accordingly, Appellants have

not shown an abuse of discretion in the court's voir dire of
prospective jurors.

(Note that during voir dire, exhaustive

questioning was done by Judge Rokich over a two hour period
including his substantially covering 63 proposed questions
requested by counsel for Appellant.

(R. p. 137-44.)

Appellants' argument on this issue, basically relies on the
Montana case of Borkoski v. Yost, 594 P.2d 688 (Mont. 1979).
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111 Borkoski J( ! 11" f»J ai nt ;i f; t ask.ed the Li id 1 courf, tni
permission
propaganda

to examine prospective
Id., at: 6 90.

deliberated
verdict

lasted eight day.'i; and after th*' inry

for approximately
favor

40 minutes, the jury returned

Nt* Jefendai

the Montana Supreme Cour

.;- requester

rneir xni~
voir dire

the trict, c , *

, C-JL.;.

Borkoski

line ?i :nquiry.

their analvsis

a

After the trie

committed reversible error and d e n ^ d

pursue

Lor I re 1 uoii

The district court denied this motion.

if'h e trial in linrrkoski

JJJL,

jurors concerninq

Ld

rx^~

i

beginninc

.

r

^ r r \ -.-vk
agreemer,

simply

-

w>iair.* :f: >..iui -u^

enable counse,

p- ^ ^

determine the

existence
ii

enable counsel

At

*r

:^,elligent peremptory c h a l l e n g e s "
* - • *:

Id.; see also Doe
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examination
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In the case at b a r there was no preliminary showing
of any fact that m i g h t have made relevant an inquiry
concerning bias arising out of the relationship of
verdicts and insurance premiums. Where a line of
.questioning o b v i o u s l y is going to open up prejudicial
speculation, . . . counsel must b e prepared to show the
- 13 -

l

" Q4

need which might make such an inquiry relevant, or run
the risk of an immediate mistrial. Insurance matters
should.be handled with the same safeguards. In the
case before us, counsel did not advise the court of the
existence of recent institutional advertising, or of
other current propaganda calculated to produce bias on
the part of jurors in the local co\irt. Thus there was
no occasion to open up the matter of insurance whether
innocently or with scienter. We hold that the inquiry
was improper.
Id. at 694 (quoting Johnson v. Hanson. 237 Or.l, 389 P.2d 330,
331 (1964))

(emphasis in original).

The Borkoski Court then

went on to list various factors to be considered before allowing
a line of inquiry designed to uncover such possible bias,
stating:
The holdings in these cases are important in our
resolution of the situation such as the one presented
in the instant appeal. The attorney for Borkoski did
present to the trial court evidence of recent
institutional advertising by the very insurance
companies involved in the case; advertising carried in
popular national magazines at about the time of the
drawing of the jury panel: advertising calculated to
produce bias upon the part of the jurors against
awarding large amounts of damages to personal injury
plaintiffs such as Borkoski. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that a line of inquiry
designed to uncover this possible bias should be
permitted.
Id.
Appellants in this case failed to proffer any "recent"
prejudicial advertising, only proffered a 1986 article
concerning tort reform propaganda. (See Brief of Appellants, Add.
A.)

This article was over three years old at the time of voir

dire, prejudicially emphasized "insurance," and clearly does not
meet even the Borkoski required showing of potential juror bias

- 14 -
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~f.

I lie

trial court [abused] its discretion in failing to allow plaintiff
to voir dire a juror regeirding discussions between the juror and
his wife relating to the wife's employment as an insurance
adjuster.-

There is no separate section in Appellants brief

dealing with this issue and the only treatment is tangentially
in Appellants discussion that the judge erred in his voir dire by
failing to ask appellants proposed questions concerning "tort
reform" propaganda*

(Brief of Appellant, p. 11.)

Appellants

refer to two jurors that they claim "may have been exposed to
such propaganda."

(Id.) They claim that potential juror Grice

could have been exposed because he lived with a physician.
However, this question as to potential juror Grice is moot
because he was excused for cause.

They also claim juror Kuhn

could have been exposed to such because he was married to an
employee of an insurance company.

Mrs. Kuhn actually was a

secretary (not an adjuster) to the Utah Business Insurance Trust
Company (which does not write professional liability insurance.)
(Tr. Vol. 7, p. 8) In any event, as discussed above, the voir
dire questions asked by the judge, in their totality and in
context with the remainder of voir dire, were substantively
responsive to Plaintiffs' concerns and were sufficient to reveal
"tort reform" bias. Without cause for the court to remove this
juror, appellant could have dismissed this juror with one of 3
available peremptory challenges but failed to do.

Even assuming

juror Kuhn was biased, the verdict was unanimous from all 8
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jurors suggesting there were sr ;
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Even Assuming That The Trial Judge Abused His Discretion
In His Voir Dire Of Prospective Jurors, Such Error Was
Harmless,
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O r t e g a , 383 P.2d dl 40Bi' Joseph, 348 P. 2d 418; see a l s o Verde,
770 P.2d a t 120-21

J.scretioi i ii i h 1 s
voir dire

* prospective jurors, such error was harmless because

the "tort reform" propaganda wi. Hi win m I i P I run I iff1
. .• . jpeaxs
.2d 695
unanimous

WHTI

damages, inn liability, ' Borkoski.
.L>

• cts of the case at bar r the "\nry

ound r
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amages
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Appellant rely
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-~ --.>ww>.
Tie court in Borkoski stated;

Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusions ao uc
avail Borkoski on this appeal
, , Even though accept Borkoski's arguments, it is undeniable that the
purpose of the advertisements was to reduce the amount
of damages awarded by a jury, At no poi nt is it
suggested, either by Borkoski or in the advertisements
themselves, that juries should not find a party
negligent I n the first place. The ads speak only to
- 17 -

damages, not liability. Here, the jury found defendant
doctors not liable at all. The jury did not even reach
the question of damages. In such a case, Borkoski's
arguments lose their vitality, and any error committed
must be viewed as harmless and not grounds for
reversal. Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.
Id.. at 695 (emphasis in original).
Appellants' brief appears to treat the alleged error as
though it concerned liability or whether the doctor was
negligent.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 12-13.) However, as the Utah

Court of Appeals and other courts have pointed out, such errors
concern "potential bias against large monetary awards."

Ostler,

781 P.2d at 445; see also e.g. Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59; Borkoski.
594 P.2d at 194-95.
Because the assumed error went to the issue of damages, (not
liability), and because the jury did not even reach the question
of damages, the error must be viewed as harmless and not grounds
for reversal.
Based on the above authorities and discussion, Judge Rokich
did not abuse his discretion in his voir dire at the prospective
jurors; and even assuming he did, such error was harmless.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENTING
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.
WHERE THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND "THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR VERDICT."
In denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial or for Judgment
N.O.V., the Honorable John Rokich entered the following minute
entry on August 17, 1989,;
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Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V. or New Trial
is denied, there was substantial evidence to support
their verdict,
The jury, based upon the testimony of the experts,
could and evidently did conclude that the surgical
procedure of reflection and peeling back the tissue
from the ductus was appropriate; that in such a
procedure, the nerve could be stretched to a point
which would cause the nerve to cease to function and
injury could occur" wi thout neg] igence on, the part of
the defendant.
I

)

•

•

T h u s , a c c o r d i n g t o the Judge who p r e s i d e d a t t r i a l
l o o k e d fit
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P.2d

fui

>II.J.

I "I

I.

»• . I neii,« i \ ,

lere

e v i d e n c e t u s u p p o r t t h e unanimous j u r y v e r d i c t

i n ' f a v o r of Respondent Pi

motic.

I «r.l

a mini WHO

sei.

DoiirMil !• t y ,
IULIII

i.ILL1

iiLandar d f o r r e v i e w f o r a

~ new t r i a l in P e a t s v . Commercial S e c u r i t y Bank, 745

**J

•

• uni
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A jury's verdict which is the subject of a motion
u i a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence
supporting it was completely lacking or so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust• Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 p.2d
232, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). We review the jury's
verdict in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, and accord the evidence presented and every
reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence the
same degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 :
170, 172 (Utah 1983); see Jacobsen Construction Co. v.
Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 3 0 6 , 308 fUtah
1980)
Id. at 1192.
T"l if" sl),ci!'idai',d 1 in

J, ii\ - in, in'" I in considering a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set forth in tbe case of
King v, Fereday f 739 1'. : 'd f, in (Tit.ih n « ,. ;.
i '

>iJ i

i lujjy, I.I « :our t

A i i i a I court: should grant a uu»Lion tor judgment

notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-movant party, it finds that no
competent evidence supports the verdict.

In reviewing the trial

court's determination on such an issues, this Court must apply
the same standard.-

Id, at 620.

In addition to viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the
court must accord every reasonable inference fairly drawn from
the evidence the same degree of deference.

Anderson v. Toone,

671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); see also King, 739 P.2d at 620-21.
Respondent called, as an expert witness on the standard of
caxe

Dr. William A. Gay, Jr., a board certified cardio-thoracic

surgeon who has been associated with the University of Utah
Medical Center since 1984 when he joined the heart transplant
team.

He served on the faculty at Cornell University Medical

College from 1971 through 1984 and was Professor of Surgery and
Surgeon in Chief at the New York Hospital, Cornell Medical
Center, where he did virtually all of the pediatric cardiosurgery.

(Tr. Vol. 5, p. 1-9.)

Dr. Gay testified that appellant

had a history of infectious complications in the left lung which
complicated the surgery and which made the extra pleural approach
the only viable access to the ductus in this particular instance.
(Tr. Vol. 5, p. 20-21.)

He testified it is not always possible

to identify the nerve because of the operative field and because
the nerve may be obscured by blood and by thickness of the tissue
surrounding it.

(Tr. Vol. 5, p. 15, 18.)

To not dissect out or

isolate the nerve would be a preferable technique when using an
- 20 -
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Garth Orsmond, a specialist in pediatric cardiology who

cared for appellant and who "has practiced at the Primary
I'll i Idren "'» l IlledjcaJ CenLei s m e w

I "I h testified that this nerve

injury was a o s k Unit occurs with this surgical procedure,
Vol
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JL*ldien i Hospital he has had about three or four patients who
have sustained an injury to the left recurrent laryngeal nerve.
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(Tr. Vol. 4, p. 67-68.) With Corinne, her prior bleeding into
the pleura caused scarring, fibrosis and 1 centimeter of pleural
thickening making the surgery more difficult.
36-38, 10.)

(Tr. Vol. 4, p.

Because this vocal cord nerve hooks around the

surgical area, any trauma to that area including instrumentation
could cause the injury without tying or cutting the nerve.

(Tr.

Vol. 4, p. 21.)
The deposition of Dr. Karl White, a cardio-pulmonary
specialist from Denver, Colorado, was read to the jury.

He

testified as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Epperson) And from your experience, Dr.
White, could an injury to the recurrent nerve not
necessarily involve cutting, but could involve, as you
just indicated pressure —
A. Stretching, external trauma, both could induce
that type of problem, and we have seen that numerous
times in our practice.
((Emphasis added.) (Deposition of Dr. White published to jury p.
*9.)
Appellants' only expert on the standard of care was Dr.
[Robert A. Achtel, a cardiologist from Sacramento, California.

He

has watched patent ductus repair operations being done by
surgeons, but has never personally done such a surgery.

(Tr.

Vol. 6, p. 9, 11.) The full extent of Dr. Achtel's surgical
training was six months of general surgery training in his junior
year of medical school, plus "two weeks.H (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 13.) A
cardio-thoracic surgeon such as Dr. Doty has a four year
residency in general surgery followed by a two year
specialization in cardio-thoracic surgery.
- 22 -

(Tr. Vol. 6, p. 14.)
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Because of Corinne's extensive scarring, the extra pleural
approach was required.

The ductus was observed at surgery as 3/4

the diameter of the descending thoracic aorta (one quarter being
more typical.)

The nerve could not be isolated and the

reflection technique was required.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25, 33, 38,

70.)
Finally, Dr. Doty rendered the opinion within a reasonable
degree of medical probability that his own care complied with the
standard of caxe of a reasonable and prudent cardio-thoracic
surgeon in 1984 in Utah and in the United States in performing
this operation.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 114.)

He rendered the opinion

that the ductus being large and having high blood pressure within
it, caused tension to be brought to bear on the recurrent branch
of the vegas nerve, and that during the course of meticulous and
careful separation and peeling back and reduction of the tissues
from the surface of the ductus that the nerve probably ceased to
function.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113-114.)

This evidence, together with much additional evidence in the
transcript demonstrates substantial evidence to support the jury
verdict.
Note, Appellants place emphasis on the fact that the jury
deliberations were short with lengthy exhibits.

However the

transcript will show that the jury deliberated for over 30
minutes that each juror had a personal copy of the exhibits, that
they had carefully considered the evidence for four days, and
that they had been read all jury instructions before retiring to
- 24 -

deliberate.

The jury was fully apprised of the facts and law and

the mere fact that the jury took only 33 minutes to deliberate
does not establish that they did not impartially look at the
facts or evidence submitted in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above authorities and argument, the trial judge
properly restricted voir dire of the prospective jurors and did
not abuse his discretion in denying Appellants' motion for a new
trial, or, alternatively. Judgment N.O.V.

Accordingly, the

judgment below should be affirmed.
DATED THIS

I I

day of September, 1990.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

DAVID H. EPPERSON
Attorneys for Respondent,
Dr. Donald B. Doty,
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
EVANS, CORINNE
PLAINTIFF

VS
DOTY, DONALD B. DR

CASE NUMBER 860908392 PI
DATE 08/17/89
HONORABLE JOHN A ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK MTR

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. HOWARD, JACKSON
D. ATTY. EPPERSON, DAVID H.

THE COURT NOW RULES ON THE MATTERS HERETOFORE UNDER ADVISEMENT TO WIT;
"PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOV OR NEW TRIAL IS DENIED
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY UPON WHICH
TO SUPPORT THEIR VERDICT.
THE JURY, BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERTS, COULD
AND EVIDENTLY DID CONCLUDE THAT THE SURGICAL PROCEEDURE OF REFLECTION AND PEELING BACK THE TISSUE FROM THE DUCTUS WAS APPROPRIATE; THAT IN SUCH A PROCEEDURE, THE NERVE COULD BE STRETCH
ED TO A POINT WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE NERVE TO CEASE TO FUNCTION
AND INJURY COULD OCCUR WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANT.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS OR TAX COSTS IS GRANTED IN PART, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HIS JURY FEES OF $50.00, WITNESS FEES TO WIT; $14.00
PER DAY PLUS MILEAGE AT .30 CENTS PER MILE."
DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO PREPARE THE ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
CC

JACKSON HOWARD
DAVID H. EPPERSON

tr1 1 :: 1S39
David H. Epperson, #1000
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

By

L^HtJZ3&«gL

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
CORRINE EVANS, by and through
her guardians ad litem J.
BLAKE EVANS AND DONALEE J.
EVANS,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW
TRIAL AND ORDER MODIFYING
COST AWARD TO DEFENDANT

vs.
DR. DONALD B. -DOTY,
Defendant.

Civil No:

C86-8392

Judge John A, Rokich

Plaintiff's motion for JNOV or new trial and to tax costs
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, on August 3,
1989 at 9:15 a.m.

Corrine Evans and her guardians ad litem, J.

Blake Evans and Donalee J. Evans were present and were
represented by their attorney, Jackson Howard, Esq.

Defendant

Donald B. Doty, M.D. was present and was represented by his
attorney, David H. Epperson, Esq.

The Court, having reviewed the

memoranda of fact and law filed by each party in support of their

respective positions, and the Court having heard oral argument
from counsel for each party, and the Court having taken the
matter under advisement;
And the Court having issued a written opinion on August 17,
1989 finding as follows:
The Court now rules on the matters heretofore
under advisement to wit:
"Plaintiff's motion for judgment NOV or new
trial is denied there was substantial
evidence presented to the jury upon which to
support their verdict.
The jury, based upon the testimony of the
experts, could and evidently did conclude
that the surgical procedure of reflection
and peeling back the tissue from the ductus
was appropriate; that in such a procedure,
the nerve could be stretched to a point which
would cause the nerve to cease to function
and injury could occur without negligence on
the part of the defendant.
Defendant's motion to strike memorandum of
costs and disbursements or tax costs is
granted in part, defendant is entitled to his
jury fees of $50.00, witness fees to wit;
$14.00 per day plus mileage at .30 cents per
mile."
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion
for judgment NOV or new trial is denied; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant is awarded costs to
include jury fees of $50.00, witness fees of $14.00 per day, plus
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mileage at .30 cents per mile for the appearance of Dr. Garth
Orsmond, Dr. William Gay, and Dr. Dean ZoBell.
DATED this

/ ^

day of -bntjrt&tr, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

^±1

JOHN A. ROKICH
rict Court Judge
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MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this

fS

day of August, 1989, to:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
* ••Forneys for Plaintiffs
0. Box 778
)vo, Utah 84603
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